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Synaesthesia, Hypnosis and Consciousness 
Summary 
For people with synaesthesia, a percept or concept (inducer) triggers another experience 
(concurrent) which is usually in a different modality. The concurrent is automatic, and 
in the case of certain types of synaesthesia also consistent, however the relationship 
between the inducer and concurrent is not fully understood and shall be investigated in 
this thesis from different perspectives.  
The first is using hypnosis to suggest synaesthesia-like phenomenological 
experiences to participants, and measuring behavioural responses to see whether they 
behave in a similar manner to developmental synaesthetes. Results from hypnotic; 1) 
grapheme-colour (GC) synaesthesia; 2) motion-sound synaesthesia; suggest that 
phenomenological experiences similar to developmental synaesthesia can be 
experienced by highly susceptible participants, but is not associated with the same 
behaviour as developmental synaesthetes. 
Developmental GC synaesthetes were tested to determine whether a grapheme 
presented preconsciously binds with the concurrent colour to the extent that it 
influences behaviour or evokes the phenomenology of colour. Two techniques were 
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used, gaze-contingent substitution (GCS) and continuous flash suppression (CFS). 
Using GCS, it was shown that although digits can be primed preconsciously, they don’t 
bind with their concurrent colour to influence behaviour. Nevertheless, many 
synaesthetes still experienced colours though they didn’t necessarily match the primed 
digit. CFS experiments showed that the colour of a grapheme’s concurrent, or whether 
the grapheme is presented in the correct or incorrect colour for that synaesthete, doesn’t 
influence the time for conscious perception of a grapheme, even though colour words 
presented in the correct colour are perceived faster than those in the wrong colour. 
Phenomenological differences were compared to the behavioural measures using 
questionnaires modified using factor analysis (the R-RSPA and R-ISEQ). 
Overall, inducers must be seen consciously for them to bind with the concurrent, 
and experiencing the phenomenology of synaesthesia is not sufficient to behave like a 
synaesthete.  
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CHAPTER 1: 
SYNAESTHESIA, HYPNOSIS AND CONSCIOUSNESS- OVERVIEW 
 
1.1 Introductory remarks 
1.1.1 What is synaesthesia? 
Synaesthesia is an experience where a percept or concept (inducer) triggers another 
experience (concurrent) which is usually in another modality (Grossenbacher & 
Lovelace, 2001). These pairings are not experienced by the majority of the population 
(Ward & Mattingley, 2006)  A large range of synaesthesia types have been discovered, 
and each is named by the pairing of inducer and concurrent, in that order 
(Grossenbacher & Lovelace, 2001). One of the most common types is grapheme-colour 
(GC), which has a prevalence of roughly 1 % (Simner et al., 2006). For GC 
synaesthetes, a letter, digit or grammatical symbol triggers an automatic colour 
experience (Mattingley, Rich, Yelland, & Bradshaw, 2001) which is consistent over 
time (Baron-Cohen, Harrison, Goldstein, & Wyke, 1993). Although there are some 
trends for the colour which is experienced for each grapheme, such as A is often red 
(Simner et al., 2005) in general, the colour and grapheme matching is idiosyncratic, 
each synaesthete has their own individual ‘colour palette’ (Hubbard & Ramachandran, 
2003). New types of synaesthesia are constantly being discovered, such as motion-
sound (MS) synaesthesia, where viewing motion or flashing lights causes a concurrent 
sound, which was first reported in 2008 and for which there is only one published study 
(Saenz & Koch, 2008). Synaesthesia is a fascinating experience which is connected to 
all senses, taste (Simner & Haywood, 2009; Ward & Simner, 2003), touch (Banissy, 
Cohen Kadosh, Maus, Walsh, & Ward, 2009; Banissy & Ward, 2007), sound (Ward, 
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Huckstep, & Tsakanikos, 2006), sight (Saenz & Koch, 2008; Simner et al., 2005) and 
smell (Cytowic, 1993).  
1.1.2 Why research synaesthesia? 
Synaesthesia may be a rare and poorly understood experience, but most people with 
synaesthesia enjoy being a synaesthete. Many didn’t know that it was unusual to 
experience the world as they do until accidentally finding out that others don’t, for 
example, see music, or discover synaesthesia in the media. Rather than causing 
problems, memory advantages have been measured in some areas compared to non 
synaesthetes (Rothen, Meier, & Ward, 2012). If synaesthesia is not a problem, then why 
research it? Synaesthesia binds two different percepts or concepts, and allows 
exploration of how this binding occurs. Using synaesthesia as an example, we can test 
how percept binding occurs, what neural areas are involved in this integration, why 
particular percepts are bound and not others, or what cognitive mechanisms are required 
for this binding? Synaesthesia can be used to research the development of perception 
(Baron-Cohen, 1996; Spector & Maurer, 2009) or neural pruning during normal 
development (Cohen Kadosh, Henik, & Walsh, 2009). Enhanced memory abilities 
associated with synaesthesia (Rothen et al., 2012) give potential for the development of 
new memory improvement techniques. Percepts which are not ‘real’ but nonetheless 
experienced also enable research of internally generated perception. Apart from options 
to investigate perception more generally, there is the major question of how the inducer 
triggers the concurrent? Are these two percepts linked at a neuroanatomical level? Or 
can anyone experience synaesthesia?  Does the inducer always trigger the concurrent, or 
are there limitations on the synaesthetic experience? There is therefore a wide array of 
processes which can be investigated in synaesthesia research, regarding normal and 
unusual development. 
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 This thesis aimed at expanding our understanding of the conscious experience of 
synaesthesia from three perspectives. The first was to use hypnosis to create 
synaesthesia-like experiences in people who do not naturally experience synaesthesia. 
At the time of starting this thesis, there was only one published study that created 
synaesthesia in non synaesthetes using hypnosis (Cohen Kadosh, Henik, Catena, Walsh, 
& Fuentes, 2009). In Paper 1 and Paper 2 hypnosis was used to create synaesthesia-like 
experiences in non synaesthetes, and their behaviour was measured on tests previously 
conducted on real synaesthetes. The relationship between synaesthesia phenomenology 
and behaviour could therefore be tested in non synaesthetes. 
 The second direction was to explore the phenomenology of GC synaesthetes to 
better understand the variation in this particular type of synaesthesia. Existing 
phenomenology questionnaires were tested using factor analysis to find out how the sub 
types of GC synaesthesia are related to each other and to analyse the factorial validity 
and reliability of these commonly used questionnaires. This would allow better 
classification of synaesthetes and therefore more accurate grouping of participants in 
GC experiments. 
 Finally, whether a synaesthetic inducer can bind with its colour was researched 
using two techniques which allow a grapheme to be presented without conscious 
awareness. If the pre consciously viewed grapheme can bind with its concurrent, and 
influence behavioural responses, then it would be known that synaesthesia can occur 
without conscious awareness. Furthermore, by recording phenomenology, it could be 
determined whether the conscious experience of colour can occur without a consciously 
detected grapheme. 
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 In this chapter, the literature on the possibilities for studying synaesthesia with 
hypnosis, the phenomenology of GC synaesthesia and the role of attention and 
consciousness in synaesthetic experience will be reviewed.  
1.2 Hypnosis 
1.2.1 What is hypnosis? 
Defining hypnosis is difficult, as the theories of hypnosis are so varied that 
incorporating them into one working definition poses problems (Wagstaff, 2014). 
Therefore hypnosis is generally described in terms of the process rather than a 
definition. A hypnosis session usually consists of three sections. Initially, participants 
are asked to focus intently on something particular (e.g., on the back of the participant’s 
hand) and brought into a relaxed state ready to partake in the hypnosis session and 
receive the suggestions given to them. This is the induction. The nominal “entering into 
hypnosis” is usually signalled by counting upwards to a number defined as being 
indicative of reaching hypnosis, before informing the participant that they are now 
hypnotised. There is however debate whether the induction used in hypnosis to create 
the hypnotic state is actually required for hypnosis, and comparison of the induction 
labelled as “relaxation” or “hypnosis” has found that is it the term hypnosis which 
increased the susceptibility of participants most, not the induction itself (Gandhi & 
Oakley, 2005). The main part of the hypnosis session involves making suggestions to 
the participant. The third and final section, bringing the participant back “out of 
hypnosis”, usually is counting backwards down from the maximum number reached in 
the induction, back to one.  
Instrumental hypnosis (using hypnosis as a tool to study other cognitive 
processes) can create transient symptoms similar to clinical populations, at least on the 
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surface, or unusual perceptual experiences. Cognitive processes can be manipulated in 
non-clinical participants and their impact measured (Oakley & Halligan, 2009). In this 
way, hypnosis might be a useable tool for studying synaesthetic processing in non 
synaesthetes, a question which will be asked in this thesis. In comparison, intrinsic 
hypnosis research investigates the nature of hypnosis itself. 
1.2.2 Types of suggestions 
Suggestion types can be roughly divided into motor suggestions (movements) or 
cognitive suggestions (e.g. alterations of perception). A positive suggestion adds 
something, such as making somebody’s hands move together or hallucinate a sound. 
Negative suggestions remove something, like preventing someone from lifting their 
arm, or not being able to see. Motor suggestions are often accompanied by perceived 
lack of control (Oakley & Halligan, 2009). 
 A suggestion is first given, followed possibly by some preparation time, and 
then finally the suggestion is either experienced or tested. An example would be giving 
a suggestion for an arm to become stiff so that it can’t bend (Bowers, 1998). Initially, 
the participant would be asked to raise their arm out in front of them (preparation for 
suggestion) and be told that it is very stiff like a board so that it can’t bend (suggestion) 
before being asked to try and bend it if they can (testing the suggestion). If the 
participant does not bend their arm, then they have passed the hypnotic suggestion. 
Suggestions which are tested before being brought “out of hypnosis” are hypnotic 
suggestions, those given but not tested until after being brought out of hypnosis are 
post-hypnotic suggestions. Post-hypnotic suggestions are usually triggered, such as by a 
clap of the hands.  
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 Of greatest interest for this thesis, are cognitive suggestions which can create 
hallucinations similar to synaesthetic experiences. Auditory hallucination to hear the 
song ‘Jingle Bells’ is included in the Waterloo-Stanford group scale of hypnotic 
susceptibility, form C (Bowers, 1998). Hypnotic auditory hallucinations and real sound 
activate part of the right anterior cingulate which is not active during imagined sound 
(Ahmias, 1998) further supporting the ability for high susceptible people to experience 
auditory suggestions. If auditory hallucinations can be triggered by specific stimuli, this 
provides an opportunity to create auditory concurrents and synaesthesia-like 
experiences. 
 Visual hallucinations may seem harder to imagine for most people. Although 
one can imagine an image in their mind’s eye, this is not altering the perception of an 
external visual stimulus as in GC synaesthesia. High susceptible participants (people 
who experience a range of hypnotic suggestions) have however been able to either add 
colour to a grey scale image, or drain colour from a coloured image (Kosslyn, 
Thompson, Costantini-ferrando, & Spiegel, 2000). This also corresponded to changes in 
activation in colour sensitive areas of the brain measured using positron emission 
tomography (PET). This showed an impressive ability to hypnotically change the 
perception of an external stimulus, however high susceptible participants can perform 
the add or drain colour task without hypnotic suggestion (McGeown et al., 2012). 
Suggestibility, rather than hypnosis, accounted for the changes in perception and 
activation measured using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). High 
suggestible participants do not automatically ‘slip into’ hypnosis when asked to perform 
colour alterations out of hypnosis (Mazzoni et al., 2009) however mental imagery 
abilities were not reported. The link between suggestibility and mental imagery is 
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unclear, nevertheless, colour perception can be manipulated by high susceptible 
participants and used as a tool in synaesthesia research. 
1.2.3 Individual differences in hypnotic susceptibility 
Susceptibility (also called suggestibility) to hypnosis follows a normal distribution, with 
only a minority of people being responsive to many or few suggestions, and the 
majority being responsive to some (Kihlstrom, 2013). This grouping of participants 
labels them as low (few responses), medium (some responses) or high (many responses) 
susceptibility. There is variability in how participants are grouped depending on which 
screening measure of susceptibility used (Barnes, Lynn, & Pekala, 2009). The scale 
used in this thesis is the Waterloo-Stanford group scale of hypnotic susceptibility, form 
C (Bowers, 1998). Using a 12 point scale, low would be 0-3, medium 4-8, high 9-12 
(Piccione, Hilgard, & Zimbardo, 1989) corresponding to 26.0% as low, 62.6% as 
medium and 11.4% as high susceptibility (Bowers, 1998). Motor suggestions, such as 
arm rigidity, are experienced by far more people (40-50%) than cognitive suggestions, 
such as a fly hallucination (16-23%) which are harder to evoke in participants (Barnes et 
al., 2009). Participants are therefore usually screened before taking part in hypnosis 
research so that participants of particular susceptibilities can be recruited. Susceptibility 
does however remain stable over 25 years (Piccione et al., 1989).  
Mental imagery is the ability to deliberately experience internally generated 
percepts, such as imagining the sounds of a bell, visualising a tree in the mind’s eye, or 
tasting a raspberry (Kosslyn, Behrmann, & Jeannerod, 1995). Hypnotic susceptibility is 
positively related to mental imagery (Glisky, Tataryn, & Kihlstrom, 1995) therefore to 
prevent confounds of mental imagery ability within hypnosis research, studies which 
involve positive hallucinations should record abilities across participant groups. No 
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personality traits have consistently correlated with hypnotic susceptibility 
(Nordenstrom, Council, & Meier, 2002).  
 
1.2.4 Theories of hypnosis  
There are many theories of hypnosis, each with its opposing counterpart. These can be 
grouped as state/ non-state, neurocognitive/ sociocognitive, or special process/ social-
psychological (Hasegawa & Jamieson, 2002).  
 The state theory (or special process) theory is that hypnotic behaviour is actually 
different to non-hypnotic behaviour, insofar as people are able to perform or experience 
suggestions whilst hypnotised that they wouldn’t be able to do without hypnosis 
(Spanos, 1986). The “hypnotic state” is required. Dissociation theory is a type of special 
process theory and proposes a dissociative process is required. Dissociation theory 
suggests these apparent new abilities are due to a dissociation of cognitive processing 
mechanisms (Hilgard, 1986; Woody & Bowers, 1994). Dissociation is either a sense of 
detachment, in respect to oneself or your environment, or compartmentalisation, where 
there is an impairment in a usually controllable process (Holmes et al., 2005). The state 
and special process theories are similar in that a change is required in the person for 
them to respond to the hypnotic suggestions. Some examples of proposed special 
abilities gained by participants through hypnosis are a reduction in perceived pain 
(Freeman, Barabasz, Barabasz, & Warner, 2000) or control over automatic colour word 
and font colour binding in the Stroop task (Raz, Moreno-Iñiguez, Martin, & Zhu, 2007). 
In order to test dissociation theories of hypnosis, variability in dissociation has been 
researched. Although correlational analysis between susceptibility and dissociation 
found no relationship between these (Dienes et al., 2009) this may be due to sub groups 
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within high susceptible people, one of which does experience dissociation (Terhune & 
Cardeña, 2010). Furthermore, even low dissociative high susceptible participants 
experience increased dissociation whilst hypnotised (Terhune, Cardeña, & Lindgren, 
2011). Together, the evidence for a link between hypnotisability and dissociation is 
inconsistent, but needs to be considered in hypnosis research. 
 The non-state (or social-psychological) theory hypothesises that no new 
abilities are created by the hypnosis, the participant retains actual control of their action 
and chooses to respond in the way requested by the experimenter (Spanos, 1986). 
Variations in behavioural traits are compared to susceptibility to account for the range 
in response rate such as absorption (Rainville, Hofbauer, Bushnell, Duncan, & Price, 
2002), mental imagery (Coe, St Jean, & Burger, 1980), fantasy proneness (Rhue & 
Lynn, 1989), compliance (Mazzoni et al., 2009; Raz, Kirsch, Pollard, & Nitkin-Kaner, 
2006), and expectation (Gandhi & Oakley, 2005; Kirsch, 1985).  
Neurocognitive research has been incorporated into cognitive theories of 
hypnosis, with neuroimaging investigation being used as evidence that hypnosis 
involves more than just imagining the experience (Oakley & Halligan, 2009). 
Differences in regions such as the frontal lobe (Egner, Jamieson, & Gruzelier, 2005; 
Farvolden & Woody, 2004; Gruzelier, 2006), anterior cingulate cortex (Rainville et al., 
2002) or hemispheric asymmetry (Naish, 2010) have been measured. Neuroimaging 
techniques are also used to measure differences between hypnotic and resting states 
(Horton, Crawford, Harrington, & Downs, 2004; Maquet, Faymonville, & Degueldre, 
1999; Terhune et al., 2011). Although differences are measured, it isn’t clear exactly 
how they are related to susceptibility or how they change as a result of hypnosis. 
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The sociocognitive perspective is that hypnosis is goal directed, the participant 
acts dependent on their aims, expectations and opinions in order to control their 
thoughts and behaviour (Lynn & Green, 2011) even though they don’t experience 
volition, it feels automatic and out of their control (Dienes & Perner, 2007). This is 
comparable to Hilgard’s neo-dissociation theory where responding is goal directed and 
only feels out of control, this process being described as divided consciousness 
(Hilgard, 1986).  
Another group of theories which are centred around conscious are higher order 
thought (HOT) theories which suggest that awareness of one’s mental states is required 
for consciousness (Lau & Rosenthal, 2011). If someone sat down, they could think “I 
am sitting down”. If they considered this action from a higher level first, “I am 
intending to sit down” then this would be a HOT. Cold control theory suggests hypnotic 
involuntariness is caused by performing an action without having the associated 
accurate HOT (Dienes & Perner, 2007). A person could lift their arm in response to a 
levity motor suggestion, but not have the associated HOT “I am intending to lift my 
arm” producing a feeling of loss of control over their actions. 
More recently, there have been attempts to integrate different theories to reduce 
the dichotomy of competing theories (Raz & Shapiro, 2002), for example treating 
biological and psychological aspects separately confounds their general integration 
(Hasegawa & Jamieson, 2002). Integrating the theories is a promising step into 
explaining susceptibility and changes as a response to hypnosis, but has not yet been 
achieved. 
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1.3 Hypnosis and synaesthesia 
1.3.1 Previous hypnotic synaesthesia research 
Hypnosis has been used to investigate synaesthesia in order to determine whether 
synaesthesia is due to neuroanatomical or functional differences. Initially, Cohen 
Kadosh and colleagues suggested to four high susceptible participants that the numbers 
1-6 would each evoke a specific visual colour associated to it. Digits were then 
presented in black font against a coloured background which was either the same colour 
as that hypnotically suggested to the participant (congruent) or a different colour 
(incongruent). Participants had to indicate if a grapheme was present on the background. 
They showed that participants were less accurate at indicating a grapheme’s presence 
when it was displayed against a congruent opposed to incongruent background. This 
was given as evidence of the automatic generation of the colour through post-hypnotic 
suggestion, its comparability with developmental synaesthesia, and that synaesthesia 
can be created without changes in neuroanatomy. Although interference effects were 
recorded, the interference itself was dramatically large, especially as the response of the 
only developmental synaesthete to be tested using a similar task was far less (Palmeri, 
Blake, Marois, Flanery, & Whetsell, 2002). Further to this, the task the developmental 
synaesthete completed was far more difficult, having to indicate the grid reference of a 
particular grapheme rather than simply indicate if a grapheme was present. It is 
therefore surprising that such large interference effects were created through hypnosis. 
 The large interference effects could potentially be due to demand characteristics. 
Demand characteristics occur when a participant performs as they think the 
experimenter wishes them to, for example, they will ‘hold back’ on good performance 
or try harder in certain conditions (Orne, 1962; Spanos, 1986). As this may happen 
unconsciously, the participants may have performed poorer for congruent trials as they 
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expected they should. In order to test whether hypnotic synaesthesia is comparable to 
developmental synaesthesia, demand characteristics would need to be controlled for, 
and an improvement in performance be looked for rather than an impairment. This is 
because it is easier to deliberately perform poorer than it is to perform better on a task. 
Also, as the phenomenology of the participants was not recorded in great detail by 
Cohen Kadosh et al. (2009), this would need to be known so that pure associations 
without colour phenomenology can be ruled out. 
 Furthermore, hypnotic synaesthesia can help with researching what the 
processes underlying hypnosis itself are (the intrinsic study of hypnosis). Theories of 
hypnosis can be roughly divided into those which posit hypnosis gives the subject new 
extra abilities that are not possible without hypnosis (such as reducing the perception of 
pain (Freeman et al., 2000)), and those which state hypnosis can’t create new skills (eg., 
Spanos, 1986). If the performance of high susceptible people improves on a task due to 
synaesthesia-like hallucinations so that they behave like a developmental synaesthete, it 
would provide evidence that hypnosis can create new abilities. If not, it suggests that no 
new ability has been created. 
1.4 Grapheme-colour synaesthesia phenomenology 
1.4.1 Theories of grapheme-colour synaesthesia 
There are many theories of GC synaesthesia, including both cognitive and neurological 
mechanisms. Here, some of these theories will be discussed briefly.   
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Figure 1.1. From Grossenbacher and Lovelace (2001). This diagram depicts alternative 
routes for concurrent activation from the inducer.  
 
The disinhibited feedback model suggests that feedforward activation, which has 
travelled through an area which integrates information from multiple pathways, then 
feeds back through another pathway due to insufficient disinhibition (Grossenbacher & 
Lovelace, 2001). By this model, synaesthesia is caused by activation due to the inducer 
feeding back to the concurrent neural areas due to disinhibited feedback, as seen in 
Figure 1. The cross activation hypothesis posits that, using GC synaesthesia as an 
example, extra neural connections are required between the grapheme and colour areas 
of the brain (Ramachandran & Hubbard, 2001), more precisely the visual word form 
area (VWFA) and colour area (V4) which are adjacent in the fusiform gyrus and may be 
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connected (Hubbard, Brang, & Ramachandran, 2011). The proximity of these regions, 
and the hereditability of GC synaesthesia (Baron-Cohen, Burt, Smith-Laittan, Harrison, 
& Bolton, 1996) led them to theorise cross-activation (depicted as horizontal activation 
in Figure 1) occurred between these areas, causing the GC synaesthesia. By this 
account, activation should pass directly from the inducer cortical area to the concurrent 
cortical area. Increased activation in areas associated with colour processing in response 
to graphemes by GC synaesthetes has been given as evidence for the cross-activation 
model (Hubbard, Arman, Ramachandran, & Boynton, 2005). 
The re-entrant model, a variation on the cross-activation model, suggests that 
higher level grapheme processing feeds back to both the grapheme and colour areas 
(which are specifically linked for GC synaesthesia) (Smilek, Dixon, Cudahy, & 
Merikle, 2001). The cross-activation model has recently been modified to include many 
features of the other models, becoming a lot more all-encompassing including both 
excitation and inhibition, cross-activation between areas, bottom up and top down 
processes, to form the cascaded cross-tuning (CCT) model (Hubbard et al., 2011). This 
modification was in part due to advances in understanding of letter processing, 
suggesting it is a hierarchical process of feature detection and competition between 
letters (Dehaene, Cohen, Sigman, & Vinckier, 2005).  
So why are these areas connected in the first place? One explanation is that 
everyone starts out as a synaesthete, and that through the normal pruning process these 
extra connections are removed, but that for some individuals they remain (Spector & 
Maurer, 2009). This would explain why synaesthesia runs in families, though not 
necessarily the same type (Barnett, Finucane, et al., 2008) and suggests that mutations 
in genes which control broader connectivity may account for synaesthesia (Bargary & 
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Mitchell, 2008). Research on genetic linkages to synaesthesia have already found 
promising results in coloured sequence synaesthesia (Tomson et al., 2011).  
Alternatively, synaesthesia may be purely functional without neuroanatomical 
differences. This view is supported by temporary synaesthetic type experiences which 
can be triggered by hallucinatory drugs (Luke, Friday, & Terhune, 2012) or hypnosis 
(Cohen Kadosh, Henik, Catena, et al., 2009). In this thesis, whether special 
neuroanatomy is required for synaesthesia will be tested using hypnosis. 
1.4.2 Defining projector and associator grapheme-colour synaesthesia sub types 
GC synaesthetes experience colours for letters, digits and grammatical symbols and 
although there is large variability in how they experience the colours, the 
phenomenology of their GC synaesthesia. Not only does each synaesthete have their 
own colour palette (Simner et al., 2005) for the digits they experience colour for, but 
they may not have an associated colour for every grapheme, it may only be a subset of, 
say the numbers 0-9. Although colour is the primary reported characteristic of the 
phenomenology, other properties are also reported, such as texture  (Eagleman & 
Goodale, 2009). Furthermore, they can experience the colours in different places. 
Projector GC synaesthetes see the colour either directly on the grapheme itself, whereas 
associator GC synaesthetes see the colour in their minds eye, or have more a sense of 
‘knowing’ or ‘feeling’ that a grapheme is a certain colour (Ward, Li, Salih, & Sagiv, 
2007). In order to corroborate this distinction, questionnaires have been designed to 
measure which sub type of GC synaesthesia a person has, and studies have looked for 
behavioural differences between the groups. 
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1.4.3 Grapheme-colour synaesthesia phenomenology measures 
The two main GC sub type questionnaires are the Illustrated Synaesthetic Experience 
Questionnaire (ISEQ; Skelton, Ludwig, & Mohr, 2009) and the Projector Associator 
(RSPA; Rouw & Scholte, 2007) questionnaire. The ISEQ contains a cartoon picture of a 
person viewing black graphemes on a piece of paper, and five statements, each with a 
picture to illustrate the phenomenology of that question visually (such as coloured 
letters in the mind’s eye). A seven point Likert scale is used (1 = least accurate, 7 = 
most accurate). To determine which type a synaesthete is, the mean of the three 
associator questions is subtracted from the mean of the two projector questions. A value 
of 1 or greater indicates a projector, less than 1 an associator, and around zero is 
undetermined. The RSPA contains 12 questions, answered using a five point Likert 
scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). Classification is again done by 
subtracting the mean associator from projector value (six questions of each sub factor). 
Positive values indicate a projector, negative an associator. There are limitations with 
both questionnaires, they both presume that colour phenomenology lies on a continuum 
with projector and associator being at either end of this bimodal distribution. Skelton 
and colleagues mention that two of their synaesthetes agreed with both projector and 
associator statements and labelled them as ‘undetermined’. Each questionnaire was also 
made with a very limited sample size, 12 for the ISEQ and 18 for the RSPA, which 
appears limited when attempting to investigate variability in phenomenology. Further, 
neither questionnaire has been through the usual method of validation for a new 
measure, factor analysis, which allows underlying factors to be grouped. In this thesis, 
the ISEQ and RSPA will therefore undergo factor analysis using a far larger sample to 
determine whether projector and associator phenomenology is indeed a continuum, and 
if the questionnaires themselves are internally valid and reliable. 
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1.4.4 Behavioural differences between projectors and associators 
What, if any, behavioural differences have been measured between these groups? A 
clear distinction has been measured using a synaesthetic Stroop task. Participants had to 
say out loud into a microphone, either the real colour or their synaesthetic colour, of 
graphemes presented in either a congruent or incongruent colour for that participant 
(Dixon, Smilek, & Merikle, 2004). Projectors were faster at naming their synaesthetic 
colour and associators faster for naming font colours. This double dissociation was 
given as evidence for the higher/ lower distinction of GC synaesthesia. Lower 
synaesthetes are those for whom the features of the graphemes trigger the colour, 
whereas for higher synaesthetes it is the concept of the number which has the colour 
experience (Ramachandran & Hubbard, 2001). The behavioural distinction between 
projectors and associators has been replicated (Ward et al., 2007) although exploration 
of linkages between higher characteristics and colours (dice patterns, number words, 
spatial forms and time) found no pattern between projectors and lower characteristics, 
or associators and higher characteristics. Ramachandran and Hubbard (2005) suggested 
tentatively when they conducted fMRI investigation of GC synaesthesia that projector 
(or lower) synaesthesia results from ventral pathway cross activation, and more parietal 
areas for associator (or higher) synaesthesia. The distinction has been further supported 
by increased inferior temporal connectivity in projectors (Rouw & Scholte, 2007), and 
grey matter differences between projectors (perceptual areas) and associators (memory 
areas) (Rouw & Scholte, 2010) although this doesn’t paint a completely clear picture.  
According to the CCT model of synaesthesia and the hierarchical network of 
letter detection, there should be an association between the similarity of features within 
a letter and the colour it evokes (Brang, Rouw, Ramachandran, & Coulson, 2011). 
Correlational analysis supported a relationship between letter shape and colour 
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similarity for both projectors and associators. Critically, this effect was significantly 
larger for projectors than associators, supporting the greater role of lower level feature 
analysis in projector synaesthetes (Brang et al., 2011).  
1.5 Synaesthesia, attention and consciousness 
1.5.1 Synaesthetic Stroop task 
Originally in the field of synaesthesia research, emphasis was put on measuring 
behavioural differences between synaesthetes and non synaesthetes to demonstrate that 
the phenomenon is genuine (Ward et al., 2007). In the Stroop task (Stroop, 1935) 
participants state out loud the font colour of colour words presented in the correct 
colour (eg. RED written in red ink) or incorrect colour (eg. RED written in green). 
When the colour and word don’t match RTs are longer and more errors are made, this is 
due to interference from the automatically read colour word. This task can be modified 
for a wide array of synaesthesia types. Here the stimulus is paired with either the correct 
(congruent) or an incorrect (incongruent) concurrent. If interference effects are 
measured for incongruent trials, then it can be shown that the concurrent is 
automatically paired with the inducer and actually experienced by the synaesthete. A 
variety of synaesthetic Stroop tasks have been performed, confirming the automatic 
binding and therefore the genuineness of synaesthesia (Dixon et al., 2004; Mattingley et 
al., 2001; Mattingley, Payne, & Rich, 2006; Rothen, Nikolić, et al., 2013).  Although 
this pairing, or ‘binding’ is automatic and consistent, the relationship between measured 
behavioural differences and the phenomenology of the synaesthetic experience is less 
well understood. Furthermore, it doesn’t demonstrate the level at which the colour is 
being linked with the grapheme, as colour associations rather than real colours can also 
cause interference in the Stroop task (Meier & Rothen, 2009). 
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 Studying synaesthetes is not only informative for the field of synaesthesia, it 
also helps us understand conscious perception in non-synaesthetes. As synaesthesia is 
an unusual perceptual experience, what are the differences between synaesthetes and 
non synaesthetes which cause the generation of such experiences? Can anyone have 
similar experiences under certain conditions? As there is a large range of synaesthesia 
inducer and concurrent pairings we can test theories for a variety of percepts, and 
furthermore test the individual differences of conscious experience within each of them 
(Sagiv & Frith, 2013). For example, what causes the differences between projector and 
associator synaesthetes, and are these differences common to the general non-
synaesthete population? From a personal perspective, synaesthesia is also a great 
opportunity to research unusual perceptual experiences which are actually enjoyed by 
the majority of people who experience them.  
1.5.2 Visual search tasks 
A question of interest in GC synaesthesia, is whether when looking at a page of black 
font text, each grapheme in view is coloured, or only those being attended to? As 
binding of a grapheme and its concurrent colour is automatic (Mattingley et al., 2001), 
attention levels can be manipulated to see whether the same behaviour occurs across 
levels and therefore a grapheme and colour are binding without attention.  
Several types of visual search tasks have been conducted, which are based on the 
principle that if elements within the visual array are coloured differently, this aids in the 
detection of a target (Hubbard, Arman, Ramachandran, & Boynton, 2005). If a colour 
binds with a grapheme pre attentively, it should aid in visual search. The first projector 
to be tested using a visual search task was participant C, who had to locate one of two 
possible target graphemes presented against a background either congruent or 
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incongruent with the grapheme’s concurrent, within an array of 7, 13 or 19 graphemes 
and then give its grid location on an imaginary 6 by 6 matrix (Smilek et al., 2001). C 
was slower at localising a grapheme when the background colour was congruent with 
the photism of the grapheme to be located although there was no difference between 
congruent and incongruent trial error rates. In a variation of this task synaesthete AD 
had to indicate which letter was presented (for 65 ms followed by a 100ms mask) on a 
green or red background (the colours for the two letters included, F and R) (Sagiv, Heer, 
& Robertson, 2006). Her RTs for trials when the grapheme and background colour were 
congruent were actually faster than those for incongruent backgrounds, the direct 
opposite pattern measured in C (Smilek et al., 2001). Phenomenological differences are 
suggested to account for this (Sagiv et al., 2006) and varieties of phenomenology will 
be discussed later in this chapter.  
Synaesthete WO completed a similar task, having to detect a 2 within an array of 
5’s, or an 8 within 6’s (Palmeri et al., 2002). The font style was digitised, the numbers 
were made of straight lines only and as such there was minimal difference in local 
properties. For WO, both 8 and 6 are blue and his RTs for responses (whether a target 8 
or 2 was present or not) were similar as those for the controls, but for 2’s (which are 
orange) he was faster than controls for detecting it against the 5’s (which are green for 
him). WO stated that the 2 would “pop-out” from the colour, however when the 
distractors were nonsense symbols, this advantage ceased. The authors concluded that 
attention was required for the grapheme to bind with the colour, allowing distractor 
graphemes to be identified more easily and rejected. Two GC synaesthetes (AD and CP) 
had to detect the presence or absence of an individual grapheme target (the letter L) 
either upright or inverted (note the inverted L is a nonsense symbol), and surrounded by 
T’s rotated at 180o (Sagiv et al., 2006). For synaesthetes all font was black, for controls 
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the inverted condition was black and the upright version had the L in colour (green or 
orange-mustard) as these were the synaesthete’s concurrent colours for L. A marked RT 
difference between controls viewing real colour and synaesthetes showed that the colour 
was only added after identification of the grapheme, rather than aiding in detection of it. 
Together, these studies suggest that graphemes can appear coloured to GC synaesthetes, 
but that colour is secondary to grapheme identification. Inconsistent results required 
more detailed analysis, which has since been conducted. 
To investigate whether colours aid detection of larger more complex grapheme 
arrays, an embedded-figures test was conducted where a shape made up of 6-8 
graphemes which elicit the colour red, green, blue or yellow was embedded within an 
array of distractor graphemes (for example a diamond of ‘E’s which elicit red, 
surrounded by ‘O’s which trigger blue, and ‘H’s which trigger green) (Hubbard et al., 
2005; Hubbard & Ramachandran, 2005; Ramachandran & Hubbard, 2001). Six 
synaesthetes and 120 control subjects completed this with all graphemes presented in 
black font and a further 120 control participants completed it in real colour (20 
participants per synaesthete completed it in the photism colours). The accuracy of 
synaesthetes was significantly better than controls who viewed the array in black, but 
significantly worse than those who viewed it in real colour. Colours therefore bound to 
the graphemes, but not with the efficiency of real colour. Little detail of phenomenology 
was given which would strengthen understanding of the attention and colour 
relationship. 
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Figure 1.2. Example embedded-figure stimulus (A) and how it would look if 
completely coloured (B) or coloured more in line with synaesthetes phenomenological 
reports (C). 
 
The most extensive embedded figures task study had a larger sample size (36 
synaesthetes and 36 controls) and also recorded the percentage of graphemes in the 
array which were perceived as coloured and the vividness of any colour perceived (1= 
no colour, 6 = very vivid colour) (Ward, Jonas, Dienes, & Seth, 2010). Shapes (square, 
rectangle, diamond or triangle) and distractors were made of black mirror image 2’s and 
5’s (similar to the Plameri et al. (2002) study). Figure 2 shows an example stimulus 
from this study and how it would look if it were completely, or partially, coloured. 
Ward and colleagues found synaesthetes to be significantly more accurate than control 
participants. Furthermore, they explored differences between projectors and associators, 
finding that although projectors reported experiencing colour on significantly more 
trials than associators, there was no significant difference in accuracy, percentage of 
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coloured digits within the array, or vividness of colour. The authors suggest that the 
colours helped in perceptual grouping of the graphemes, which aided in the detection of 
the embedded shape. This is in line with a perceptual grouping task conducted on two 
synaesthetes, where participants had to indicate which direction the graphemes within 
the display appeared to group (horizontal or vertical) (Ramachandran & Hubbard, 
2001). The grapheme arrays were designed such that they could be grouped in terms of 
the shape of the graphemes themselves, or theoretically for the synaesthetes, in the 
opposite direction which matched their synaesthetic concurrent. The synaesthetes chose 
the direction corresponding to their colours whereas controls were more influenced by 
the graphemes. Visual search and grapheme direction is therefore influenced by 
perceptual grouping.    
Serial visual search tasks although producing measurable differences between 
synaesthetes and controls in some studies, have not in every variation (Edquist, Rich, 
Brinkman, & Mattingley, 2006; Gheri & Baldassi, 2008). Together, these tasks 
demonstrate that synaesthetic colours can aid in perceptual grouping in ways similar to 
real colour, even though the strength of synaesthetic photisms are not necessarily as 
strong as real colour.  
1.5.3 Visual crowding 
To suppress the conscious awareness of a stimulus, crowding can be used. A stimulus is 
surrounded by visually similar flanking elements: ‘distractors’. When viewed 
peripherally, the central stimulus is summated with the crowding distractors (Faivre, 
Berthet, & Kouider, 2012), suppressing it from conscious perception. If a grapheme is 
crowded by another four graphemes to form a cross shape, identification of the central 
grapheme is improved if it is presented in a different colour to the crowding graphemes 
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(Kooi, Toet, Tripathy, & Levi, 1994). Hubbard and Ramachandran (2001) used this 
principle to test whether synaesthetic colours are triggered pre attentively. They selected 
graphemes which elicit the colours red, green, blue and yellow for each synaesthete and 
presented one grapheme surrounded by four other (same) graphemes to form a cross 
shape (Hubbard & Ramachandran, 2005). This was presented to either the left or right 
of the screen for 100ms while looking at the central fixation cross, the task being to 
indicate what the central grapheme was. Results were mixed, with three of the 
synaesthetes performing better than controls, and no difference evidenced for the other 
three. Furthermore, control participants who completed trials in which the graphemes 
font was actually coloured performed significantly better than synaesthetes. This 
suggests that for some synaesthetes the colours may occur pre attentively, but that 
synaesthetic colours are not as strong as real colours.  
This task has been replicated, except that a pattern mask was also presented for 
250ms (Ward et al., 2007) and a larger sample of 14 synaesthetes (seven projectors, 
seven associators) was tested. Although there was a general trend for projectors to be 
better at the task than associators, this difference was not significant. In an elaboration 
of this design, the relationship between behaviour and phenomenology was explored 
more fully as all seven of the projectors and one associator reported having colour 
experiences. Graphemes were instead either surrounded by four nonsense symbols, or 
three symbols and one distracting grapheme, and synaesthetes indicated whether they 
saw the grapheme and colour, saw the grapheme only, saw colour only, or saw nothing. 
Six of the projectors and one associator reported colour, and for the symbol and 
grapheme distractor version, behaviour predicted phenomenology as trials in which the 
grapheme was correctly identified were more likely to be accompanied by a colour for 
the six projectors who saw colour. However, there were also trials in which no 
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grapheme was seen, but a colour was still experienced. These results support the 
projector/ associator divide, and provide interesting investigation of the relationship 
between phenomenology and behaviour. More detail of what colours were seen would 
allow us to determine whether the colours were actually pre attentive, or occurred after 
the grapheme was identified. Furthermore, both the Hubbard et al. (2005) and Ward et 
al. (2007) studies had accuracy levels well above chance, showing that detection levels 
were relatively high and a reasonable level of attentional awareness had remained. 
1.5.4. Shifts of attention 
Phenomenological reports suggest that GC synaesthetic concurrents are experienced 
only for graphemes in the attentional window (Ward et al., 2010). This coincides with 
how local and global shifts of attention can coincide with experienced colour. WO, 
when viewing Navon numbers such as a large 5 made up of smaller 2’s, experienced the 
concurrent colour for the number (either local or global) attended to (Palmeri et al., 
2002). Similarly, manipulating the size of an attentional window alters interference 
effects (Sagiv et al., 2006). The digits 2 and 7 were presented at the screen periphery (in 
white), and 200ms later dots which are coloured the concurrent for one of the digits (as 
seen by the two synaesthetes). These are either grouped near the centre of the screen, or 
around the peripheral digits so that the attentional window either includes the irrelevant 
digits or not. Participants indicated the dots colour. When the attentional window 
included the digits, larger interference effects were measured than when attention was 
away from the digits, although the effect did not disappear entirely which the authors 
suggested may signify residual grapheme and colour binding without attention.  
 In an attentional blink task, a stimulus was presented in a string of images (Rich 
& Mattingley, 2010). Participants had to first identify the orientation of a grating 
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presented at the start of the image stream, drawing their attention. A grapheme was 
presented in the stream, either congruent or incongruent with a colour patch presented at 
the end: this had to be identified after the grating orientation. If the grapheme was 
included at the point in the stimulus stream which incurred the strongest attentional 
blink effect, the Stroop interference effect disappeared compared to if the grapheme was 
presented out with the attentional blink timeframe. This supports the need for attention 
to trigger the concurrent colour. 
By incorporating an additional task to manipulate attentional load, Mattingley, 
Payne and Rich (2006) measured manipulations from a synaesthetic Stroop task where 
participants named the colour of a target patch presented after a grapheme which was 
surrounded by a segmented diamond shape. On each side of the diamond was a gap, and 
after naming the target colour participants stated which side had the larger gap. In the 
low load task the size difference was large and therefore easy to determine, in the high 
load task the difference was minimal and harder to judge. When the colour target was 
incongruent to the grapheme concurrent for the synaesthetes, RTs were significantly 
longer than for congruent trials. Further, this effect was modulated by task load, with a 
smaller difference in RTs between congruent and incongruent RTs for the high load 
trials which demanded greater attention, than for the low load trials. Attention therefore 
appears to modulate behaviour in GC synaesthesia.  
1.5.5 Synaesthesia and awareness of the inducer 
Another associated question is whether fully attending a grapheme, but without 
conscious awareness would be enough to trigger the concurrent colour and grapheme 
binding. There is an array of evidence to show that attention is required to induce the 
colour concurrent, however the experience of colour photisms without knowledge of 
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what grapheme had been presented (Ward et al., 2007) suggests synaesthesia without 
conscious awareness. How could this occur? Can a synaesthetic inducer bind with its 
concurrent without conscious awareness? In order to test this hypothesis, behavioural 
influences would have to be measured in response to stimuli processed without 
conscious perception. Furthermore, although a participant may believe that they did not 
perceive a stimulus (subjective criterion), they may still perform better than chance. To 
demonstrate the stimulus really wasn’t perceived, they would need to perform at chance 
level during forced-choice detection (objective criterion) (Lin & He, 2009).  
To test whether conscious perception of a grapheme was required to trigger the 
concurrent, Mattingley, Rich, Yelland and Bradshaw (2001) used masking, a technique 
where a stimulus is presented for a short duration, with an irrelevant meaningless image 
presented immediately after to suppress the conscious detection of the stimulus (Faivre 
et al., 2012). They masked a grapheme and presented a coloured target in a congruent, 
incongruent or neutral colour. When the grapheme was presented for 500ms (a long 
duration and therefore consciously seen), RTs for indicating the target’s colour were 
significantly longer when the grapheme and colour patch were incongruent or neutral, 
then when the colour patch was the same as the concurrent for that synaesthete. 
However, when the graphemes were only presented for 56 or 28ms, the interference 
effects were eliminated. This was given as evidence that the grapheme does not bind 
with its concurrent pre consciously. To substantiate that it was not due to insufficient 
time for the colour to be generated, this task was repeated with a 500ms delay before the 
onset of the colour target, and the same lack of interference was measured. Furthermore, 
although grapheme identification at these durations was low, when a grapheme target 
rather than colour target was used, control participants demonstrated interference effects 
for incongruent (different prime and target graphemes) compared to congruent trials 
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(although the difference was only 21 and 7ms, respectively). Priming a grapheme may 
be possible at these short durations, but it doesn’t inform whether a connected 
experience in another modality could be triggered with this level of processing.  
Binocular rivalry (where two different images are presented, one to each eye), 
doesn’t cause images to become merged, rather they tend to alternate from one back to 
the other and so forth (Lin & He, 2009), and more rarely merges or mosaics of images 
are created causing mixed dominance (Kim, Blake, & Palmeri, 2006). Both real colour 
and synaesthetic colour cause perceptual grouping in binocular rivalry, increasing their 
conscious perception in comparison to the rival image (Kim et al., 2006). Synaesthetic 
colours can therefore increase the conscious perception of a normally consciously 
transient image. 
Bidirectionality of synaesthetic response has been demonstrated when deciding 
which in a pair of digits is larger, as when presented in colours suggesting a larger 
distance along the number line than they actually are (i.e. displaying the digits 4 and 5 
in the colours for 2 and 7) RTs are shorter than if they are presented in the correct 
colours (Cohen Kadosh et al., 2005). Colour therefore influenced the perceived 
magnitude of the number difference.  
Other techniques which can be used to investigate consciousness are gaze-
contingent crowding and continuous flash suppression which can present stimuli for 
extended periods of time without being perceived (Kouider, Berthet, & Faivre, 2011; 
Tsuchiya & Koch, 2005). These were used in this thesis to investigate whether a 
subliminally viewed grapheme would bind with its concurrent colour for GC 
synaesthetes in Paper 4 and will be described later in this paper. 
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1.6 Synaesthesia and mental imagery 
 
A link between synaesthesia and mental imagery has been suggested. Barnet and 
Newell (2008) compared synaesthetes (mainly GC synaesthetes) to non-synaesthetes 
using a questionnaire which assessed the strength of a participant’s visual imagery 
ability, the Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ; Marks & Marks, 1973). 
Synaesthetes reported significantly greater mental imagery abilities in comparison to 
non-synaesthetes (Barnett & Newell, 2008). The link between synaesthesia and mental 
imagery was strengthened in a study of abilities of spatial forms of synaesthesia where 
ordinal sequences such as days of the week, months or numbers have spatial locations. 
For example, each month would have a special location which is within the wider 
arrangement of months each with their own special spatial location. Price (2009) 
investigated the link between spatial forms of synaesthesia and mental imagery using 
two questionnaires which measure mental visual imagery, the Subjective Use of 
Imagery Scale (SUIS; Reisberg, Pearson, & Kosslyn, 2003) which measures 
spontaneous use of visual mental imagery, and the Object–Spatial Imagery 
Questionnaire (OSIQ; Blajenkova, Kozhevnikov, & Motes, 2006) which measures 
visual and spatial imagery ability. Price found that the spatial form synaesthetes 
reported significantly higher levels of visual imagery on the SUIS, and the visual 
subscale of the OSIQ than control participants. However for the spatial imagery OSIQ 
subscale there was no significant difference. The combined findings of Price (2009) and 
Barnett and Newell (2008) support the assertion that at least visual mental imagery 
ability is linked to synaesthesia. 
 To better understand the relationship between mental imagery and synaesthesia, 
Spiller, Jonas, Simner and Jansari (2015) compared synaesthetes with a range of 
different inducer and concurrent pairings against non-synaesthetes. Six questionnaires 
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were used, the VVIQ, SUIS, Clarity of Auditory Imagery Scale (CAIS; Willander & 
Baraldi, 2010), Vividness of Olfactory Imagery Questionnaire (Gilbert, Voss, & Kroll, 
1997), Vividness of Movement Imagery Questionnaire (Roberts, Callow, Hardy, 
Markland, & Bringer, 2008) and an adapted version of the shortened Betts’ 
Questionnaire Upon Mental Imagery (Sheehan, 1967). Spiller and colleagues (Spiller, 
Jonas, Simner, & Jansari, 2015) supported previous studies by showing that 
synaesthetes reported significantly higher mental imagery than controls. Furthermore, 
they showed that synaesthetes with a concurrent or inducer in a specific modality (such 
as taste) reported significantly greater mental imagery in that modality than synaesthetes 
who didn’t have a linked concurrent or inducer. Therefore synaesthetes don’t only 
report greater levels of mental imagery overall, but this is also linked to their particular 
type of synaesthesia. This demonstrates the strong link between synaesthesia and mental 
imagery, however behaviour on tasks related to these modalities was not measured and 
should be assessed in future research. 
1.7 Overview of Papers 
1.7.1 Overview Paper 1 
There was only one published study, when this thesis was started, where synaesthesia-
like experiences were induced in high susceptible participants (Cohen Kadosh, Henik, 
Catena, et al., 2009). This study measured an impairment in performance which is easier 
to produce through demand characteristics (Spanos, 1986) than an advantage. 
Furthermore the reports of phenomenological experiences were somewhat vague for 
stringent comparison to developmental synaesthete’s phenomenology. A task which had 
been used extensively is the embedded-figure visual search task which GC synaesthetes 
often complete with increased accuracy compared to non synaesthetes (Hubbard et al., 
2005; Hubbard & Ramachandran, 2005; Ward et al., 2010). Quantitative values for 
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phenomenology are also known for this task (Ward et al., 2010) so both behaviour and 
experience could be compared for the hypnotic synaesthetes against known measures. 
 High susceptible participants completed an embedded-figures task with digitised 
2’s making a shape (square, rectangle, triangle, diamond) surrounded by mirror image 
digitised 5’s. Trials lasted 1, 2, 3 or 4 s, and the experiment was completed twice, once 
at baseline and once with a hypnotic suggestion to see the digit 2 as vividly green, and 5 
as vividly red. In each trial, the embedded shape was chosen using a 4AFC decision, 
then the percentage of digits appearing as coloured and the vividness of any colours 
experienced (1= no colour, 6 = very vivid colour) was indicated.  
 Accuracy didn’t improve in the hypnosis condition even though many of the 
participants did experience colour for the digits. The percentage of digits in the array 
coloured, and the vividness of their colours was actually comparable to that of 
developmental synaesthetes on the same task (Ward et al., 2010). Interestingly, after a 
median split so that those who experienced lots of colour could be compared to those 
who experienced little colour, differences between accurate and inaccurate trials were 
evident. Those who experienced lots of colour reported a higher percentage of digits 
within the array as coloured, and more vivid colours, for accurate compared to 
inaccurate trials. Interestingly, this finding suggested that the colour was added after the 
shape had been detected within the array rather than helping in the identification of the 
embedded shape. Even after a median split, accuracy was not higher for the hypnosis 
compared to baseline condition. Overall, it appeared that high susceptible participants 
could be given hypnotic suggestion to feel like a synaesthete, but not behave like one. 
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1.7.2 Overview Paper 2 
In Paper 1 it was shown that hypnotic suggestion to experience a GC synaesthesia type 
hallucination didn’t produce a behavioural advantage, and that mental imagery may 
have been part of the production of the colours. This was because more colour was 
experienced for accurate compared to inaccurate trials, and once the shape had been 
detected within the array, it would be easier to add the colour. In the second hypnotic 
synaesthesia experiment, mental imagery ability was therefore recorded so this could be 
correlated with behaviour. A different type of synaesthesia was chosen for the 
suggestion, motion-sound (MS) synaesthesia. This was because very little is known 
about MS synaesthesia, with only one published experiment at the time (Saenz & Koch, 
2008). Also, it was known that auditory hallucinations can be generated (Bowers, 1998) 
as well as sound through auditory mental imagery (Willander & Baraldi, 2010). This 
study used the same paradigm as the only study of MS synaesthesia (Saenz & Koch, 
2008). Pairs of either auditory or visual sequences similar to Morse code had to be 
differentiated as same or different. The auditory sequences were beeps, visual ones were 
flashing white circles. As there is an advantage for auditory compared to visual trials in 
general, Saenz and Koch found that the MS synaesthetes performed better than controls 
for visual trials only as they had the auditory concurrent to aid them.  
In Paper 2, MS synaesthetes completed the sequence differentiation task once as 
they naturally have an auditory concurrent. Low, medium and high hypnotisable non-
MS synaesthetes completed the experiment twice: once at baseline and once with 
suggestion to hear beeps for the flashing circles. All non-MS synaesthetes received the 
same suggestion, but high participants received an induction first. It therefore acted as a 
post-hypnotic suggestion for the high susceptibility participants, and a mental imagery 
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instruction for low and medium susceptibility participants. The suggestion was triggered 
by a clap of the hands.  
It was found that the MS synaesthetes were significantly more accurate than the 
low susceptible group at baseline for visual trials, therefore the MS synaesthetes did 
have a general advantage for the task presumably due to their auditory concurrents. 
However, neither the post-hypnotic or mental imagery suggestion improved 
performance in the experimental block for the non-MS synaesthetes. Many of the non-
MS synaesthetes used beeps spontaneously as a strategy for the visual trials at baseline, 
however they were not more accurate than participants who didn’t use this strategy. 
Further, general visual or auditory imagery ability did not correlate with accuracy. It 
was therefore shown that MS synaesthesia is not due to mental imagery, and that 
deliberately using mental imagery doesn’t improve accuracy.  
Overall, Paper 1 and Paper 2 showed that hypnosis can produce the 
phenomenology of synaesthesia, but not associated behaviour advantages. This suggests 
synaesthetic behaviour is due to more than phenomenological influences like those 
created with hypnosis. Synaesthetes must have either learnt how to use the concurrent 
over time, or more likely, special neuroanatomy is also required for synaesthesia. The 
similarity in reported phenomenology between the hypnotic and developmental 
synaesthetes is remarkable, and by distinguishing the differences between them what 
causes synaesthesia could be uncovered. 
1.7.3 Overview Paper 3 
As the two main measures of synaesthesia projector and associator phenomenology had 
never been formally assessed, responses were collected from GC synaesthetes on the 
RSPA (Rouw & Scholte, 2007) and ISEQ (Skelton et al., 2009) and tested using Factor 
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Analysis. This allows correlations within the data to group the questions so that 
subcomponents to a construct can be identified, and the reliability of these 
subcomponents assessed. To classify a synaesthete in the RSPA and ISEQ, the mean 
associator value is subtracted from the mean projector value. This assumes that 
phenomenology of GC synaesthesia is a continuum, with associator at one end of the 
bimodal distribution, and projector at the other. Although Skelton et al. noted that some 
synaesthetes do not neatly fall into one sub type or another, in their questionnaire they 
are called ‘undetermined’, without conducting factor analysis it can’t be known for sure 
that phenomenology is indeed one dimension. Responses from the Coloured Letters and 
Numbers (CLaN) questionnaire (Rothen, Tsakanikos, Meier, & Ward, 2013) were also 
gathered as this is the only synaesthesia questionnaire tested using factor analysis.  
 Exploratory factor analysis was conducted on each questionnaire individually. 
The process involved removing questions which did not correlate well with the other 
questions, and repeating the analysis until the questions were grouped with a valid and 
reliable factor structure. Both questionnaires were reduced during this process, however 
both retained the same question divide between projector and associator questions, 
although these were not in one factor. Both questionnaires contained two factors which 
corresponded to the projector/ associator divide. Therefore, the phenomenology is not 
one continuous dimension, rather two independent measures which can overlap, as 
some synaesthetes scored highly on both projector and associator questions. 
Correlational analysis against the dimensions of the CLaN validated the revised 
questionnaires. 
As GC synaesthete sub groups are compared in many synaesthesia experiments, 
it is important to define them correctly. From Paper 3 it became clear that treating GC 
synaesthesia phenomenology as one continuous dimension is not appropriate, and that 
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projector and associator dimensions should be treated independently for the calculation 
of group. Differences between projector and associator synaesthetes in terms of 
measured behaviour is inconsistent, and this may due in part to not identifying the sub 
group of participants accurately. Using the revised questionnaires produced through 
factor analysis may reduce the noise in these studies.   
1.7.4 Overview of Paper 4  
In Paper 4 the link between consciousness and synaesthesia was researched using two 
techniques not employed previously in GC synaesthesia research. Previously it has been 
shown that masked graphemes can prime another grapheme (Mattingley et al., 2001), 
however this doesn’t mean that they necessarily prime a colour strongly enough to 
influence colour detection (Blake, Palmeri, Marois, & Kim, 2005) or that the grapheme 
was processed enough to trigger the colour. Mattingley has also stated that the 
unconscious priming effect may not be evident in all synaesthetes and that group 
analysis may not be an appropriate method of investigation (Mattingley, 2009). Rather 
than look at small samples or individual cases, which is often the case with synaesthesia 
research, I chose to look at large samples using techniques which would provide longer 
exposure to a priming stimulus without conscious awareness, to strengthen any priming 
effects. This would prevent unrepresentative individual differences (Rothen & Meier, 
2009) from clouding understanding of consciousness and synaesthesia.  
Using peripheral crowding, the conscious awareness of a stimulus can be 
reduced. As the peripheral presentation relies on participants viewing the fixation point 
rather than diverting their view to the crowded stimulus, a short stimulus duration can 
reduce the chances of it being viewed foveally (Hubbard & Ramachandran, 2005). This 
limits the length of time that a stimulus can be presented. Gaze-contingent crowding 
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(GCC, also called gaze-contingent substitution) uses eye tracking to more tightly 
control what the person views. Like in peripheral crowding, the priming image is 
surrounded by distractors. By tracking the direction of gaze, and predefining the 
acceptable window of attention around the fixation deemed acceptable for eye fixation 
without being too close to the crowded image, prime viewing can be controlled. 
Another almost identical image, with no prime included, is presented when gaze 
deviates from fixation out with the predefined window. The prime is therefore viewed 
peripherally when fixation is within the window, and the crowding only is viewed when 
away from fixation. This prevents the prime ever being viewed foveally. Both static and 
dynamic images can be shown for several seconds without being consciously seen 
(Kouider et al., 2011). This provides highly controlled viewing for long durations.  
In binocular rivalry, which was discussed earlier, two different images are 
presented, one to each eye. The consciously perceived image tends to alternate between 
the two. Continuous flash suppression (CFS) is similar in that a different image is 
presented to either eye, but the consequences are different. The dominant eye views a 
constantly changing, high contrast image, such as an alternating Mondrian image (many 
overlapping squares of different colours or shades of grey). A static image is presented 
to the other eye. Initially, only the high contrast alternating image is consciously 
perceived (for as long as three minutes) before the static image suddenly ‘breaks 
through’ into conscious awareness (Lin & He, 2009). By measuring conscious 
awareness we are able to investigate unconscious processing (Kouider et al., 2011; 
Stein, Hebart, & Sterzer, 2011). Differences in static image can influence the time it 
takes for it to be consciously perceived, showing that the image is being processed pre 
consciously. This technique can therefore be used to study pre conscious processing and 
percept binding.  
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 In Paper 4, whether a grapheme binds with a concurrent colour for GC 
synaesthetes was investigated using these two techniques. In Experiment 1, GCC was 
used to present a digit (1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8 or 9) for 2.5 s without the participant being 
consciously aware of it. After the priming period, several different tasks were 
completed. In Experiment 1A, participants had to decide whether the central target 
number presented after the crowded digit was greater or less than 5. The number could 
either be congruent (was the same as the primed number, or required the same button 
response) or incongruent (was a different number, or required a different button 
response). This task was designed to show that the number was being primed. Although 
priming effects were not reflected in the RTs, more errors were made for incongruent 
compared to congruent trials, showing that the digits had been primed. In Experiment 
1B, rather than showing a central target digit, a central colour patch was presented 
which matched one of four digits presented in that experiment and was individually 
tailored for each GC synaesthete. In each trial, the peripherally presented digit and 
target colour could either be congruent or incongruent. Synaesthetes had to indicate the 
target colour through a 4FC button press, and their response could therefore be correct 
or incorrect. There was no difference in either the RTs or error rates for congruency of 
digit and target colour. This suggests the grapheme did not bind with its concurrent 
colour to influence behaviour. In Experiment 1C synaesthetes and controls completed a 
prime identification task, choosing which digit was being presented peripherally. 
Confidence was rated, and colour experienced/ vividness of colour for synaesthetes. 
Colours increased the confidence synaesthetes had in their answer, but not their 
accuracy. Interestingly, colours were more likely to match the digit the synaesthete 
chose than the digit they viewed.  
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 In Experiment 2, CFS was used to test whether a pre consciously presented 
grapheme would bind with its colour and influence the time it took for the grapheme to 
break through into awareness. In Experiment 2A, graphemes were chosen for each 
synaesthete, which either had a colourful concurrent (like red, green) or a greyscale 
concurrent (like black, grey). As colour aids in conscious perception it was 
hypothesised that if the grapheme bound with the concurrent, then graphemes with a 
colourful concurrent should break through faster than those with a greyscale concurrent. 
A grapheme was presented in black and the participant stated the grapheme name into 
the microphone as soon as they saw it. There was no difference in RTs between 
graphemes which had a colourful or greyscale concurrent. In Experiment 2B, 
graphemes that evoked red, green, blue or yellow were chosen and presented in either 
the congruent or incongruent colour. If they bound preconsciously, then congruent 
graphemes would be expected to break through faster, but this was not found. In 
Experiment 2C, a more standard Stroop task was run using CFS except that they stated 
the word not colour (control participants only). Incongruently coloured colour words 
broke through slower than congruent or neutral words. There were also more errors for 
incongruent than congruent or neutral words. Therefore, colour words bound with their 
colour preconsciously, but for GC synaesthetes the grapheme didn’t bind with the 
colour. Measures in Experiments 1 and 2 were also correlated with the CLaN and R-
RSPA questionnaires. 
 The question of whether a synaesthetic inducer binds with its concurrent when 
viewed unconsciously appears answered. Investigating this question using several 
difference techniques is of great importance. Mattingley et al. (2001) used masking to 
prevent conscious perception of the grapheme, and in this thesis GCC and CFS were 
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used. As unconscious GC synaesthesia concurrents are not primed using any of these 
techniques, the grapheme and colour do not bind preconsciously. 
1.8 Discussion 
This thesis set out to learn more about the conscious experience of synaesthesia. Using 
hypnosis, it has been shown in Paper 1 and Paper 2 that hypnosis can produce the 
phenomenology of GC and MS synaesthesia, but not the behaviour. The lack of 
behaviour improvement typical of developmental synaesthetes on the embedded-figure, 
or sequence differentiation task showed that feeling like a synaesthete was not enough 
to behave like one.  
 It has become clear that both attention and conscious detection of an externally 
presented grapheme is required for the synaesthetic GC concurrent to be triggered and 
bound to the grapheme. A lack of colour priming using GCS, or difference in break 
through time using CFS in Paper 4 demonstrated this. This supports a wealth of research 
into the requirements of attention and consciousness in GC synaesthesia research. Paper 
4 was however the first to allow a realistic duration for the concurrent colour to bind 
with the grapheme and provided conclusive evidence for the attention and 
consciousness needed in GC synaesthesia. 
 It was very interesting that in Paper 4, many GC synaesthetes reported colour 
experiences in the grapheme detection task, even when the grapheme was incorrectly 
identified. Colours were even reported which did not match any of the 4AFC grapheme 
options. This was reported by several of the synaesthetes themselves during testing, as 
they were somewhat confused. As it was more likely for the colour to match the chosen 
digit than the presented one, this shows that a synaesthetic concurrent can be created 
from an internally generated inducer.  
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It became clear as research for this thesis progressed, that phenomenology is an 
important and central aspect of synaesthesia research which is at times overlooked. In 
Paper 1, hypnotic suggestion created phenomenology remarkably similar to that of 
developmental GC synaesthetes. In Paper 2, many of the non-MS synaesthetes 
spontaneously used beeps similar to those heard by MS synaesthetes to aid in the 
sequence differentiation for visual trials. Synaesthetic phenomenology can therefore be 
experienced by non synaesthetes. In Paper 3 the classification of GC synaesthetes as 
projector or associator was found to be at times unrepresentative, as these are distinct 
dimensions which can both be experienced by some synaesthetes rather than one or the 
other. Then in Paper 4, colours experiences were linked more to choices made by GC 
synaesthetes than digits viewed. It is therefore clear that phenomenology of 
synaesthetes should be considered in more detail than a general consistency score.  
Mental imagery was another common theme within this thesis. In Paper 1, 
mental imagery was thought to explain the differences in phenomenology measures 
between accurate and inaccurate trials, as after a shape is identified it is easier to project 
colour on post-hoc. In Paper 2 mental imagery was included but didn’t account for the 
variation in task ability. Mental imagery could also possibly account for the colours 
experienced by GC synaesthetes in Paper 4 that matched the digit they chose rather than 
the digit they saw. Early visual detection processes can’t account for the colour 
generation in these trials. Rather, after choosing the digit a colour is then being 
triggered, and this is from an internally generated percept. These colours may therefore 
either be mentally generated, or more general colour associations.  
There is a debate in both the hypnosis and synaesthesia literature on whether 
they are due to neuroanatomical differences or functional differences. In this thesis 
hypnosis, a largely debated topic with high variability and a low presence of high 
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susceptible individuals, was used to research synaesthesia.  Synaesthesia itself however 
is another debated area with high variability and a low prevalence. The general 
consensus of both research areas is that the opposing theories need to be integrated to 
include both neuroanatomical and functional mechanisms.  
Phenomenology without behaviour was found in Paper 1 and Paper 2 when 
researching hypnotic synaesthesia. Phenomenology without conscious awareness was 
evident in Paper 4 when researching GC synaesthesia. Combined these demonstrate the 
importance of the mechanisms underlying behaviour and phenomenology and the need 
to consider both when researching hypnosis or synaesthesia. 
The phenomenology of MS synaesthesia needs to be explored more thoroughly, 
as only brief descriptions have been given so far (Saenz & Koch, 2008). If MS 
phenomenology is based primarily on sounds naturally associated with movement, in 
what way is it different from learnt associations? Hearing movement seems like a far 
more natural connection than, for example, seeing colour for letters, so why is it so rare 
in comparison? To what extent are MS concurrents idiosyncratic, and are they 
consistent? As this thesis has shown phenomenology can be quite variable across 
synaesthetes and impact on behaviour, knowing more about the MS synaesthetic 
experience would benefit experiment design. Development of an MS synaesthesia 
questionnaire could help locate more synaesthetes to take part in research since so few 
of them have thus far been discovered.  
Apparent motion, where two displays with tokens in different places are shown 
in quick succession and therefore perceived as moving, can be influenced by GC 
synaesthetic colours grouping tokens and therefore the direction of motion (Kim et al., 
2006). By manipulating the difference between the tokens, MS synaesthetes may have a 
42 
 
lower threshold for detecting apparent motion. It may also be possible to manipulate 
this effect if sounds similar to their concurrent for motion is played to them through 
headphones, compared to completing the same task in silence. This way, a more motion 
based task could be used rather than flashing lights which although producing sound are 
only one way in which the sound of MS synaesthetes is triggered. 
The difference between a mentally imagined colour and a synaesthetic colour 
need to be researched more fully in GC synaesthesia. Thus far studies have investigated 
overall differences in ability, but this doesn’t inform us of the differences between these 
at a phenomenological level for the individual, or from a neurological perspective. If a 
colour can be triggered from a mentally generated grapheme, how does this differ from 
one triggered by external low level feature detection and grapheme identification? 
Although several studies have looked at behavioural differences between projector and 
associator synaesthetes (Dixon et al., 2004; Rouw & Scholte, 2007; Ward et al., 2010), 
how this interplays with mental imagery could be researched further. Associator 
synaesthetes may be better at mentally viewing their colours or manipulating them in 
their minds eye, whereas projectors may rely more heavily on the external visual 
stimulus. Conversely, ‘know’ associators may be poorer at mental imagery, and 
projectors superior (Simner, 2013). 
As hypnotic synaesthesia appears to have the same phenomenology as 
developmental synaesthesia but different behaviour, it would be useful to see at what 
point these two experiences diverge. Using EEG it would be possible to research any 
difference in pattern between a developmental GC synaesthete and a hypnotic 
synaesthete viewing a grapheme which evokes a colour. As differences have been 
measured already in GC synaesthetes (Barnett, Foxe, et al., 2008) and hypnosis has 
been used to reduce interference effects in a face-colour synaesthete (Terhune, Cardeña, 
43 
 
& Lindgren, 2010) the differences between transient and developmental synaesthesia 
could be investigated. 
Overall, this thesis has confirmed the importance of researching synaesthesia 
from both a phenomenological and behavioural perspective simultaneously. It has been 
shown that synaesthesia requires conscious awareness for it to influence behaviour, 
even though phenomenology may be experienced without consciously detecting a 
grapheme for GC synaesthetes. The experience of phenomenology in hypnotic 
synaesthesia without behaviour also confirms that the behaviour of synaesthetes is due 
to more than the functional linking of inducer and concurrent.  
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CHAPTER 2: 
CAN GRAPHEME-COLOUR SYANESTHESIA BE INDUCED BY HYPNOSIS?  
-PAPER 1 
2.1 Abstract 
Grapheme-colour synaesthesia is a perceptual experience where graphemes, letters or 
words evoke specific colours, which are experienced either as spatially coincident with 
the grapheme inducer (projector sub-type) or elsewhere, perhaps without a definite spatial 
location (associator sub-type). Here, we address the question of whether synaesthesia can 
be rapidly produced using a hypnotic colour suggestion to examine the possibility of 
‘hypnotic synaesthesia’, i.e. subjectively experienced colour hallucinations similar to 
those experienced by projector synaesthetes.  We assess the efficacy of this intervention 
using an “embedded figures” test, in which participants are required to detect a shape 
(e.g., a square) composed of local graphemic elements. For grapheme-colour 
synaesthetes, better performance on the task has been linked to a higher proportion of 
graphemes perceived as coloured.  We found no performance benefits on this test when 
using a hypnotic suggestion, as compared to a no-suggestion control condition.  The same 
result was found when participants were separated according to the degree to which they 
were susceptible to the suggestion (number of coloured trials perceived).  However, we 
found a relationship between accuracy and subjective reports of colour in those 
participants who reported a large proportion of coloured trials: trials in which the 
embedded figure was accurately recognised (relative to trials in which it was not) were 
associated with reports of more intense colours occupying a greater spatial extent.  
Collectively, this implies that hypnotic colour was only perceived after shape detection 
rather than aiding in shape detection via colour-based perceptual grouping.  The results 
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suggest that hypnotically induced colours are not directly comparable to synaesthetic 
ones. 
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2.2. Introduction 
Individuals with grapheme-colour synaesthesia experience a colour (concurrent) when 
viewing particular letters, numbers or grammatical symbol (inducer).  The triggered 
colour experience is automatic (Mattingley et al., 2001) and the concurrent colour is 
consistent over time (Simner et al., 2005). The developmental form of synaesthesia 
emerges early in life (Simner, Harrold, Creed, Monro, & Foulkes, 2009), is associated 
with genetic differences (Tomson et al., 2011), and also structural and functional 
differences within the brain (Hubbard et al., 2005; Rich et al., 2006; Rouw & Scholte, 
2007; Weiss & Fink, 2009). Early development may not be the only pathway for the 
emergence of synaesthetic experiences (unless, of course, one chooses a priori to limit 
the term ‘synaesthesia’ to particular causal mechanisms).  It has long been known that 
synaesthesia can be acquired as a result of sensory loss (Armel & Ramachandran, 1999) 
or temporarily after taking hallucinogenic drugs (Luke & Terhune, 2013; Sinke et al., 
2012). More recently, synaesthesia has been reported to arise after brain damage (Ro et 
al., 2007) and it has also been suggested that synaesthesia may arise, in blind individuals, 
after expertise with sensory substitution technology (Ward & Wright, 2012; see also 
Farina, 2013; Ward & Meijer, 2010).  Finally, it has been claimed that synaesthesia can 
be induced by hypnosis in hypnotically susceptible individuals (Cohen Kadosh, Henik, 
Catena, et al., 2009).  In the present study we re-examine this claim using an ‘embedded 
figures’ test that has been widely used in grapheme-colour synaesthetes. The benefit of 
this task is that evidence for synaesthesia type behaviour would be measured through task 
improvement, rather than through deficits, which are easier to produce through task 
compliance. The issue is of theoretical importance because positive findings would 
suggest that synaesthesia can (at least in some circumstances) arise from purely functional 
– rather than structural – brain changes (Grossenbacher & Lovelace, 2001) and, moreover, 
that hypnosis can create novel perceptual abilities.   
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Hypnosis is able to alter the phenomenological properties of participants’ 
subjective experience (Kihlstrom, 2013; Oakley & Halligan, 2013). The process of 
hypnosis can be divided into induction and suggestion stages.  In the induction stage, a 
putative ‘hypnotic state’ is induced, or expectations for experiences are heightened, or the 
subject is simply alerted that the context is appropriate for a certain sort of response (e.g. 
Kirsch, 2011; Oakley & Halligan, 2009); in the second stage, suggestions are given to the 
participant to experience a (potentially) wide range of physical and perceptual 
experiences. There is considerable variability both in individual hypnotic susceptibility 
(Bowers, 1998) and in the range of experiences that can be induced.  Importantly, 
perceptual hallucinations (e.g. hearing music) can be induced in many participants 
(Bowers, 1998), providing a potential link to synaesthesia.   
Although there is general consensus that hypnosis can alter a participant’s 
subjective experience and this can then cause behavioural changes (Kihlstrom, 2013) the 
neural processes underlying the functional changes corresponding to hypnotically 
induced perception remain poorly understood. One class of theories postulates that highly 
hypnotisable people can perform tasks hypnotically they could not do otherwise; for 
example, distort perception so that they actually can see non-existent objects in a way 
they could not imagine (e.g., Brown & Oakley, 2004) or fail to perceive stimulation that 
would otherwise impinge on their awareness (e.g. as pain, Hilgard, 1986). Another class 
of theories postulates that highly hypnotisable people cannot do anything hypnotically 
that they could not do anyway (e.g. Sarbin & Coe, 1972; Spanos, 1986).  One way of 
characterising the latter class of theory is in terms of “cold control” (Dienes, 2012), which 
postulates that the defining feature of acting hypnotically is simply the incorrect meta-
cognition that one is not intending the (motor or cognitive) action. For example, hypnotic 
hallucination of an object on this account is imagining the object, but without realising 
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that one is deliberately creating a visual representation: It appears to occur from other 
causes and thus appears as perception (Dienes & Perner, 2007).  That is, according to cold 
control, hypnotic responding involves no new abilities, just the sense that an action is 
happening by itself. The two classes of theory can be tested by using suggestions for 
abilities not already possessed by subjects: If the subject gains abilities they did not have, 
the second class of theory is refuted.  As we will argue, suggestions for synesthetic 
experiences can serve this function. Synesthetic experience has some perception-like 
qualities that may enable performance on some tasks (Ramachandran & Hubbard, 2001) 
so the question arises whether hypnotically-induced synesthetic experience is more 
perception-like than imagined synesthetic experience.  
The generation of synesthetic experience appears automatic, and automatic 
processes are partially defined by the difficulty in controlling them. So the question is 
raised whether control of synesthetic experience might be greater hypnotically rather than 
non-hypnotically. One developmental form of grapheme-colour synaesthesia has been 
temporarily reduced through hypnotic suggestion. Terhune, Cardeña, and Lindgren 
(2010) abolished the phenomenological synaesthetic experiences in AR, a synaesthete 
who experiences colours when viewing faces. She had to name the colours of face stimuli 
which were presented in either congruent or incongruent colours. Stroop-like interference 
effects were evident in comparison to controls in both reaction times (RTs) and event 
related potentials (ERPs) at baseline, however, after a post hypnotic suggestion these were 
no longer evident. This indicates the relevance of synaesthesia to testing theories of 
hypnosis, as well as for hypnosis for testing theories of synaesthesia. We will consider 
the converse case to that of Terhune et al., namely, of hypnotically suggesting a type of 
synaesthesia in people who did not previously experience it. 
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To create a ‘hypnotic synaesthesia’ one can use the suggestion that when seeing 
(for example) the letter A the participant will see a special red colour on the page. 
Supporting this idea, the phenomenological perception of colour (or no colour) has been 
manipulated using suggestion to add or drain colour from patterned stimuli (Kosslyn, 
Thompson, Costantini-Ferrando, & Spiegel, 2000). High but not low susceptible 
participants all reported being able to see grey-scale stimuli as coloured, and coloured 
stimuli as grey-scale when given hypnotic suggestion to do so. Further, positron emission 
tomography (PET) indicated changes in cerebral blood flow for left and right fusiform 
areas (perhaps corresponding to human V4) when hypnotic induction was used; however, 
non-hypnotically imagining the colour changes produced significant changes only in right 
fusiform cortex. Hypnosis appeared to influence activity in colour-sensitive areas of the 
brain in a way imagination alone could not.  
The Kosslyn et al. (2000) study highlights the issue of demand characteristics in 
hypnosis research, and the tendency of subjects to either “hold back” or try harder in 
different conditions to produce the pattern of results they perceive as desired (Orne, 1962; 
Spanos, 1986). Specifically, the suggestion was more strongly worded in the hypnosis 
rather than the imagination condition in order that subjects would not confuse the two 
conditions and “slip into trance” in the imagination condition. Kirsch, et al. (2008) 
presented the identical colour adding or draining suggestions with or without hypnotic 
induction, and obtained substantial and near equivalent changes in colour perception in 
both conditions. (Further, subjects rated themselves as clearly not hypnotised in the non-
hypnotic condition, indicating that slipping into trance was not a problem.)  Thus, when 
demand characteristics were more nearly equalised the difference between hypnosis and 
non-hypnosis in subjective experience greatly diminished. Further, McGeown, et al. 
(2012) showed that similar activation in visual areas was produced in both the hypnotic 
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and non-hypnotic conditions. That is, as cold control theory predicts, hypnotic 
hallucination with the suggestions used by Kosslyn et al. (2000) may involve the same 
visual abilities as imagination, with the difference being purely metacognitive (Dienes, 
2012). 
There has been one previous attempt to hypnotically induce grapheme-colour 
synaesthesia (Cohen Kadosh, Henik, Catena, et al., 2009). Cohen Kadosh and colleagues 
assigned colours to digits either through post-hypnotic suggestion or learnt association 
(e.g. 5 = green). Participants were required to search for an achromatic (black) grapheme 
against a coloured background. The results showed that search was impaired when the 
suggested colour was congruent with the background. However, this result reflects a 
deterioration in performance which is easier to simulate (explicitly or implicitly) than an 
improvement. Cohen Kadosh et al. requested control groups to associate the colours with 
the digits in non-hypnotic contexts; the non-hypnotic request had no effect on the search 
task. However, a non-hypnotic request carries different demand characteristics from a 
hypnotic or post-hypnotic suggestion.   It is also unclear from this study whether the 
performance on the task does indeed resemble that found in developmental grapheme-
colour synaesthesia. To our knowledge only one developmental grapheme-colour 
synaesthete has been tested on a version of this task (Smilek et al., 2001). While 
performance of this synaesthete showed the same trend as the ‘hypnotic synaesthetes’ 
(i.e. worse performance on congruent trials, about 20%, compared to incongruent trials, 
about 90%), they were far from equivalent in other respects. Perhaps surprisingly, the 
manipulation had only a mild effect on the synaesthete (88 % correct for congruent and 
96 % for incongruent conditions) but a drastic effect on the hypnotised non-synaesthetes. 
Although direct comparison of proportion correct trials is difficult due to differences in 
the task, the comparison is striking as the synaesthete completed a more difficult task than 
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the non-synaesthetes, being required to provide a specific grid location for the target 
grapheme amongst distractors. Furthermore, although behavioural similarities between 
developmental and hypnotic synaesthetes are informative of cognitive processes, they 
don’t provide detail of the phenomenological experience of the participant, an aspect 
which requires more attention in hypnotic synaesthesia research as well as more generally 
in neuroscience (Lifshitz, Cusumano, & Raz, 2013).  
In the present study, we re-examine whether hypnotically induced synaesthetic 
colours can lead to facilitated performance on the Embedded Figures Test. Although the 
test itself (and the interpretation of the results) is not without controversy, it has the 
advantage of predicting that synaesthetic (or hypnotically hallucinated) colours should 
facilitate rather than impair performance on a difficult task, as in the previous study.  
Moreover, the test has been utilised in several previous studies involving grapheme-
colour synaesthetes providing useful benchmark comparisons. Ramachandran and 
Hubbard (2001) showed synaesthetes arrays comprising of different graphemes (e.g. 5s 
and 2s) such that one of the graphemes could be grouped together to form a shape (e.g. a 
triangle made of 2s)1 (Ramachandran & Hubbard, 2001). The task was to identify the 
global shape, from four alternatives, given a limited viewing time of 1 second. 
Ramachandran and colleagues (2001) found their two synaesthetes to be significantly 
more accurate in identifying the embedded shape than controls. They later called this 
effect “pop-out” (Hubbard, Manohar, & Ramachandran, 2006). 
The effect was partially replicated by Hubbard et al. (2005) who noted that the 
“pop out” effect was not as great as would be expected for true colour. Rothen and Meier 
                                                          
1 In their original study there were always three kinds of graphemes presented, but the test is 
commonly illustrated by the example of 5s and 2s. 
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(2009) however did not find an accuracy advantage for synaesthetes in comparison to 
controls for the same task. Ward, Jonas, Dienes and Seth (2010) partially supported the 
original findings with their larger scale replication study involving a sample of 36 
synaesthetes. Synaesthetes’ accuracy at detecting embedded shapes was significantly 
higher than controls, though detection rates (41% for synaesthetes) remained significantly 
below that corresponding to true “pop out”. In this study, participants were also required 
to rate the phenomenal vividness of the synaesthetic colour and to indicate what 
percentage of the digits appeared as coloured. Importantly, the greatest performance 
benefits were found for those synaesthetes who experienced a large proportion of the 
array as coloured. This was interpreted by proposing that synaesthetic colours may 
facilitate local grouping within a spatial window of attention but that synaesthetic colours 
do not enable pre-attentive pop-out. The latter interpretation may explain why other 
studies, based on more standard visual search paradigms, have often failed to find any 
benefit of synaesthetic colours in detecting a target achromatic singleton grapheme 
(Edquist et al., 2006; Sagiv et al., 2006).  Once a grapheme has been attended to it evokes 
a colour and improves visual search (Wolfe, 1994) as it allows the synaesthete to discard 
distractor graphemes faster or reduce their likelihood of returning to the discarded 
grapheme again through local perceptual grouping (Sagiv & Robertson, 2005). That is, 
synaesthesia may assist local grouping of elements on the basis of colour (facilitating the 
embedded-figures test) but synaesthetic colour may not enable pre-attentive pop-out (on 
more standard visual search).  
As noted by Ward et al. (2010), grapheme-colour synaesthetes differ in the extent 
to which they perceive (or notice) their synaesthetic colours during this task. Synaesthetes 
classed as ‘projectors’, i.e. who report their colours in the spatial location of the 
grapheme, were more likely to report colours (and showed a trend to do better overall on 
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the task).  The reasons for this are not completely understood (Ward et al., 2010; Ward, 
Li, Salih, & Sagiv, 2007). Nevertheless, for the present purposes we decided to optimise 
the chances of obtaining a significant result by instructing our highly hypnotisable 
participants to project colours onto the array of graphemes. If hypnotic suggestions can 
create grapheme-colour synaesthesia then hypnotically hallucinated colours will facilitate 
performance on this task (relative to a no-suggestion control condition). We also ask, if 
hypnotic grapheme-colour synaesthesia can be induced, are the perceptual reports similar 
to those of natural synaesthetes in regards to the vividness and percentage of coloured 
digits?  
2.3 Method 
A counterbalanced two (condition; hypnotic suggestion versus no-suggestion) by four 
(duration; 1, 2, 3 and 4 seconds) within subjects design was used.  
Participants 
Fourteen participants aged 18 - 42 (M = 23.2, SD = 6.3) were recruited through the 
University of Sussex Hypnotic Susceptibility Register. Each had previously been 
screened using the Waterloo-Stanford Group Scale of Susceptibility, form C (Bowers, 
1998) with a score of 8 or higher being used to classify them as highly susceptible. This 
corresponds to the upper 10% of people screened. Scores ranged from 8 – 11 (M = 9, SD 
= 1.04). Each was paid £5 for participation, the whole experiment lasting approximately 
one hour.  No participant reported having any type of synaesthesia, this was asked prior 
to testing. The study was granted clearance from the University of Sussex ethics 
committee. 
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Materials 
The embedded figures stimuli consisted of four shapes (squares, rectangles, triangles and 
diamonds) of number 2s embedded in an array of 5s taken from the Ward et al. (2010) 
study.  Each shape was made from 6 to 10 target 2s surrounded by 41 distractor 5s, all of 
which were in black font. Participants sat approximately 85 cm from a 15” LCD monitor 
with 60 Hz refresh rate. The shape location differed across trials, not always appearing in 
the centre.  E-prime 2.0 software was used to run the experiment.  
Procedure 
The experiment was repeated twice within each session, counterbalanced so that half of 
the subjects completed the hypnosis condition first, and the other half the control.  
Participants were not informed that the study would include hypnosis until just prior to 
the hypnosis condition to avoid ‘hold back’ (Stam & Spanos, 1980) where participants 
may unconsciously perform poorer in the baseline condition than they were capable of. 
The experiment consisted of four blocks which were completed twice, once to 
obtain a measure of general baseline ability and once with a hypnotic suggestion to 
experience colours for the numbers in the display. For half of the participants the block 
order was ascending (1 to 4 seconds stimulus duration), for the other it was descending 
(4 to 1 second). In the hypnosis condition, participants received a brief induction (where 
the participant was asked to become relaxed and counted down into a deep hypnotic state) 
before a hypnotic suggestion to see green for 2 and red for 5 on the monitor where the 
digit was, very much like a projector synaesthete. Prior to each of the four hypnosis 
blocks, the suggestion was reinforced by getting the participant to focus on an individual 
stimulus digits and attempt to enhance the colour. This was done for both the 2 and 5. If 
they did not see any colour, they were asked to attempt to visualise it as coloured as best 
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they could. Figure 2.1 shows how the stimulus would be coloured if colour experiences 
phenomenologically similar to those of natural synaesthetes were evoked using hypnotic 
suggestion. When completing the four control blocks, no specific instructions were given 
on how to complete the task. Whether the participant started with the hypnosis or control 
condition was counterbalanced. 
Suggestion for hypnotic grapheme-colour synaesthesia 
The following suggestion was used to induce GC synaesthesia-like experiences in the 
participants during the hypnosis blocks. 
“Now you will see on the computer screen many 2s and 5s.Whenever you see the digit 
five you will experience it as having a special red colour. Similarly, whenever you see 
the digit two you will experience it as having a special green colour. I want you to make 
the special colour as vivid as possible, actually see the colour there. Soon you will be 
presented with a screen containing both 5’s and 2’s. You will be able to see the 5’s as 
vividly red and the 2’s as vividly green. On each trial there will be a green shape made 
up of 2’s. You must select the shape you see. The trials will be presented for one second, 
two seconds, three seconds or four seconds. Is that clear? Ok we can start” 
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Figure 2.1. An example stimulus (A) as presented (in black font), (B) a schematic 
assuming presentation in colour , and (C) a partially coloured version in line of the 
phenomenological reports of projector synaesthetes. Note that stimuli were never 
presented in colour during the experiment.   
 
An example trial was given at the start of each block where they were reminded 
to find the shape made of 2s, and the responses required. Each trial was preceded by a 
central fixation cross for 1 second. The stimulus was then displayed for 1, 2, 3 or 4 
seconds depending on the block, followed by a blank screen containing instructions to 
respond using a four-alternative forced choice to indicate the shape (square, rectangle, 
diamond or triangle). Following this, they were asked to rate their subjective experience 
of colour during the trial display.  Specifically, they were asked to rate the vividness of 
any perceived colours (1 = no colour, 6 = very vivid colour) followed by the percentage 
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of digits within the array which were they experienced as coloured. The fixation cross 
then appeared to signal the start of the next trial. Accuracy was emphasised and 
participants were aware that the proceeding trial did not begin until a response had been 
made for the current trial. On completing the hypnosis condition, the suggestion was 
removed (by stating that numbers no longer had any special colours, and appear as they 
did before any suggestion was given) then the participant was counted out of hypnosis. 
Trial sequence can be seen in Figure 2.2 
Figure 2.2.  Experiment trial sequence. For response 1, shapes (square, rectangle, 
diamond and triangle) were presented with response keys underneath (keys 1-4). 
Response 2, was measured using a six point scale (1 = no colour, 6 = very vivid colour) 
followed by response 3, the percentage of digits within the array which were coloured 
which was typed by the participant. 
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2.4 Results 
Accuracy of target detection 
The accuracy data were measured using percentage accuracy and were analysed as a 2x4 
repeated measures ANOVA contrasting condition (presence/absence of hypnotic 
suggestion) and duration of stimulus (1-4 seconds).  The Greenhouse-Geisser correction 
was used where appropriate. The main effect of duration was significant (F (1.78, 22.13) 
= 45.16, p < .001) with pairwise comparisons using Bonferroni adjustment showing 
significant differences between all durations (p < .001) other than between 3 and 4 s (p = 
.13) due to accuracy improving when the arrays were presented for longer durations (1 
second M = 46.6%, MSE = 3.0; 2 seconds M = 61.1 %, MSE = 4.8; 3 seconds M = 74.0 
%, MSE = 4.5; 4 seconds M = 79.1 %, MSE = 5.3).  The main effect of condition was not 
significant (F (1, 13) = 0.62, p = .45): accuracy for the control condition (M = 67.2 %, 
MSE = 5.5) was similar to that in the hypnosis condition (M = 63.2 %, MSE = 3.9). The 
interaction was also not significant, with accuracy being similar between control and 
hypnosis conditions for each duration (F (3, 39) = 0.88, p = .46).  This data is depicted in 
Figure 2.3. To determine whether the lack of main effect of condition reflected insensitive 
data, or supported a null hypothesis, we used a Bayes factor analysis (Dienes, 2011). 
Whereas significance testing only allows the null hypothesis to be rejected, Bayes factor 
analysis also allows the null hypothesis to be supported (Kass & Raftery, 1995). If the 
Bayes factor is less than 1/3 there is substantial evidence for the null over the specified 
alternative; if greater than 3, substantial evidence for the alternative; otherwise the data 
are insensitive in distinguishing the two hypotheses. Ward et al. (2010) found that 
synaesthetes were better than normal on this task by 10%; thus this was used as the 
standard deviation of a half-normal to represent an alternative hypothesis that the 
hypnosis suggestion created a genuine synaesthesia (as per the guidelines in Dienes 
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(2011) Appendix). With an actual mean difference of -4% (SE = 5.1%), the Bayes factor 
is 0.28, i.e. there was substantial evidence for the null hypothesis, that there is no 
difference between percentage accuracy for the hypnosis versus control condition. 
 
Figure 2.3. Shape detection accuracy for control and hypnosis conditions across stimulus 
durations (1-4 seconds). Error bars represent 1 SEM. 
 
Phenomenological reports 
We next considered the extent to which the participants experienced colours during the 
task. Table 2.1 shows the number of trials in which colour was perceived, the average 
vividness of colours reported by each participant, and the percentage of graphemes in the 
array that were perceived as coloured.  These data are reported only for the hypnotic 
suggestion condition. Twelve out of the 14 participants experienced some colour during 
the hypnosis condition.  For those who did experience colour, the proportion of digits and 
intensity in which they saw colour was extremely variable across participants. 
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Table 2.1. Summary of subjective colour experiences for each participant for the 
hypnosis condition only in descending order from the participant who experienced 
colour for the most trials to least. The table shows the percentage of trials where a 
colour was reported, average intensity (1 = no colour, 6 = vivid colour) and percentage 
of graphemes within the array perceived as coloured.   
Part. 
Number 
% 
Coloured 
Trials 
% of Graphemes Perceived  
as Coloured (all trials) 
Average Intensity (all 
trials) 
 
  1 s 2 s 3 s 4 s 1 s 2 s 3 s 4 s 
11 100 52 57 49 41 3.96 3.96 3.68 3.79 
2 99 63 80 81 81 3.75 5.04 5.04 5.46 
8 97 24 37 39 41 2.64 3.57 3.89 4.25 
17 97 90 60 56 58 4.32 3.89 3.00 3.07 
6 96 37 34 38 42 3.07 3.29 3.32 3.89 
12 83 47 61 67 61 3.50 3.89 4.61 3.64 
7 81 7 3 6 5 1.50 1.25 1.75 1.50 
1 51 29 27 10 1 2.61 2.32 1.54 1.14 
16 29 3 7 3 5 1.21 1.39 1.25 1.32 
15 14 1 0 2 10 1.11 1.04 1.11 1.29 
3 12 7 0 0 0 1.43 1.00 1.00 1.00 
14 1 0 0 0 0 1.00 1.04 1.11 1.00 
9 0 0 0 0 0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
10 0 0 0 0 0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 
A one-way ANOVA comparing intensity ratings across stimulus duration was not 
significant (F (1.45, 18.87) = 0.19, p = .76): that is, intensity ratings were similar across 
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all durations (1 second M = 2.29, MSE = 0.33; 2 seconds M = 2.41, MSE = 0.39; 3 seconds 
M = 2.38, MSE = 0.40; 4 seconds M = 2.38, MSE = 0.42). (Note that Ward et al. (2010), 
reported a similar average vividness rating, 3, for genuine synaesthetes.) Similarly, a one-
way ANOVA comparing percentage of graphemes perceived as coloured across stimulus 
duration was not significant (F (1.52, 19.73) = 0.11, p = .84) with comparable percentage 
of grapheme appearing as coloured across all durations (1 second M = 25.72 %, MSE = 
7.64; 2 seconds M = 26.25 %, MSE = 7.68; 3 seconds M = 24.99 %, MSE = 7.72; 4 seconds 
M = 24.75 %, MSE = 7.57), (Ward et al. (2010), reported a similar percentage, 30%, for 
genuine synaesthetes.) The duration which the embedded figures stimulus was presented 
for therefore did not substantially affect the phenomenological experience of colour. 
Relationship between accuracy and phenomenological reports of colour 
In order to better understand the role, if any, that colour was playing in shape detection 
the relationship between accuracy and the phenomenological colour reports was explored. 
For these analyses, the participants were divided by a median split according to 
the number of trials in which they reported colour experiences thereby creating two 
groups: many or few colour response to the colour suggestion. 
There is evidence for a relationship between accuracy and phenomenological 
report when trials are grouped by accuracy.  Participant 10 who never experienced colours 
had 100 % accuracy for the 4 seconds duration block preventing comparison between 
correct and incorrect trials; after excluding this participant there remained six participants 
in the group who experienced few colours and seven in the group who experienced many 
colours. Using phenomenological ratings (mean intensity, mean number of graphemes 
perceived as coloured) as the dependent variables a 2x2x4 ANOVA was conducted 
contrasting group (many v. few colour-responses), accuracy (correct v. incorrect trials) 
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and duration (4 levels). The data are summarised in Figure 3. For intensity, there was a 
significant interaction of group X accuracy (F (1, 11) = 5.09, p = .045).  All other main 
effects and interactions were not significant. The interaction was analysed further by 
simple effects of accuracy for each group. For the group who experienced few colours, 
the effect of accuracy was not significant (F (1, 5) = .016, p = .71) however for the group 
who experienced many colours this main effect was significant (F (1, 6) = 6.32, p = .046) 
as more vivid colours were reported for accurate compared to inaccurate trials. This is 
summarised in Figure 2.4.   
 
Figure 2.4. The mean intensity of colours (1 = no colour, 6 = vivid colour) reported for 
trials in which the embedded figure was correctly or incorrectly detected dependent on 
whether the participant saw many colours or few colours.   Error bars represent 1 SEM. 
 
For the percentage of graphemes perceived as coloured, there was again a 
significant interaction of group X accuracy (F (1, 11) = 5.80, p = .035). The other main 
effects and interactions were not significant. A simple effects analysis indicated that for 
the group who experienced few colours, the effect of accuracy was not significant (F (1, 
5) = 0.51, p = .51) whereas for the group who experienced many colours it was significant 
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(F (1, 6) = 6.51, p = .043) with more colours being reported for accurate opposed to 
inaccurate trials. The data are summarised in Figure 2.5. Together, the results from 
Figures 2.4 and 2.5 show that participants who saw many colours had more intense and 
wide spreading phenomenological colour experiences for trials in which they correctly 
compared to incorrectly identified the embedded shape. 
 
Figure 2.5. The percentage of graphemes within the array being reported as coloured for 
trials in which the embedded figure was correctly or incorrectly perceived.  Error bars 
represent 1 SEM. 
 
Although the different groups report different levels of colour intensity and 
disparity on correct versus incorrect trials, the overall number of correct trials didn’t differ 
according to these groups.  A 2x4 repeated measures ANOVA with percentage correct as 
the dependent variable contrasting group (experiencing few versus many colours) and 
duration of stimulus (1-4 seconds) was conducted, considering only the hypnotic-
suggestion condition. This data is summarised in Figure 2.6. The main effect of duration 
was significant (F (1.67, 20.09) = 18.88, p < .001) with accuracy improving as stimulus 
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duration increased. The interaction between group and stimulus durations was not 
significant (F (1.67, 20.09) = 0.31, p = .70). Importantly, the difference in accuracy for 
the hypnosis block between those who experienced many (M = 61.7%, MSE = 5.7) and 
few (M = 64.7%, MSE = 5.7) colour responses to the synaesthesia suggestion was not 
significant (F (1, 12) = 0.13, p = .72. To interpret the non-significant result, a Bayes Factor 
analysis was conducted. Again a half-normal distribution was chosen to test the 
alternative hypothesis that the group who experienced many versus few colours 
performed better, representing a real synaesthesia-like behavioural advantage in those 
who had phenomenological experience of the colours. As Ward et al. (2010) measured a 
10% accuracy advantage for synaesthetes, this was used as the SD. With a mean 
difference of -3, and MSE of 9.5 the resulting Bayes Factor was 0.58 which is between 
1/3 and 3 and therefore indicates insensitive data.  
 
Figure 2.6. Shape detection accuracy for lots and little colour responders during the 
hypnosis condition across stimulus durations (1-4 seconds). Error bars represent 1 SEM. 
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2.5 Discussion 
We aimed to determine whether hypnotic synaesthesia was similar either behaviourally 
or phenomenologically to developmental synaesthesia through measuring accuracy and 
colour experience during an embedded figures task with and without hypnotic suggestion.  
Under the hypnotic suggestion the phenomenology of the participants was similar to that 
documented for synaesthetes.  Specifically, they tended not to perceive the entire array of 
graphemes as coloured and the subjective intensity ratings were similar to those reported 
by synaesthetes.  However, the behavioural advantage previously found for synaesthetes 
was not found under hypnotic suggestions, even when one only considers those subjects 
who responded strongly to the specific suggestions.  Further analyses (using Bayes 
factors) suggested that this was not merely due to a lack of sensitivity. As such, our 
conclusion is that hypnotically induced grapheme-colour experiences are not equivalent 
to those in developmental synaesthesia.    
On first impressions, this result seems at odds with Cohen Kadosh et al. (2009), 
who found that hypnotically suggested synaesthesia results in similar performance to 
developmental synaesthetes, showing a deterioration in the ability to detect an achromatic 
grapheme when the concurrent matched the background colour. However, because this 
study predicted an impairment (as opposed to an enhancement), their task is potentially 
more susceptible to demand characteristics.  We note that the experimenter in the present 
study was not blind to the experimental condition.  However, the principal effect (if any) 
of lack of blindness would be to amplify demand characteristics, which we have argued 
are less likely to apply in our study than in Cohen Kadosh et al. (2009).  The combination 
of a strong behavioural effect in Cohen Kadosh et al., and none at all in our study, is most 
simply explained by subjects responding according to how they believe they should, 
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without hypnotically-induced alterations in perceptual abilities. This claim is entirely 
consistent with subjects in both studies having subjectively compelling experiences. 
It is important to note that the ability to respond to the synaesthesia suggestion 
was very variable across our participants.  This is perhaps not surprising since perceptual 
hallucinations are difficult to evoke even in highly hypnotisable subjects (Bowers, 1998). 
It should also be noted that many developmental grapheme-colour synaesthetes fail to 
report colours during this task, at least during brief (1 second) presentations of the array 
(Ward et al. 2010).  The strength of subjective experience of the colours was comparable 
to that of synaesthetes. Anecdotally, some of our participants noted that the hypnotically 
suggested colours appeared to diminish over time.  To reduce the impact of this, the 
suggestion was reinforced between blocks to sustain the colours but several participants 
struggled to maintain the suggestion all the same. Future research should combine 
extensive training of grapheme-colour pairings (e.g., Rothen, Wantz, & Meier, 2011) with 
subsequent hypnotic suggestion.  
If (at least some) of our hypnotised participants reported colour experiences then 
why didn’t this help them to detect the embedded figure?  Our explanation is that the 
colour hallucinations are primarily added after grapheme (and global figure) 
identification or, relatedly, that the ‘task’ of adding colour visualisations competes with 
the primary task of finding the embedded figure.  This is supported by the analysis in 
which participants were divided (by median split) according to whether they reported 
many or few colour visualisations.  For the half of participants who experienced many 
colours, significantly more vivid colours were reported for accurate compared to 
inaccurate trials. This difference was not evident in the group who did not experience 
much colour, perhaps due to a floor effect given that so little colour was reported by these 
participants. The enhanced colour experience for correct compared to incorrect trials for 
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those who did experience colour may reflect the ease with which the colours could be 
projected onto the graphemes by the participant. In this view, once the shape has been 
detected, the identity of digits within the array can more easily be inferred, potentially 
allowing easier visualisation of the spatial localisation of the red and green colours. In 
trials in which the shape has not been detected, the participant is performing two tasks at 
once; the conscious task of identifying the shape and the ‘unconscious’ task of projecting 
colours onto black graphemes. The process of binding the grapheme with the concurrent 
colour does not seem to occur as automatically in hypnotically suggested synaesthesia, as 
compared to developmental synaesthesia. Indeed, there is evidence that many hypnotic 
responses take up capacity by virtue of being hypnotic (Hilgard, 1986; Tobis & 
Kihlstrom, 2010; Wyzenbeek & Bryant, 2012; contrast Woody & Bowers, 1994). 
Developmental and artificially induced variants of synaesthesia (ie. hypnotic or drug 
induced) may be different. Auvray and Farina (in press) have explored this issue, and 
using their characterisation of developmental synaesthesia  (as satisfying the criteria of 
the pairing of an inducer with a conscious concurrent, the idiosyncratic nature of the 
concurrent, and the concurrent being produced automatically and consistently) they have 
suggested hypnotic synaesthesia satisfies the requirements of having a concurrent paired 
with an inducer, in an idiosyncratic and automatic way, but that consistency requires 
further investigation. Further, they suggest that the concurrent may be produced by 
imagery. Our results support a limited similarity between developmental and hypnotic 
synaesthesia, and showing that despite the phenomenology, the concurrent may not be 
automatically produced (as shown by a lack of behavioural improvement). 
How is it possible that our participants were able to generate colour experiences 
at all (assuming, that is, that their subjective reports had some basis)?  One possibility is 
that it relies on mechanisms normally used to support visual imagery.  However, we did 
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not assess this directly in our research.  Other research suggests that there are individual 
differences between high and low hypnotisable subjects in the tendency to employ 
imagery in suitable contexts (e.g. Lynn, & Green, 2011; Hilgard, 1979; Roche & 
McConkey, 1990; Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974; Wilson & Barber, 1982).  However, the 
tendency to employ imagery in certain contexts may reflect strategic differences rather 
than ability differences given that high susceptible participants are not especially quick at 
visual information processing (Acosta & Crawford, 1985; Friedman, Taub, Sturr, & 
Monty, 1987) and are not especially high in rated imagery vividness (Jamieson & 
Sheehan, 2002; though compare the feats of imagery achieved by high but not low 
susceptible subjects in Mazzoni et al., 2009). These suggestions are tentative given that 
we did not run low hypnotisable subjects.  Further, measuring the mental imagery abilities 
of participants would help clarify to what extent participants are able to use mental 
imagery to complete the tasks and how this relates to the individual profiles of hypnotic 
susceptibility  (Cardeña, 2005; Terhune & Cardeña, 2010).  
    The lack of behavioural advantage for hypnotic synaesthetes can be taken as 
evidence against functional similarity between hypnotic and natural synaesthesia, but by 
the same token it provides support for the Cold Control theory of hypnosis (Dienes & 
Perner, 2007), and the class of theories which postulate no special ability is gained when 
an action is performed hypnotically (e.g. Kirsch & Lynn, 1999). Cold Control theory 
states that the subjective lack of volition in hypnosis is due to not forming the higher order 
thought (HOT) linked to the intention. In this sense, someone who responds to the 
suggestion ‘lift your arm’ could lift their arm but not have the HOT ‘I am intending to 
my arm’. If this theory holds, then participants should not be able to perform better in the 
hypnosis block then they do in the control block. Our data indeed support this inference. 
Theories that postulate that hypnotic hallucination is perception-like in a way that goes 
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beyond normal imagery (e.g. Brown & Oakley, 2004) are challenged by the current 
results.  
In summary, hypnosis can induce verbal reports of phenomenological experience 
of grapheme-colour synaesthesia similar to those provided by developmental grapheme-
colour synaesthetes, when applied in high susceptible participants.  However, even 
though there are strong similarities in the subjective reports of natural and hypnotic 
synaesthetes, this in not reflected in behavioural similarities.  Highly hypnotisable 
subjects do not gain any perpetual abilities with a hypnotic suggestion that they did not 
have prior to hypnotic induction (Dienes & Perner, 2007). 
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CHAPTER 3: 
HYPNOTIC MOTION-SOUND SYNAESTHESIA AND MENTAL IMAGERY 
-PAPER 2 
3.1 Abstract 
Motion-sound (MS) synaesthesia occurs when viewing movement or flashes of light 
causes a concurrent auditory experience. In general, rhythms are easier to discriminate 
when presented via audition (sequences of beeps) rather than vision (sequences of 
flashes), and previous research has shown a behavioural advantage for MS synaesthetes 
when discriminating pairs of flashing light sequences. This is consistent with the idea that 
the flashes have auditory-like properties for these people. To explore this further, we took 
advantage of the fact that hypnosis can create perceptual experiences reported to be 
phenomenologically similar to the experiences of synaesthetes. We asked whether 
behavioural advantages similar to those measured in MS synaesthetes can be evoked in 
participants using mental imagery or hypnosis to “hear” beeps similar to Morse code 
when viewing flashing circles. MS synaesthetes were significantly better at 
differentiating visual trials compared to low (hypnosis) susceptible participants. Mental 
imagery or hypnosis didn’t improve the accuracy of participants, therefore MS 
synaesthesia appears to involve more than automatic mental imagery and can’t be created 
using hypnosis.  
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3.2 Introduction 
Motion-sound (MS) synaesthesia is one of the more recently discovered types of 
synaesthesia and is characterised by objective visual movement or flashes of light 
(inducer) causing a simultaneous sound experience (concurrent) (Saenz & Koch, 2008). 
There is variability in the sounds which different MS synaesthetes hear (whirring, beeps, 
tapping) (Saenz & Koch, 2008), however the only published study of motion-hearing 
synaesthesia tested four synaesthetes who all heard beeps similar to Morse code when 
viewing flashing circles of light (Saenz & Koch, 2008). When making same/different 
judgements for pairs of visual or auditory sequences, there is a general behavioural 
advantage when determining whether auditory sequences are the same or not,  compared 
to visual sequences (Glenberg, Mann, Altman, Forman, & Procise, 1989; Guttman, 
Gilroy, & Blake, 2005). Participants are able to hear the “rhythm” of the beeps easier than 
viewing the sequence of flashing circles. Saenz and Koch (2008) therefore hypothesised 
that MS synaesthetes would have a behavioural advantage over non-synaesthetes for pairs 
of visual sequences in virtue of the concurrent sound, but that there would be no 
difference between synaesthetes and non-synaesthetes when discriminating among purely 
auditory sequences. This is indeed what they found, and this was provided as evidence 
for the existence of MS synaesthesia. This doesn’t however inform us whether non-MS 
synaesthetes can improve their accuracy if they deliberately hear similar sounds. In this 
study we shall explore artificial MS synaesthesia using mental imagery and hypnosis to 
ask whether similar behavioural advantages to developmental MS synaesthetes can be 
created and are not therefore special to MS synaesthetes. This would show that MS 
synaesthesia is due to specific cognitions rather than of organic origin.  By exploring the 
phenomenology of developmental MS synaesthetes this study also considers how MS 
synaesthesia compares to general synaesthesia classification systems. This is required as 
automaticity is the only criteria explored thus far. 
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The first study of MS synaesthesia supported the automatic nature of the 
concurrent sound, however this only illustrates one possible criterion for synaesthesia 
(Aurvray & Farina, in press). There are difficulties in defining synaesthesia due to the 
large, increasing number of synaesthesia types claimed as well as selection biases of 
participants in synaesthesia experiments (Simner, 2012). Auvray and Farina suggest four 
distinct criteria that should be satisfied for a particular experience to be classified as 
synaesthesia-like or synaesthetic. These are; pairing between an inducer and a conscious 
concurrent, idiosyncratic concurrents, automaticity and consistency. The auditory and 
visual sequence task used by Saenz and Koch (2008) showed that the inducer (movement) 
was paired with a conscious concurrent (consciously perceived sound). Further to this, 
the auditory concurrent was automatic as the MS synaesthetes had a behavioural 
advantage for the visual trials in comparison to control participants.  
 The other aspects of Auvray and Farina’s synaesthesia classification system have 
not yet been explored for MS synaesthesia, that of consistency and idiosyncrasy. 
Consistency is typically measured in synaesthesia through test re-test consistency, where 
the concurrents evoked by specific inducers are indicated by the synaesthete either several 
times in the same session (Eagleman et al., 2007) or after a delay in time such as months 
(Simner, Gärtner, & Taylor, 2011). Idiosyncrasy is individuality in specific inducer and 
concurrent pairings. Not all synaesthetes have the same experience for a particular inducer 
(such as what colour grapheme-colour synaesthetes experience for the letter “Y”). Saenz 
and Koch (2008) noted that the phenomenology of MS synaesthesia for their four 
synaesthetes consisted of non-linguistic sounds like beeps, whirrs or taps. How 
idiosyncratic are these sounds? In comparison to a letter having a particular colour, it 
could be argued that all these sounds (beeps, whirrs or taps) are associated with particular 
movements or flashes of light. More unusual sounds triggered by movement would 
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provide evidence for idiosyncrasy in MS synaesthesia. Furthermore, do different types of 
movement make different sounds? Saenz and Koch (2009) noted that the synaesthetes 
reported having these sounds for as long as they could remember, however there are no 
test, re-test measures of MS synaesthesia. Consistency is therefore not known. Exploring 
these aspects of MS synaesthesia would show how it compares to other more researched 
types of synaesthesia. There is however debate whether consistency is really a 
requirement of synaesthesia, or whether consistent concurrents are limited to a subset of 
synaesthetes (Simner, 2012). 
Although Saenz and Koch (2008) have shown that MS synaesthesia gives a 
behavioural advantage for distinguishing between visual sequences pairs in relation to 
controls, the role of mental imagery in this context has not been explored. Could mental 
imagery alone produce the same advantage with the auditory concurrents working as an 
“auditory technique”? If so, this would show that MS synaesthesia is due to functional 
rather than organic mechanisms.  
Hypnosis allows a participant’s perceptual experience to be altered in a specific 
way, such as to create a visual hallucination of not seeing something which has been 
presented in front of them (Bowers, 1998). Generally, hypnosis starts with an induction 
where the participant is brought into a relaxed state, before the experimenter makes 
structured suggestions (Oakley & Halligan, 2009). If the suggestions are tested at this 
point during hypnosis, they are hypnotic suggestions. Participants are then brought out of 
hypnosis after which post-hypnotic (out of hypnosis) suggestions can be tested, such as 
analgesia. Post-hypnotic suggestions allow the testing of participants while they are in an 
alert state.   
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The scope of hypnosis to generate new experiences can be used to research 
theories of hypnosis itself. One group of theories pertain that hypnosis can be used to 
create new abilities or skills in the participant that are not accessible without hypnosis, 
such as being able to withstand pain (Hilgard, 1986; Freeman, Barabasz, Barabasz, & 
Warner, 2000) or control automatic cognitive processes such as font colour and colour 
word binding in the Stroop task (Raz et al., 2003; Raz, Shapiro, Fan, & Posner, 2002). 
Another class of theories maintain hypnosis can’t create any new abilities (eg. Sarbin and 
Coe, 1972; Spanos, 1986). Theories with this view include  higher order thought (HOT) 
theories (Dienes & Perner, 2007), which suggest hypnosis works by impeding the higher 
order thought associated with a particular act, for example lifting your arm with a 
levitating suggestion, but without thinking “I am intending to lift my arm”, causing a 
feeling of loss of control for the action. Hypnosis is an alteration in meta-cognition, not 
creation of new abilities. Therefore, if hypnosis can create new abilities, such as task 
advantages similar to those exhibited by developmental synaesthetes, this would support 
theories which sustain new abilities can be created, otherwise they would support the 
latter. 
Hypnosis has been used previously in an attempt to create hypnotic grapheme-
colour (GC) synaesthesia. Cohen Kadosh and colleagues investigated whether grapheme-
colour synaesthesia-like percepts could be induced in participants highly susceptible to 
hypnosis, and whether this was sufficient to create associated behavioural changes 
(Cohen Kadosh, Henik, Catena, et al., 2009). For hypnotic synaesthetes, accuracy was 
significantly lower for detecting graphemes when the concurrent and background colour 
matched, making them harder to see compared to when they didn’t. This was interpreted 
as support for the view that synaesthesia-like behaviour was created without organic 
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changes (as there would have been insufficient time following hypnosis to generate 
neurological changes).   
Anderson et al. (2014) examined a situation in which hypnotically-induced GC 
synaesthesia would be expected to induce behavioural advantages (rather than 
impairments). Participants were required to detect an embedded shape, rate the vividness 
of colours experienced and the percentage of digits in the array which appeared coloured. 
Accuracy for identifying the embedded shape was not higher for the hypnosis block (in 
which they experienced colours for the digits) in comparison to the no suggestion control 
block. This was in contrast  to studies which have tested developmental GC synaesthetes 
on the same task (Ward et al., 2010). The authors suggested that the colours experienced 
were more akin to mental imagery than true synaesthesia. This is because  the colours did 
not appear automatically and therefore aid in the shape detection task, they were produced 
after shape detection (when it was easier to add colour to the image as the location of the 
shape had already been identified and it was clear which colour should appear where 
within the digit array). They therefore suggested that hypnotic GC synaesthesia was 
similar phenomenologically, but not behaviourally. Results of hypnotic synaesthesia 
studies are therefore inconsistent thus far.  
Dissociation is either a sense of detachment, in respect to yourself or your 
environment, or compartmentalisation, an impairment in a usually controllable process 
(Holmes et al., 2005). There have been some reports that people who are highly 
susceptible to hypnosis and generally do not experience dissociation become more 
dissociative while “under” hypnosis (Terhune et al., 2011) although the general trend for 
highs to be dissociative is disputable (Dienes et al., 2009).This study will therefore use 
post-hypnotic suggestion (where the suggestion is triggered after the participants has been 
brought out of hypnosis) to prevent any possible confounding effects of a hypnotic-
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suggestion (where the suggestion is triggered whilst the participant is under hypnosis). 
Further to this, participants will complete a dissociation questionnaire, the Dissociative 
Experiences Scale- C (DES-C) (Wright & Loftus, 1999) to determine whether 
dissociation is accounting for behavioural changes in participants. 
The current study will therefore use the auditory and visual sequence 
differentiation task used by Saenz and Koch (2009) and compare task performance for 
developmental MS synaesthetes and control participants of different hypnotic 
susceptibilities. Mental imagery instructions or post-hypnotic suggestions will be given 
for control participants to use the auditory technique in the attempt to improve their 
accuracy for visual trials in a similar manner to the developmental MS synaesthetes. 
Questionnaires will be used to assess their visual and auditory mental imagery abilities 
and dissociation. 
3.3 Method 
For this study all participants completed the task at baseline i.e., participants completed 
it without any mental imagery or hypnotic instruction to measure their general ability. 
The non-MS synaesthetes completed the task a second experimental time to investigate 
the effects of mental imagery or hypnotic instruction. A mixed two (time; baseline or 
experimental) by four (group; high, medium, low or MS synaesthete) design was used 
with repeated measures for the time and independent for condition.  
Participants 
Eleven men, 32 women and one transgender (N = 44) participant aged 18-44 (M = 23.49, 
SD = 5.40) completed the experiment. They were recruited through the University of 
Sussex hypnotic susceptibility database and synaesthesia database. They were paid £5 for 
participation. Ethical clearance was granted by the University of Sussex Ethics 
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Committee. There were 16 low susceptible, 10 medium susceptible, 14 high susceptible, 
3 MS synaesthetes who hear beeps for flashing lights, and one MS synaesthete with other 
MS concurrents. As he had very different sounds he was not included in the MS 
synaesthete group. 
Participant CT hears crackles similar to lightening when viewing flashing lights, 
very different to those of the other synaesthetes therefore he was not included in the 
general analysis. He is also highly susceptible to hypnosis, therefore we tested whether 
we could create auditory hallucinations similar to the other high participants. Even 
though he had his own specific concurrent to the flashing lights (which happened for 
roughly 40% of trials), after post-hypnotic suggestion, he actually heard beeps as well 
(for an additional 10% of trials). This avenue is not explored further in this study, but 
the ability to add a secondary concurrent in a synaesthete could allow comparison of 
developmental and artificial concurrents in the same individual in future research. 
Materials 
Auditory sequences were played through Sennheiser HD 497 headphones. The program 
was run using E-prime 2.0 and presented on a 32cm CRT monitor with 60 Hz refresh rate. 
The Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ; Marks & Marks, 1973) 
and Clarity of Auditory Imagery Scale (CAIS; Willander & Baraldi, 2010) were used to 
measure the visual and auditory mental imagery capabilities respectively. Dissociation 
was measured using the Dissociative Experiences Scale-Comparison (DES-C; Wright, 
Loftus, & Wright, 2002). 
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Procedure 
Participants sat with their chin on a rest, 44.5 cm from the monitor. The experiment was 
based on the Saenz and Koch (2008) study. Each sequence was made of four short 
(50ms) and four long (200ms) presentations of beeps (360Hz) or white circles (1.5 
degree radius) each separated by a 100ms blank interval. This series of beeps/ flashing 
circles made a short sequence, similar to Morse code. In each trial, two sequences 
would be presented in succession which were either identical to each other, or slightly 
different. Each trial consisted of either two auditory ‘beep’ sequences or two white 
flashing circles sequences. During auditory trials, only a fixation cross was on screen. 
There were 100 trials (50 visual, 50 auditory) and half the stimulus pairs were the same. 
Participants made a 2AFC decision using the keyboard to indicate whether the pair of 
sequences were the same, or different (S = same, D = different).  Initially four practice 
trials were completed during which feedback was not given before the main experiment 
started. Participants were informed that they would complete the experiment twice with 
different instructions before the second run and knew whether they were in the hypnosis 
(high hypnotic susceptibility) or mental imagery (low or medium hypnotic 
susceptibility) group. The three MS synaesthetes completed the task once (other than 
the highly hypnotisable MS synaesthete who completed it twice). The experiment was 
conducted in a darkened room.  
 After the baseline block where the general ability of the participant was 
recorded, instructions for the experimental block were given to the low, medium and 
high groups (MS synaesthetes didn’t complete the experimental block as they already 
have an auditory concurrent). Those in the hypnosis group were given a short induction 
before a post-hypnotic suggestion to hear a beep every time a white circle appeared on 
the screen, and to hear these beeps in the same sequence in which the flashing circles 
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appeared. This would be triggered by one clap of the hands, with two claps indicating 
the end of the suggestion. They were then brought out of hypnosis. The mental imagery 
group only read the suggestion and trigger instruction (hand clap), but not the hypnotic 
induction. This ensured that both (non synaesthetic) groups were given the same 
instructions. The experimenter then clapped their hands once before the experiment was 
completed for the second time to trigger the post-hypnotic or mental imagery suggestion 
to hear a concurrent auditory experience for the flashing white circles.   
 After the experimental block the experimenter clapped their hands twice to stop 
the post-hypnotic suggestion (or indicate that the participant could stop deliberately 
imagining the sounds). Participants were asked whether they used any techniques to aid 
in the differentiation of the sequences (baseline or experimental block; visual or 
auditory sequences). They answered additional questions about the experimental block; 
% of visual trials they heard beeps for and how many years of music experience they 
had. Finally, the VVIQ, CAIS and DES-C were administered.  
3.4 Results 
The analyses will be conducted in two stages. Initially, the baseline data (completion of 
the experiment initially with no mental imagery or hypnotic instruction) will be 
analysed according to status i.e. susceptibility or MS synaesthete. Next, the 
experimental data (completion of the experiment after mental imagery or hypnotic 
instruction) will be analysed according to condition i.e., mental imagery or hypnotic 
suggestion.   
Accuracy was compared using d’, this measure of accuracy represents the 
difference between the standardised (z score) signal present, and signal absent data 
distributions. The task used in this study was to decide whether two sequences were the 
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same or different. A hit (H) corresponded to a trial in which a different pair of 
sequences were correctly classed as different by the participant, and a false alarm (FA) 
corresponded to a trial in which two same sequences were incorrectly classed as 
different. The formula is d’= z(H) - z(FA).  Response bias, how the participants are 
tending to respond, was also analysed to see if this accounts for differences between 
groups. The measure of response bias used with d’ is Criterion, c = -(Z(H) + Z(FA))/2. 
Larger values indicate a bias towards one particular response. A negative criterion value 
suggests a greater number of “different” responses (liberal bias). Positive criterion 
values show a greater number of “same” responses (conservative bias). 
Baseline accuracy 
We first tested whether accuracy for auditory trials was greater than for visual trials, as 
this is the premise on which the study is based. If auditory trials were not easier to 
distinguish between, then advantages from internal auditory concurrents in MS 
synaesthetes would not aid in differentiation for visual trials. We performed a two 
(stimulus; visual or auditory) by four (group; low hypnotisability, medium 
hypnotisability, high hypnotisability or MS synaesthete) mixed ANOVA with repeated 
measures for stimulus, with d’ as the dependent variable. The main effect of stimulus 
when ignoring time or group was significant (F (1, 39) = 83.45, p < .001) with accuracy 
of auditory trials being higher than that of visual trials (see Figure 3.1). This showed 
that the basic principle underlying the study was upheld, allowing condition dependent 
behavioural improvements for visual trials compared to auditory trials to be compared.  
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Figure 3.1. Accuracy for auditory or visual trials at baseline, while ignoring group. 
Error bars represent +/- 1SEM. 
 
Next, differences between the groups at baseline was tested. The main effect of 
group when ignoring stimulus was not significant (F (3, 39) = 1.91, p = .14) with low, 
medium and high susceptible participants having similar accuracy to MS synaesthetes 
overall. This shows that there were no general differences in task ability between the 
groups. The interaction between group and stimulus was also not significant (F (3, 39) = 
0.92, p = .44) showing that the relationship between accuracy for auditory and visual 
trials was the same across all groups as can be seen in Figure 3.2.   
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Figure 3.2. Accuracy (d’) of low, medium and high susceptibility participants and MS 
synaesthetes for visual and auditory trials in the baseline block. Error bars represent +/- 
1SEM. 
 
We wanted to determine whether there was a trend for differences between 
groups in the data. We therefore conducted one way ANOVAs on each stimulus 
individually. First a four (group; low hypnotisability, medium hypnotisability, high 
hypnotisability or MS synaesthete) way independent ANOVA was run for auditory 
trials. The main effect of group was not significant (F (3, 39) = 0.59, p = 633) with 
similar accuracy across all four groups as summarised in Figure 3.2. All groups showed 
the same skill for auditory trials.  
We next tested  whether MS synaesthetes could distinguish between visual trials 
better than non- MS synaesthetes, as predicted on the basis of previous literature (Saenz 
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& Koch, 2008). To investigate whether there was a difference in accuracy for visual 
trials, a four (group; low hypnotisability, medium hypnotisability, high hypnotisability 
or MS synaesthete) way independent ANOVA was conducted. The main effect of group 
was significant (F (3, 39) = 3.07, p = .04) and Bonferroni adjusted post-hoc 
comparisons found significantly higher accuracy for MS synaesthetes compared to low 
susceptibility participants (p = .04), but no differences between any other groups. MS 
synaesthetes had the greatest accuracy for distinguishing between visual trials, as seen 
in Figure 3.2, however there also appears to be a slight trend for higher susceptibility to 
be associated with greater accuracy on this task even though this is a baseline measure 
before any suggestion has been given. 
Baseline response bias 
Next we tested whether there were differences in how the participants answered. For 
example, were the low group less accurate because they tended to respond same for 
visual trials because they were less sensitive to differences? A negative criterion value 
reflects a liberal bias, that is a greater number of “different” responses indicating a bias 
towards choosing the response “different” in the task. Positive criterion values show a 
conservative bias, that is a greater number of “same” responses and a bias towards 
choosing the response “same” in the task. In order to determine whether there were 
differences in how participants answered a two (stimulus; visual or auditory) by four 
(group; low hypnotisability, medium hypnotisability, high hypnotisability or MS 
synaesthete) mixed ANOVA with repeated measures for stimulus was conducted with 
d’ criterion as the dependent variable.  
We have already shown that accuracy was significantly higher overall for 
auditory compared to visual trials. Now looking at criterion, the main effect of stimulus 
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when ignoring group was significant (F (1, 39) = 37.15, p < .001) with participants 
being more likely to respond “different” for auditory trials and “same” for visual trials. 
One sample t-tests confirmed that these biases were significantly different from zero (t 
(43) = -5.00, p < .001; t (43) = 5.26, p < .001 respectively). There were therefore 
significant differences in how the participants responded depending on the type of trial. 
The data is shown in Figure 3.3. 
 
Figure 3.3. Response bias of low, medium and high susceptibility participants and MS 
synaesthetes for visual and auditory trials in the baseline block. Negative values reflects 
a greater number of “different” responses (liberal bias). Positive values show a greater 
number of “same” responses (conservative bias). Error bars represent +/- 1SEM. 
 
Were there differences between the groups in how they responded? The main 
effect of group when ignoring stimulus was not significant (F (3, 39) = 2.48, p = .08) 
with relatively consistent responses across all groups. The interaction was not 
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trial type was similar across groups. We wanted to look for trends, therefore the data 
were split according to stimulus type.  
Initially a four (group; low hypnotisability, medium hypnotisability, high 
hypnotisability or MS synaesthete) way independent ANOVA was run for auditory 
trials to see if all groups responses in the same way. The main effect of group was not 
significant (F (3, 39) = 1.30, p = .29) with similar criterion across all four groups. 
Therefore all groups not only had the same level of accuracy for auditory trials, but they 
responded in the same way as well.  
To investigate whether there was a difference for visual trials, a four (group; low 
hypnotisability, medium hypnotisability, high hypnotisability or MS synaesthete) way 
independent ANOVA was conducted. The main effect of group was not significant (F 
(3, 39) = 2.11, p = .11) as responses type was similar across groups, although there was 
a general trend for MS synaesthetes to respond more as “different”. The MS 
synaesthetes, who were significantly more accurate than low susceptible participants on 
visual trials, tended to respond “different” more which is in line with the general 
response bias of all participants to respond “different” for auditory trials. This could be 
interpreted as further evidence of the MS synaesthetes actually hearing sounds when 
viewing the flashing circles. 
Spontaneous baseline strategies 
Non-MS synaesthetes (high, medium and low susceptible participants) were asked after 
completing the experiment whether they used any strategies to aid their judgements the 
first time they completed the experiment for auditory trials, or for visual trials. People 
generally just listened to the auditory trials, which is not surprising since there is a 
general advantage for auditory sequence differentiation. However, 15 of the non-
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synaesthetes (7 low, 7 medium and 1 high) used mentally created “beeps”, which were 
described as similar to the actual beeps they heard during the auditory trials, to aid their 
judgements for the visual trials. They spontaneously used the same strategy as the MS 
synaesthetes, and this was before MS synaesthesia, or the suggestion, had been 
mentioned to them. In order to determine whether this produced a behavioural 
improvement compared to participants who did not add the beeps to visual trials 
themselves, an independent samples Mann-Whitney U test comparing accuracy for 
visual trials in the baseline block, ignoring the group of participant was conducted, 
revealing no significant difference (U = 235.00, p = .18, r = .21) between the groups (no 
beeps, Median = 0.47, range = -0.59-3.73; yes beeps, Median = 0.94, range = -0.10-
1.53). When non-MS synaesthetic participants spontaneously used mentally evoked 
beeps to help them differentiate between visual trials in the baseline block, this did not 
actually improve their accuracy. 
Effect of mental imagery or post- hypnotic suggestion on accuracy 
Spontaneously using beeps for visual trials did not cause those participants to have 
better accuracy. In order to determine whether hypnotic suggestion, or mental imagery, 
improved performance for non-MS synaesthetes, the difference between baseline and 
experimental conditions was compared.  A change score was calculated for each 
participant by subtracting the baseline accuracy or criterion value from the experimental 
block value for visual or auditory trials.  
Initially a two (stimulus; visual or auditory) by three way (group; low, medium 
or high hypnotisability) mixed ANOVA with repeated measures for stimulus was run 
with d’ as the dependent variable. The low and medium groups received mental imagery 
instructions, whereas the high group received hypnotic suggestion. The low and 
87 
 
medium groups were not combined, as in the Anderson et al. (2014) study of hypnotic 
synaesthesia as the high susceptible participants performed comparably to GC 
synaesthetes suggesting a link between susceptibility and task performance. The key 
statistics of interest in the current study is whether visual accuracy increases as a result 
of hypnotic suggestion and imagery suggestion (a main effect of stimulus) or whether 
an increase in visual scores is found for hypnotic suggestion alone (an interaction of 
stimulus and group such that ‘highs’ show the greatest improvement on visual trials). 
The main effect of stimulus when ignoring group was not significant (F (1, 37) = 0.00, p 
= .98) with accuracy change of auditory trials being similar to visual trials therefore 
there was not an overall improvement for one stimulus type in comparison to the other. 
The main effect of group when ignoring stimulus was not significant (F (2, 37) = 0.94, p 
= .40), with similar overall accuracy change across all groups. The interaction was also 
not significant (F (2, 37) = 0.57, p = .57). The relationship between accuracy change for 
stimuli was similar across all groups and can be seen in Figure 3.4.   
 Finally for accuracy change, the data was split by stimulus type. A one way 
between subjects ANOVA was conducted on the auditory trials, with no significant 
difference (F (2, 37) = 0.11, p = .90) between the different susceptibility groups. For 
visual trials, no significant difference (F (2, 37) = 1.86, p = .17) between the different 
susceptibility groups was evident therefore there was no difference between the effects 
of mental imagery or post-hypnotic suggestion. As can be seen in Figure 3.4, the only 
increase in accuracy was for the low group in visual trials.  This could possibly be a 
practice effect given that this group started with the worst performance. In general, from 
looking at Figure 3.4 it appears that performance was relatively stable across the 
baseline and experimental blocks. 
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Figure 3.4. Accuracy (d’) change for low, medium and high susceptible groups. Error 
bars represent +/- 1SEM. 
 
Effect of mental imagery or post- hypnotic suggestion on response bias 
 No changes in accuracy were evident as a result of mental imagery or post-hypnotic 
suggestion, however this does not rule out changes in response bias. A two (stimulus; 
visual or auditory) by three (group; low hypnotisability, medium hypnotisability or high 
hypnotisability) way mixed ANOVA with repeated measures for stimulus was run with 
criterion as the dependent variable. For response bias, the main effect of stimulus was 
not significant (F (1, 37) = 0.17, p = .68) with similarly little response change for 
auditory and visual trials. The main effect of group was not significant (F (2, 37) = 0.05, 
p = .95) with overall bias being similar across groups. The interaction was not 
significant (F (2, 37) = 0.31, p = .73) and can be seen in Figure 3.5. 
 The data was then split according to stimulus type, and a one way ANOVA for 
group conducted on response change initially for auditory, then visual trials. For 
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auditory trials, the main effect of group was not significant (F (2, 37) = 0.27, p = .78) 
with similarly small changes in response type across groups. For visual trials, there was 
also no significant difference (F (2, 37) = 0.03, p = .97) with similar response change 
across groups. Giving non-MS synaesthetes mental imagery or post-hypnotic suggestion 
therefore didn’t improve accuracy for visual trials or change how they responded.  
 
Figure 3.5. Response bias change for low, medium and high susceptible participants for 
auditory and visual trials. Error bars represent +/- 1SEM. 
 
To confirm that non-MS participants were actually hearing beeps for the flashing 
circles, and test whether there were differences between the number of beeps heard 
depending on group, a three (group; low, medium or high susceptible) way independent 
ANOVA was conducted on the percentage of trials for which beeps were heard. The 
number of beeps was similar across groups (F (2, 37) = 1.02, p = .37) as can be seen in 
Figure 3.6. All groups did hear beeps for the visual trials in around half the trials. 
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Figure 3.6. Percentage of visual trials which auditory beeps were heard for in low, 
medium and high susceptible participants. Error bars represent +/- 1SEM. 
 
Correlations with questionnaire measures  
Exploratory correlational analysis was carried out between the different experimental 
measures and the questionnaires completed after the experiment for the 40 non-MS 
synaesthete participants. This can be seen in Table 3.1. 
If it was the sound of the beeps themselves which aids in the visual sequence 
differentiation for MS synaesthetes, we would expect the number of trials for which 
beeps were heard to significantly correlate with visual d’ which was not found. The 
general trend of higher hypnotisability participants being more accurate was not 
significant. None of the mental imagery measures correlated to the visual trial accuracy. 
Hearing beeps appeared to not actually improve the participant’s performance 
suggesting that the advantage of MS synaesthetes is due to more than the 
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phenomenology of the sound. Years of musical experience was the only measure which 
was significantly correlated to visual accuracy. 
Table 3.1. Spearman’s Rho correlations between behavioural measures for the 
experimental block (non-MS synaesthetes) ignoring group against post-experiment 
questionnaire responses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
p < .05 *, p < .01 **, p < .001 *** 
 Visual 
criterion 
Auditory 
d’ 
Auditory 
criterion 
WS VVIQ Auditory 
Imagery 
DESC % 
beeps 
for 
visual 
trials 
Years 
musical 
experience 
Visual d’ .06 .55 *** -.48 ** .08 .18 .04 .01 -.19 .33 * 
Visual 
criterion 
 -.12 .33 * .08 .05 .07 .34 * -.18 .21 
Auditory d’   -.43 ** .20 .07 .11 -.13 .14 .28 
Auditory 
criterion 
   -
.12 
-.12 .02 .16 -.14 -.06 
WS     -.14 .09 .07 -.02 -.07 
VVIQ       -.60 *** -.08 -.05 .14 
Auditory 
Imagery 
      .16 .06 .21 
DESC         -.09 .21 
% beeps 
for visual 
trials 
        -.02 
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3.5 Discussion 
The aim of the study was to investigate whether MS synaesthesia can be created in non-
MS synaesthetes using either hypnosis or mental imagery, and how this differed to 
developmental MS synaesthesia. First the results suggest that participants are 
significantly more accurate at distinguishing between auditory in comparison to visual 
sequences, they were better at discriminating beep rhythms. This justifies the suitability 
of this task to investigate audition based improvements for visual sequence 
discrimination.  Synaesthetes were significantly more accurate at visual sequence 
differentiation than low susceptible participants, replicating the findings of Saenz and 
Koch (2008). Not only was there a difference in accuracy, but MS synaesthetes showed 
a trend to respond “different” for visual trials whereas all other groups more often 
responded “same”. This is comparable to how participants responded in general towards 
the different stimuli, as there was an overall bias for participants to respond “different” 
for auditory trials, and “same” for visual. MS synaesthetes therefore responded to visual 
trials in the same manner as auditory trials.   
Non-MS synaesthetes were found to often spontaneously use beeps in the 
baseline block for visual trials however they were not significantly more accurate than 
those who didn’t use beeps. This suggests that the “beeps” they heard didn’t enhance 
visual sequence differentiation in the same way as an MS synaesthesia concurrent. This 
was also in line with the results of our main research question, can post-hypnotic 
suggestion or mental imagery improve visual sequence differentiation? There was no 
improvement in the low or medium hypnotisable mental imagery groups, or the high 
hypnotisable post-hypnotic suggestion group’s accuracy or change in how participants 
responded between the baseline and experimental block. The suggestion to hear beeps 
for the visual sequences therefore didn’t improve accuracy. Regardless of whether the 
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non-MS synaesthetes spontaneously used beeps as a strategy to improve discrimination 
for visual trials, or whether they were told to in the experimental block, non-MS 
synaesthetes were not able to use them to significantly improve their accuracy.  
 After more exploratory correlational analysis relationships were found between 
years of musical experience/ tuition and visual trial accuracy for the experimental block. 
This could be because musicians learn to read musical notation, to know how a piece of 
music will sound even though they have only seen it. The link between visual and 
auditory percepts could be argued to be more closely related.  Musicians have superior 
visuospatial performance on mental imagery or perceptual tasks (Brochard, Dufour, & 
Després, 2004) therefore this sequence differentiation task could tap into similar 
abilities.  Further, musicians learn to recognise errors to improve their performance 
however musical experience was not correlated to auditory sequence performance, as 
may be expected. This could be due to the generally high performance on the auditory 
trials across groups. 
 The lack of behavioural advantage from the post-hypnotic suggestion is in line 
with previous research on GC synaesthesia which also found no improvement as a result 
of hypnotic suggestion (Anderson, Seth, Dienes, & Ward, 2014). If a behavioural 
advantage had been measured for the highly susceptible participants in either study, this 
would have been evidence against HOT theories of hypnosis, and perhaps support 
theories which propose special abilities can be induced using hypnosis (Brown & 
Oakley, 2004). Unlike the Anderson et al. (2014) study, the phenomenology of 
synaesthesia didn’t require hypnosis to induce as many of the non-MS synaesthetes 
spontaneously used mentally created beeps as a task strategy. This makes intuitive 
sense, as although direction of sound can be determined, the sound is always 
experienced internally. Experiencing colours on graphemes required externalising a 
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hallucinatory percept, a task not conducted frequently. Mental imagery, in both cases 
however, was not akin to developmental synaesthesia in behaviour.  
 Variability in MS synaesthetes phenomenology is worth further investigation, on 
a larger scale. What is the range of concurrent sounds they experience, and how do they 
differ for different types of movement? Increasingly, the importance of phenomenology 
has come into light as although behavioural differences are informative for differences 
in processing in comparison to non synaesthetes to help establish its’ cause, they are not 
a core aspect of the definition of synaesthesia (Deroy & Spence, 2013). Furthermore, 
MS synaesthete CT who was excluded from group analysis due to differences in his 
concurrent but was also high susceptible was able to experience an additional, 
phenomenologically different concurrent to his developmental concurrent after post-
hypnotic suggestion. This suggests two very distinct mechanisms for the creation of the 
auditory concurrents, one for the developmental “crackling lightening” sounds and 
another for the suggested “beeps”. These seemed to happen in addition to the 
developmental sounds (accounted for an extra 10% of trials). This was only an 
individual participant, but does suggest a new avenue of research into comparing 
developmental and hypnotic synaesthesia mechanisms. 
The response bias to answer “different” for visual trials by the MS synaesthetes 
could be explored further. Although they are more accurate at differentiating between 
trials than low hypnotisable participants, they were liberal with their “different” 
responses. Although the auditory concurrents aid in the differentiation, there may be a 
slight discrepancy between the sound sequences and visual sequences, in other words 
there may be error or noise in the translation of the visual signal into an auditory signal. 
This way, if going by the auditory sequence most of the time this will improve 
accuracy, but also produce an occasional extra false positive. The limits of translation 
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from visual to auditory sequence could therefore inform us why MS synaesthetes are 
able to use the auditory concurrent beneficially, whereas non-MS synaesthetes who try 
and use sound as a strategy to improve performance fail to improve. 
This study didn’t record phenomenology on a trial by trial basis which would 
have allowed more detailed exploration of the link between phenomenology and 
behaviour. By recording whether sounds were heard after each visual trial for both MS 
and non-MS synaesthetes, this would allow the general trend for high susceptible 
participants to perform better, and the apparent lack of improvement from concurrent 
sound in non-MS synaesthetes to be explored. Furthermore, only three MS participants 
were tested, which although similar to the sample in the original MS study (three MS 
synaesthetes) is limited 
The current study found that post-hypnotic suggestion or mental imagery can’t 
create behaviour similar to developmental MS synaesthetes, and that hearing sounds for 
flashing circles is a strategy spontaneously used by many non-MS synaesthetes. The lack 
of accuracy improvement for high susceptible participants supports theories that posit no 
new abilities can be created using hypnosis, such as the HOT theories. Non-MS 
synaesthetes who use the same strategy spontaneously don’t demonstrate the same 
advantage, showing that MS synaesthesia is not created by purely functional mechanisms, 
such as mental imagery.  
 
 
 
 
96 
 
CHAPTER 4 
PRINCIPLE COMPONENT ANALYSES OF QUESITONNAIRES MEASURING 
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN SYNAESTHETIC PHENOMENONOLOGY  
-PAPER 3 
4.1. Abstract 
Questionnaires have been developed for categorising grapheme-colour synaesthetes into 
two sub-types based on phenomenology: associators and projectors. The general 
approach has been to assume a priori the existence of two sub-types on a single 
dimension (with endpoints as projector and associator) rather than explore, in a data-
driven fashion, other possible models. We collected responses from 175 grapheme-
colour synaesthetes on two questionnaires; the Illustrated Synaesthetic Experience 
Questionnaire (Skelton et al., 2009) and the Projector-Associator Questionnaire (Rouw 
& Scholte,2007). After Principle Component Analysis both questionnaires comprised 
two factors which coincide with the projector/ associator distinction.  This suggests that 
projectors and associators are not opposites of each other, but separate dimensions of 
experience (e.g. some synaesthetes claim to be both, others claim to be neither).  The 
revised questionnaires provide useful tools for researchers and insights into the 
phenomenology of synaesthesia. 
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4.2. Introduction 
For individuals with synaesthesia, an ‘inducer’ in one modality (percept or concept) 
triggers a ‘concurrent’ experience in another modality. One of the most common types 
of synaesthesia is grapheme-colour (GC) synaesthesia (Simner et al., 2006), where 
viewing a letter, number or even grammatical symbol can induce a consistent (Baron-
Cohen et al., 1993) and automatic (Mattingley et al., 2001) colour experience. Although 
the experiences of individual synaesthetes are internally consistent, there are large 
differences between synaesthetes as to how they experience the colour. Each 
synaesthete has their own colour palette, i.e. the specific colours that they link with each 
grapheme. Although there are trends such as ‘A’ frequently being red (Simner et al., 
2005) the actual colour that a synaesthete links to each grapheme, or the number of 
graphemes they have colour associations for, are not the only differences within this 
population.  
 GC synaesthetes have been roughly subdivided in previous research according 
to where they see their colour (Dixon et al., 2004). Projectors are classified as those 
who ‘see’ the colour in a projected location. This could be actually on the grapheme 
itself where it is located, for example if looking at a letter presented in black font on a 
piece of white paper, they would see the colour superimposed onto the grapheme on the 
actual paper or they may ‘see’ the colour floating in space between the grapheme itself 
and the person. The associator category encompasses those who ‘see’ the colours in 
their minds eye (irrespective of whether the colour is the same shape as the grapheme or 
a block of colour) and people who simply ‘know’ that a grapheme is a certain colour. 
Two questionnaires have been developed and used extensively within synaesthesia 
research to determine which end of a continuous dimension synaesthetes are, either a 
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projector or associator. These are the Illustrated Synaesthetic Experience Questionnaire 
(ISEQ; Skelton, Ludwig, & Mohr, 2009) and the Rouw and Scholte PA Questionnaire 
(RSPA; Rouw & Scholte, 2007).  
Support for this sub classification of grapheme-colour synaesthesia has come 
from behavioural differences. Interference is found on a synaesthetic Stroop task when 
presented graphemes are in colours that are incongruent with their experience (relative 
to congruent) and this occurs for both projectors and associators.  However, there are 
differences between projectors and associators depending on whether the task is to name 
the real colour (and ignore their synaesthesia) or name their synaesthetic colour (and 
ignore the real one) (Dixon et al., 2004). The authors predicted that projectors would 
demonstrate greater interference effects from photisms when having to name real 
colour, which they indeed observed. Projectors were faster at naming their photisms, 
whereas associators were faster at naming the real colour, which was also in line with 
their predictions. The results were presented as evidence for differences in the location 
of the concurrent photism interfering with the task. Other behavioural differences 
include a generally stronger correlation between similar graphemes (such as ‘b’ and ‘d’) 
and their concurrent colour which has been measured in projectors compared to 
associators (Brang et al., 2011).  
Functional differences have also been measured between projector and 
associator synaesthetes with associators using areas more involved in memory 
processes, and projectors using more perceptual processing regions (Rouw & Scholte, 
2010). Differences in V4 activation pathways has been measured in response to 
synaesthetic colour, fusiform gyrus for projectors and parietal lobe for associators (van 
Leeuwen, den Ouden, & Hagoort, 2011). Structural differences have also been 
measured with projector synaesthetes having greater inferior temporal cortex 
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connectivity than associator synaesthetes, the subtypes were measured via the projector-
associator questionnaire (Rouw & Scholte, 2007). Therefore there is a range of evidence 
that differences, both behavioural and neurological, exist between the synaesthetic 
subtypes. 
Although some differences have been measured between these sub groups, there 
are also instances where such a differentiation has not been observed.  In one example, 
participants had to indicate the colour of a colour patch or black digit which was primed 
by the other (a colour primed a digit, or a digit primed a colour) (Gebuis, Nijboer, & 
Van der Smagt, 2009). Incongruent pairings caused increased reaction times and P3 
latency and amplitude differences in the ERP signal however no differences were 
measured between projector and associator synaesthetes (note participants were only 
classified from direct questioning, not a specific questionnaire). Ward and colleagues 
found minimal differences between groups in an embedded figures test, where a shape 
(square, rectangle, diamond or triangle) has been hidden within an array of distractors  
(Ward et al., 2010). Here the shape and distractors are mirror image number 2s and 5s. 
As the components of these two numbers are identical, they are difficult to differentiate 
between. Colour improves accuracy in this task as it aids in detection of the shape 
through perceptual grouping of the graphemes, which is why grapheme-colour 
synaesthetes display superior performance (Ward et al., 2010). Although projector 
synaesthetes were more likely to report seeing a colour, there was no difference in 
behavioural performance,   
Ward, Li, Salih and Sagiv (2007) have argued that that the projector-associator 
distinction, as it is typically articulated, fails to account for more nuanced 
phenomenological reports. The term “mind’s eye”, for instance, tends to be used very 
inconsistently to describe a range of experiences.  Some GC synaesthetes claim to see 
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their colours inside their body (literally) and others claim to know the colour. Both 
would tend to be subsumed by the label ‘associator’. Similarly, some synaesthetes claim 
to experience colours externally but ‘in the air’ (at a fixed location from the body) and 
others experience it on the text itself (i.e. at a location defined by the inducer itself). 
Both of these experiences tend to be classed as ‘projector’ but there is some evidence 
that they can be dissociated behaviourally (Ward et al., 2007). Rather than a dichotomy, 
Ward et al. (2007) argued for a multiplicity related to different spatial frame of 
references (object-centred, body-centred, image-centred). 
The present research has two purposes: one methodological, and one theoretical.  
In terms of methodology, we will explore the factor structure and statistical reliability 
(inter-correlations of items) of two published questionnaires using Principle Component 
Analysis (PCA). At present it is assumed, but not proven, that the responses to all 
questions related to being, say, an ‘associator’ are highly inter-correlated. It is also 
assumed, but not proven, that all questions load on to a single factor solution (with 
endpoints of projector and associator). For instance, on the RSPA a synaesthetes’ status 
as projector or associator is determined by subtracting the scores for associator 
questions from the projector questions. This tacitly assumes that all questions load on a 
single dimension rather than several dimensions. The analyses would also increase our 
theoretical understanding of synaesthetic phenomenology. For instance, some theories 
predict multiple sub-types of spatial phenomenology (Ward et al., 2007).   
A more recent measure of synaesthetic experience is the Coloured Letters and 
Numbers (CLaN) questionnaire which is the only currently published synaesthesia 
questionnaire that has been analysed using Factor Analysis (more precisely, Maximum 
Likelihood Estimates) (Rothen, Tsakanikos, et al., 2013). This produced four distinct 
factors, localisation, automaticity/ attention, deliberate use, and longitudinal changes. 
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The localisation factor relates specifically to experiencing the colours localised on the 
grapheme (‘projector’) but, interestingly, questions that one might expect to relate to 
being an associator (e.g knowing not seeing the colour, less intense colours) were not 
negatively loaded on to the same factor (instead they tended to be excluded from the 
factor structure).  This does not support the view that an associator is, statistically or 
theoretically, the opposite of a projector.  Nor did it offer strong support for the view 
that there would be at least three sub-types of grapheme-colour synaesthesia based on 
spatial phenomenology (Ward et al. 2007).  The present study directly compares the 
CLaN against the more established ISEQ and RSPA questionnaires.   
4.3. Method 
Participants were recruited through email invitation of a synaesthetic participant 
database at the University of Sussex. Demographic questions and the two questionnaires 
(ISEQ and RSPA, in that order) were hosted on Bristol Online Survey, completion took 
approximately 20 minutes and no monetary reimbursement was given to participants. 
There were 175 participants who completed the survey, 156 female, age range 15-78 (M 
= 36.33, SD = 16.22, age was not obtained for four participants). The study was granted 
clearance from the University of Sussex ethics committee. 
Consistency was completed at a previous date (and recorded onto the database) 
by 67 participants using the Synaesthesia Battery (Eagleman et al., 2007) on which 
participants indicated the colour of their concurrent (if any) for the numbers 0-9 and 
alphabet. This is done three times, which allows the Synaesthesia Battery to calculate 
consistency of colour response for each grapheme. A score lower than one is considered 
to indicate a synaesthete (Eagleman et al., 2007) although this has been increased to 
1.43 in a more recent analysis of online colour pickers (Rothen, Seth, Witzel, & Ward, 
2013). Regardless of cut off, the lower the score, the more consistent the participant is 
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for their colour choice. Also on the database were responses for CLaN which is a 
questionnaire designed to measure multiple dimensions of GC synaesthesia 
phenomenology. It has been hosted the previous year on Bristol Online Survey. The 16 
questions comprise four factors which are; localisation, deliberate use, automaticity and 
attention, longitudinal changes. This questionnaire uses a five point Likert-scale (1 = 
strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). As the database was used for recruiting 
participants, we were able to match these measures recorded previously to the RSPA 
and ISEQ questionnaires hosted on Bristol Online Survey.  
 The Rouw and Scholte (2007) PA Questionnaire has 12 questions: six are 
designed to measure the trait of associating, and six for projecting.  Responses are 
measured using a five point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). The 
synaesthete type is calculated, again, by subtracting the mean associator score from the 
projector score, with negative values indicating associator and positive values a 
projector categorisation. 
The Illustrated Synaesthetic Experience Questionnaire (Skelton et al., 2009) uses 
a seven point Likert scale (1 = least accurate, 7 = most accurate) to measure responses 
to five questions (3 associator, 2 projector). Each question has an accompanying image 
to demonstrate the particular grapheme and colour experience pairing in that question. 
To determine whether a synaesthete is a projector or associator, the mean associator 
score is subtracted from the mean projector score. The score must be greater than +/- 1 
for a categorisation, values around zero are classified as “undetermined”. 
 For our analyses, no initial grouping of questions are made because it is our aim 
to determine whether the categories of ‘projector’ and ‘associator’ emerge from a purely 
data-driven approach. It was decided to allow the data to guide the factor structure, 
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therefore the data would be analysed until all questions were included in a factor and 
each factor had internal validity and was reliable to the best the data would allow. This 
way we could explore the structure of the questionnaires to test whether colour locus is 
indeed one continuous dimension. 
4.4 Results 
Consistency comparisons 
Consistency measures were known for 67 participants (M = 0.78, Range = 0.15-3.63, 
MSE = 0.07), therefore ANOVAs were conducted to confirm that responses for 
questionnaires were similar for those whom consistency measures were obtained for and 
not. 
For the RSPA a two (consistency group; measured or not) by 12 (RSPA question 
number; 1 – 12) way ANOVA was conducted with between subjects for consistency 
and repeated measures for RSPA question number. The main effect of question was 
significant F (3.97, 686.56) = 55.75, p < .001 with Greenhouse-Geisser correction due 
to Sphericity violation. The main effect of consistency was not significant F (1, 173) = 
0.27, p = .60. Homogeneity of Variance was violated for four questions, however as this 
was only one third of questions, transformation would impair analysis of the questions 
and the p value was very large (p = .60) therefore it was considered that the consistency 
measured (M = 2.99, SE = 0.06) and not measured (M = 2.94, SE = 0.05) groups were 
indeed similar. The interaction between consistency and RSPA question number was 
not significant F (3.97, 686.56) = 55.75, p = .18. Therefore, retaining all participants for 
the Factor Analysis was deemed appropriate. In order to test whether the null hypothesis 
is supported, rather than there being insufficient evidence of a difference, is by 
conducting a Bayes factor analysis (Dienes, 2011). A value less than 1/3 supports the 
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null hypothesis, greater than 3 supports the alternative hypothesis, and between these 
values indicates insufficient evidence for either theory. A Bayes factor was calculated 
for each of the 12 questions, contrasting the group (consistency group; measured or not) 
using the values obtained from independent samples t-tests. The mean difference and 
SEM values are included in Appendix A. A two tailed normal distribution, with a SD of 
2 was used as with a five point Likert scale, the maximum deviation from the central 
value is 2). Ten of the Bayes factors supported the null hypothesis, the other two (Q4 
and Q9) indicated insufficient evidence for either hypothesis. This shows that the data 
from both groups was similar and can all be included in the factor analysis. The Bayes 
factor for each question can be seen in Appendix A. 
For the ISEQ a two (consistency group; measured or not) by five (ISEQ question 
number; 1 – 5) way ANOVA was conducted with between subjects for consistency and 
repeated measures for ISEQ question number. There was a significant main effect of 
question F (3.44, 594.18) = 58.48, p < .001 using Greenhouse-Geisser correction due to 
a violation of Sphericity. The main effect of consistency was not significant, F (1, 173) 
= 0.02, p = .88 with the consistency measured (M = 3.71, SE = 0.14) being similar to 
consistency not measured (M = 3.73, SE = 0.11) participants. The interaction between 
consistency and ISEQ question was also not significant F (3.44, 594.18) = 0.79, p = .52. 
Therefore there were not differences between the groups of participants, and it was 
deemed appropriate to include all in the Factor Analysis. Bayes factors were calculated 
for the five questions contrasting the groups (consistency; measured or not) this time 
using 3 as the SD since the ISEQ uses a seven point Likert scale. All the Bayes factors 
supported the null hypothesis (see Appendix A) and therefore all data could be included 
in the factor analysis. 
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Rouw and Scholte PA Questionnaire (Rouw & Scholte, 2007) 
RSPA preliminary analysis 
Initially we tested the data to determine whether factor analysis was appropriate. The 
questions generally did not satisfy the assumption of normality. All items within the 
questionnaire should correlate with at least half the other questions, otherwise it 
suggests that it doesn’t measure the same construct as the other questions. Q8 did not 
correlate significantly with half of the other questions and was therefore removed, after 
which all questions correlated significantly with at least half of the others.  Q8 was “The 
colour is not on the paper but floats in space”. 
PCA was run using Direct Oblimin rotation as colour localisation may be a 
continuum and therefore related aspects of a bimodal distribution. Eigenvalues over 1 
were used for inclusion as a component, and absolute values under .4 were suppressed. 
After the initial analysis, two factors were retained and all criteria other than Kaisers 
criterion (1974) were met. The analysis was therefore repeated using a forced two factor 
solution supported by the scree plot. After the second analysis, reliability would have 
been improved by removing Q9, therefore PCA was repeated without this question 
based on extraction of factors with eigenvalues greater than 1.  Q9 was “The colour has 
the same shape as the letter number”. 
RSPA initial factor analyses 
Principle Component Analysis was run using Direct Oblimin rotation as colour 
localisation may be a continuum and therefore related. Eigenvalues over 1 were used for 
inclusion as a component, and absolute values under .4 were suppressed.  
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 The Determinant was well above the required value of .00001 (.003), the Keiser-
Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy was very good at .87 (Kaiser, 
1974) and Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity was highly significant (X (55) = 960.90, p < 
.001) therefore factor analysis was deemed appropriate for the data. Average 
communalities after extraction were adequate at .71. Three components with 
Eigenvalues over 1 were extracted initially, explaining a total of 70.71 % of the variance 
however Kaiser’s Criterion were not met therefore the Scree Plot (see Appendix B) was 
checked which suggested a two factor solution. The Factor Analysis was therefore 
repeated with a fixed two factor solution.  
Average communalities after extraction was now reduced to .58 which is near 
adequate. The total variance explained was 58.17 %, with Factor 1 accounting for 45.01 
% and Factor 2 an additional 13.15 %. Q7 no longer loaded onto a factor, therefore it 
was removed and the analysis repeated. All questions still correlated significantly with 
at least half the others, the Determinant (.006), KMO (.89) and Bartlett’s (X (45) = 
866.93, p < .001) all deemed Factor Analysis suitable. Average communalities after 
extraction were .62. A total of 62.31 % of the variance was explained, Factor 1 
accounted for 47.85 % and Factor 2 a further 14.46 %. Rotation converged after 10 
iterations and all questions now loaded onto a factor. Reliability analysis showed that 
Cronbach’s Alpha increased for Factor 1 only when question 5 was removed, resulting 
in a value of .90. Although this would improve reliability, Cronbach’s Alpha was 
already very high and therefore removal of this question was not deemed necessary. For 
Factor 2 Cronbach’s Alpha would increase if question 9 was removed, with it 
improving to .68. It was therefore decided to remove question 9 and repeat the analysis. 
Q9 was “The colour has the same shape as the letter number”. 
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RSPA final factor analysis and statistical reliability 
All correlations were now significant, the Determinant was good (.008) as was the 
KMO (.89; Kaiser, 1974) and Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity was highly significant (X (36) 
= 829.02, p < .001). Factor analysis therefore appeared appropriate for the data. No 
fixed number of factors were forced so that the data guided the structure and Direct 
Oblimin rotation was again used.  
Rotation converged after 10 iterations. Average communalities after extraction 
was .66 which was close to adequate. Two factors with eigenvalues over 1 were 
extracted. Factor 1 (Colour externalisation) accounted for 52.92 % of the variance, and 
Factor 2 (Internal colour) a further 13.37 % of variance, totalling 66.29 % of variance. 
Although Kaisers Criterion were not met, the Scree plot confirmed a 2 factor solution. 
As two factors were obtained this suggests that colour locus is not one continuous 
dimension as this structure was guided by the data. 
 “Associator” had good very good internal reliability, as was evident in a 
Cronbach’s alpha value of .84. Removal of Q1 would have marginally increased α (by 
.006) however this minor increase of was considered not so this question was retained. 
“Projector” also had very good internal reliability α = .83. Removing Q5 would increase 
α to .90 but again, as reliability was already high this was retained. This can be seen in 
Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1. 
Factor loadings and reliability analysis. 
Scale and Items Reliability Eigenvalue M SD 1 2 
1. Projector 
Q1. When I look at a certain 
letter or number, I '''see''' a 
particular colour. 
α = .84 
 
4.76 2.79    1.64      .71 
Q4. It seems that the colour is on 
the paper where the letter/number 
is printed. 
  1.96 1.36 .61  
Q6. The colour is, if it were, 
projected onto the letter/number. 
  2.44 1.55 .84  
Q11.  I see the synaesthetic 
colour very clearly in proximity 
of the stimulus (e.g. on top of it 
or behind it or above it). 
  2.07 1.43 .77  
Q12.  When I look at a certain 
letter/number, the synaesthetic 
colour appears somewhere 
outside my head (such as on the 
paper). 
  1.98 1.44 .66  
2. Associator 
Q2.  When I look at a certain 
letter/ number, the accompanying 
colour appears only in my 
thoughts and not somewhere 
outside my head (such as on the 
paper). 
α = .83 1.20 3.93 1.46  .85 
Q3.  When I look at a certain 
letter/number, the accompanying 
synaesthetic colour comes in my 
thoughts but on the paper appears 
only the colour in which the 
letter/number is printed (e.g. a 
black letter against a white 
background?). 
  4.06 1.38  .81 
Q5.  The figure itself has no 
colour but I am aware that it is 
associated with a specific colour. 
  3.53 1.49  .70 
Q10.  I see the colour of a 
letter/number only in my head. 
  3.80 1.48  .78 
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Illustrated Synaesthetic Experience Questionnaire (Skelton et al., 2009) 
ISEQ preliminary analysis  
The appropriateness of completing factor analysis on the data was first determined. 
None of the questions followed a normal distribution, with substantial positive and 
negative skews being evident. Questions 3 and 5 only significantly correlated with one 
other question which would generally suggest they do not measure the same construct, 
however due to the very small number of questions they were retained, as removing 
them would reduce the total items to 3 which prevents any more than one factor being 
created stopping exploratory analysis of the questionnaires. Therefore these questions 
were retained.  
RSPA initial factor analysis 
Initially, Principle Component Analysis was run using Direct Oblimin rotation as 
localisation of colour may be part of a continuum and therefore these would be 
considered related factors. Eigenvalues over 1 were retained, and absolute values under 
.40 were suppressed. The Determinant was .664, well above the required value of 
.00001 and Bartlett’s Test of Sampling Adequacy was highly significant (X (10) = 
70.204, p < .001) however the KMO measure of sampling adequacy was only .439 
which is below the recommended value of .5 (Kaiser, 1974). . Average communalities 
after extraction was only .57. Initially, two components were extracted explaining a 
total of 56.83 % of the variance. After rotation, which converged after 7 rotations, Q3 
did not load onto either factor and was therefore removed. As Kaiser’s Criterion were 
not met the scree plot (see Appendix B) was referred to and it supported a two factor 
solution. The factor analysis was therefore repeated using a forced two factor solution 
with questions 1, 2, 4 and 5. Q3, ‘You experience a coloured copy of the letters in the 
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'mind’s eye' and black and white on the page’ was one of the associator questions. This 
left two questions classified as projector and two as associator from the original 
questionnaire.  
ISEQ final factor analysis and statistical reliability 
Q5 still didn’t correlate significantly with half the other questions. The Determinant was 
.693, Bartlett’s was highly significant (X (6) = 62.98, p < .001) and KMO was 
inadequate at .44 (Kaiser, 1974). Average communalities after extraction was now .69 
which is near .7 and therefore acceptable however Kaiser’s Criterion were still not met. 
The scree plot still suggested a two factor solution. The total variance explained was 
high at 69.33 %. Factor 1 (Projector) explained 35.43 % of the variance, and Factor 2 
(Associator) a further 33.91 %. Therefore, the Factor Analysis showed that a single 
factor solution was not optimal, and colour locus includes more than one dimension 
(two using this questionnaire). As there were only two questions in each factor, 
Cronbach’s Alpha could not be calculated. Spearmans’s Rho Correlation was therefore 
used. The correlation for both the Projector and Associator factors were highly 
significant as can be seen in Table 4.2. 
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Table 4.2. 
Factor loadings and reliability analysis. 
Scale and Items Reliability Eigenvalue M SD 1 2 P 
1.Projector 
Q2. You '''see''' a specific colour > The 
colour has the same shape as the letter 
or number > The colour is not on the 
page, but floating in space 
  = .47 1.42 2.56 1.88 .85  < .001 
Q1. You '''see''' a specific colour > The 
colour has the same shape as the letter 
or number > The colour looks like it is 
on the page  
  3.08 2.23 .82   
2. Associator 
Q4. You experience a block of colour 
in your 'minds eye' and black and 
white on the page  
= .33 1.36 2.86 2.19  .84 < .001 
Q5. You experience a sensation of 
knowing a letters colour 
  5.02 2.18  .77  
 
Comparison of original and revised questionnaires 
First the changes after modification of the questionnaires was investigated. For both 
questionnaires before and after modification, the mean score was calculated for each 
factor separately to prevent bias from uneven question numbers.  Wilcoxon Signed-
Rank Test showed the ISEQ was significantly different from the R- ISEQ (p < .001) 
with the mean of the original ISEQ (M = -1.506, SD = 2.246) being lower than the R- 
ISEQ (M = - 1.120, SD = 2.514). This shows that the ISEQ defined people more as 
associator than the R-ISEQ. Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test also showed that the RSPA 
was significantly different from the R-RSPA (p < .001) with the mean of the original 
RSPA (M = -0.986, SD = 1.748) being greater than the R-RSPA (M = -1.578, SD = 
2.093). This time the original questionnaire scored participants as less strongly 
associator than the revised questionnaire.  
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In order to determine how the modifications changed the distribution of scores, 
the number of participants classified as one type or another was determined. The 
original questionnaire classification systems were used. For both the score is calculated 
by subtracting the mean associator value from the mean projector value. For the RSPA, 
if the value is negative the participant is an associator, positive and they are a projector. 
For the ISEQ, >1 indicates projector, < -1 associator, and between +/- 1 they are 
undetermined. This is shown in Table 4.3. 
 
Table 4.3.Classifications of the synaesthetes. 
 
Questionnaire ISEQ RSPA R-ISEQ R-RSPA 
Projector 25 41 33 26 
Associator 148 134 137 149 
Undetermined  2 N/A 5 N/A 
 
 
As can be seen from Table 4.3 there is not a consensus between the questionnaires on 
how many people are associators or projectors.  The correlation between the projector 
and associator dimensions of the R-ISEQ and R-RSPA are however highly correlated, 
see Figure 4.1. 
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Figure 4.1. Mean projector and associator scores for the revised questionnaires (R-
ISEQ and R-RSPA). 
 
As can be seen from Figure 4.1, both questionnaires have difficulty 
distinguishing between associator and projector synaesthetes. If localisation is a 
continuous dimension with a bimodal distribution then it would be expected that 
participants experienced one type of localisation only. Furthermore this is necessary for 
the coding scheme used to calculate the sub type for each participant, as the mean 
associator score is subtracted from the mean projector score (Rouw & Scholte, 2010; 
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Skelton et al., 2009). This calculation is based on the theory that it is one bimodally 
distributed dimension and that participants should not score highly on both. As can be 
seen from Table 4.3 this is clearly not the case, and modification through factor analysis 
has not resolved this problem. Furthermore, for the RSPA it seems insufficient to 
consider synaesthetes undetermined if they do not clearly fit an associator or projector 
classification. Combined with the two factor solutions for the revised versions of both 
questionnaires this does suggest that there are two separate dimensions of colour locus, 
internal and external colour. For the R-RSPA, 7.43% responded highly to both projector 
and associator dimensions, and for the R-ISEQ 6.86%. 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Diagram of colour locus for graphemes. 
 
Figure 4.2 shows the suggested new classification system for grapheme-colour 
synaesthesia sub types which takes into consideration the two separate colour locus 
dimensions. Now, a synaesthesia sub type can be one of three categories; projector, 
associator or dual locus. This allows non-synaesthetes to be isolated from dual locus 
synaesthetes as they would both previously obtain an “undetermined” classification on 
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the RSPA. If a participant scores highly on both the associator and projector 
dimensions, when the mean associator value is subtracted from the associator value a 
score around zero is likely. This way, they would have a similar score to a non-
synaesthete who scores low on both dimensions. Using the above diagram we can 
differentiate between these two groups. 
 
Comparison against the CLaN Questionnaire (Rothen, Tsakanikos, et al., 2013) 
Table 4.4.  
Spearman’s Rho correlations between the projector and associator dimensions of the R-
ISEQ and R-RSPA, the four dimensions of the CLaN questionnaire and the 
Synaesthesia Battery (Eagleman et al., 2007) consistency measure. 
 
 R-ISEQ 
Associat
or 
R-
RSPA 
Project
or 
R-
RSPA 
Associat
or 
Localisati
on 
Deliber
ate Use 
Automatic
ity/ 
Attention 
Longitudi
nal 
Changes 
Consiste
ncy 
R-ISEQ 
Projector 
-.04 
 
.67 
*** 
 
-.39 
*** 
 
.54 *** 
 
.15 * 
 
.24 ** 
 
.01 
 
.06 
 
R-ISEQ 
Associator 
 -.05 
 
.28 *** 
 
-.01 
 
-.08 
 
.04 
 
-.21 ** 
 
-.00 
 
R-RSPA 
Projector 
  -.51 
*** 
 
.67 *** 
 
.20 ** 
 
.33 *** 
 
-.00 
 
.05 
 
R-RSPA 
Associator 
   -.45 *** 
 
-.03 
 
-.15 * 
 
-.01 
 
-.02 
 
Localisatio
n 
    .35 *** 
 
.38 *** 
 
.04 
 
.02 
 
Deliberate 
Use 
     .17 * 
 
.08 
 
-.10 
 
Automatic
ity/ 
Attention 
      .21 ** 
 
-.04 
 
Longitudi
nal 
Changes 
       -.06 
Note: p < .05 * p < .01 ** p < .001 *** 
 
As can be seen from Table 4.4, the strongest relationships between the revised 
questionnaires and other measurements is the Localisation dimension of the CLaN 
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questionnaire which had significant correlations with the projector dimension of the R-
ISEQ and both dimensions of the R-RSPA, providing criterion validation for the revised 
questionnaires. The associator dimension of the R-ISEQ only correlated significantly 
with the longitudinal changes of the CLaN questionnaire. Interestingly, none of the 
components correlated significantly with the Synaesthesia Battery consistency 
measurement (Eagleman et al., 2007).  
 As the CLaN had a question which corresponds to the dual locus category we 
are proposing (Q6 “I experience the synaesthetic colours in several locations at the same 
time (for instance, both on the screen and literally inside my head or some other 
combination)”), we compared answers to this question by participants who were 
categorised as dual locus synaesthete or not. An independent samples Mann-Whitney U 
test comparing participants categorised as dual locus (N = 13) using the R-RSPA against 
those who were not dual locus (N = 162), on CLaN Q6 response, demonstrated a 
significant difference (p = .01). Dual locus participants agreed to a greater extent with 
Q6 (M = 3.31, MSE = 0.36) than non dual locus (M = 2.29, MSE = 0.11). The same 
analysis for R-ISEQ found the difference between dual locus ((N = 12, M = 2.75, MSE = 
0.37) and not dual locus (N = 163, M = 2.34, MSE = 0.11) to be non significant (p = 
.22). Therefore, participants appeared to be agree with a dual locus classification when 
assigned this compared to non dual locus synaesthetes, though only to a significantly 
greater degree when measured using the R-RSPA. 
4.5. Discussion 
We conducted PCA on two questionnaires (RSPA and ISEQ) designed to measure 
colour locus for GC synaesthetes to determine whether colour locus was indeed a 
continuous dimension. After analysis, both questionnaires had been revised and 
contained two factors corresponding roughly to associator and projector factors with 
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good internal reliability and criterion validity as measured using the CLaN. We have 
therefore successfully analysed the RSPA and ISEQ, and produced new versions, the R-
RSPA and R-ISEQ. 
The RSPA originally covered the construct of synaesthetic colour experience 
more thoroughly than the ISEQ. The distribution of the all the questions violated the 
assumption of normality. This is not surprising considering that a lot of the questions, 
although using a Likert scale, are measuring responses which are almost bimodal. If 
asked, “It seems that the colour is on the paper where the letter/number is printed” most 
people are going to respond in a yes/ no manner simply because of the way the question 
is phrased and the nature of the question. The same can be argued for the majority of 
questions. This causes problems not just for PCA, but for any statistical analysis which 
requires normally distributed data. The bimodal response distribution may however aid 
distinguishing between GC synaesthesia sub types. This issue shall remain in 
synaesthesia questionnaires until a more appropriate questionnaire response method is 
developed, however this is an issue for future consideration.  
Although one question was removed, the general structure of the ISEQ 
questionnaire remained the same in terms of the question split between projectors and 
associators. This is unsurprising since there were only five questions in the initial 
questionnaire and with only two questions in each factor, reliability could only be 
measured through correlation. The existence of two distinct factors however goes 
against the continuous dimension classification of the ISEQ. 
 It should also be noted, that although the inclusion of such a few questions is 
beneficial for keeping the questionnaire brief to complete, this makes it difficult to 
analyse internally as a standalone questionnaire. As at least two questions have to be 
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grouped in order for a factor to exist, starting with five questions is very restrictive. This 
meant that although there were issues with non-normal distributions no questions could 
be removed in the preliminary analysis. The very small question size also means that the 
full range of synaesthetic experience may not be extensively measured. As this 
questionnaire has been used widely in the synaesthesia literature, it was however 
considered important to investigate the dimension(s) underlying the projector/ 
associator distinction. 
 The final R-RSPA had a two factor solution which did not support the 
continuous dimension of the original questionnaire. The two factor solution however is 
consistent with the factor structure we obtained from the R-ISEQ, and therefore we 
conclude that grapheme-colour synaesthesia subtype is not one continuous dimension, 
but two distinct dimensions. It should be noted that although two factors were found 
going against a continuous dimension, the questions were still grouped in the same way 
as the original questionnaires. It is interesting that the CLaN did not find distinct 
projector and associator factors. This could be due to either the restricted number of 
associator questions they included, or may demonstrate that the variability within GC 
synaesthetes is better accounted for by a more multi-dimensional questionnaire. One 
question from the CLaN which supports our dual locus sub type is the questions “I 
experience the synaesthetic colours in several locations at the same time (for instance, 
both on the screen and literally inside my head or some other combination)” which 
remained in the CLaN after Factor Analysis and was significantly correlated to the 
projector factor of the R-ISEQ and both factors in the R-RSPA. Therefore, the dual 
locus phenomenology experienced by some synaesthetes in our study is validated by the 
CLaN, but was not allowed for in the original versions as the process of subtracting 
associator from projector scores would have given the misleading impression of 
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experiencing colours ‘nowhere’ instead of ‘everywhere’. The fourth category (in the 
lower left quadrant) effectively denies being a projector or an associator.  One 
possibility is that some of these participants are not, in fact, synaesthetes at all.  A more 
interesting possibility is that they would agree with other kinds of statements about 
spatial phenomenology (e.g. experiencing them literally inside the body, or externally 
but not on the page).  These questions were not included at all on the RSPA or ISEQ.  
They were included in the CLaN but may have been insufficient in number (either 
number of participants, or number of items, or both) to emerge as a separate factor. 
 The Synaesthesia Battery consistency measure was not found to correlate 
significantly with the projector or associator dimensions. This is interesting considering 
that consistency is one of the main criteria used for defining someone as a synaesthete 
(Auvray & Farina, in press). This suggests that consistency of colour is not the most 
important aspect of phenomenology as an inclusion requirement for synaesthesia 
research, it is the experience of colour itself.  
We propose that there is not one continuous subtype of grapheme-colour 
synaesthesia, rather there are two separate dimensions. Synaesthetes could therefore be 
categorised (minimally) as a projector, associator or dual locus synaesthete. Using this 
categorisation may improve analysis of differences between groups, as the previously 
standard system of subtracting association scores from projector scores means that 
synaesthetes who agree to both dimensions could be wrongly categorised, and perhaps 
generate noise within a projector/ associator participant group. We believe that the R-
ISEQ and R-RSPA provide more valid measures of the subtypes, and should be used 
alongside the CLaN for more precise synaesthesia investigation. 
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4.6. Appendix 
 
Appendix A 
Question SEM Mean Diff Bayes 
factor 
Conclusion 
RSPA 1 0.25 -0.29 0.24 Supports Null 
RSPA 2 0.23 0.07 0.12 Supports Null 
RSPA 3 0.22 0.02 0.11 Supports Null 
RSPA 4 0.22 -0.40 0.56 Insufficient evidence 
RSPA 5 0.23 0.32 0.30 Supports Null 
RSPA 6 0.24 -0.01 0.12 Supports Null 
RSPA 7 0.24 0.29 0.24 Supports Null 
RSPA 8 0.20 0.22 0.18 Supports Null 
RSPA 9 0.25 -0.54 1.23 Insufficient evidence 
RSPA 10 0.24 0.18 0.16 Supports Null 
RSPA 11 0.23 -0.24 0.20 Supports Null 
RSPA 12 0.22 -0.13 0.13 Supports Null 
ISEQ 1 0.35 -0.45 0.26 Supports Null 
ISEQ 2 0.29 0.13 0.11 Supports Null 
ISEQ 3 0.35 0.28 0.16 Supports Null 
ISEQ 4 0.34 0.16 0.13 Supports Null 
ISEQ 5 0.34 0.13 0.12 Supports Null 
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Appendix B 
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Appendix C 
 
R-RSPA Questionnaire 
 
Q1. When I look at a certain letter or number, I '''see''' a particular colour. 
Q2.  When I look at a certain letter/ number, the accompanying colour appears only in 
my thoughts and not somewhere outside my head (such as on the paper). 
Q3.  When I look at a certain letter/number, the accompanying synaesthetic colour 
comes in my thoughts but on the paper appears only the colour in which the 
letter/number is printed (e.g. a black letter against a white background?). 
Q4. It seems that the colour is on the paper where the letter/number is printed. 
Q5.  The figure itself has no colour but I am aware that it is associated with a specific 
colour. 
Q6. The colour is, if it were, projected onto the letter/number. 
Q7 (originally Q10).  I see the colour of a letter/number only in my head. 
Q8 (originally Q11).  I see the synaesthetic colour very clearly in proximity of the 
stimulus (e.g. on top of it or behind it or above it). 
Q9 (originally Q12).  When I look at a certain letter/number, the synaesthetic colour 
appears somewhere outside my head (such as on the paper). 
Projector questions; 1, 4, 6, 8 and 9 
Associator questions; 2, 3, 5, 7 
* Note that question numbers have been changed from the original Rouw and Scholte 
Projector Associator questionnaire 
 
R-ISEQ Questions 
 
Q1. You '''see''' a specific colour > The colour has the same shape as the letter or 
number > The colour looks like it is on the page  
Q2. You '''see''' a specific colour > The colour has the same shape as the letter or 
number > The colour is not on the page, but floating in space 
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Q3 (originally Q4). You experience a block of colour in your 'minds eye' and black and 
white on the page  
Q4 (originally Q5). You experience a sensation of knowing a letters colour 
Projector questions; 1 and 2 
Associator questions; 3 and 4 
* Note that question numbers have been changed from the original Illustrated 
Synaesthetic Experience Questionnaire, and the corresponding images are also required 
from the original questionnaire  
Appendix D 
Coloured Letters and Numbers (CLaN) Questionnaire (Rothen, Tsakanikos, et al., 
2013) 
1. I experience the synaesthetic colours even if I do not attend to them specifically (e.g., 
while reading a book)  
2. I see the synaesthetic colours on the computer screen (or very close to it)  
3. It feels like I have to go and fetch the colours, rather than the colours coming to me  
4. I experience the synaesthetic colours in several locations at the same time (for 
instance, both on the screen and literally inside my head or some other combination) 
5. I only experience the synaesthetic colours of letters/numbers if I think about them as 
having a colour  
6. When I am looking quickly at a page of a book the synaesthetic colours appear before 
I am aware of what the letters/words are 
7. I do not ‘‘see’’ colours when I look at the letters/numbers  
8. It seems that the colour is on the screen where the letter/number is printed  
9. The synaesthetic colours appear automatically without any effort on my part 
10. I can point to the location of the synaesthetic colours  
11. My synaesthetic colours did not change their intensity over the years  
12. I use my synaesthetic colours deliberately for remembering sequences of numbers 
(e.g., PINs, telephone numbers)  
13. I deliberately try to use my synaesthetic colours in my everyday life  
14. I use my synaesthetic colours to remember dates and plan appointments (e.g., 
28.02.2010)  
124 
 
15. My synaesthetic colours were weaker in the past (i.e., years ago)  
16. My synaesthetic colours were stronger in the past (i.e., years ago) 
 
Rouw and Scholte Projector Associator (RSPA) Questionnaire (Original) (Rouw & 
Scholte, 2007) 
1. When I look at a certain letter or number, I '''see''' a particular colour. 
2. When I look at a certain letter/ number, the accompanying colour appears only in my 
thoughts and '''not''' somewhere outside my head (such as on the paper). 
3. When I look at a certain letter/number, the accompanying synaesthetic colour comes 
in my thoughts but on the paper appears only the colour in which the letter/number 
4. It seems that the colour is on the paper where the letter/number is printed. 
5. The figure itself has no colour but I am aware that it is associated with a specific 
colour. 
6. The colour is, if it were, projected onto the letter/number. 
7. I do not see the letters/numbers literally in a colour but have a strong feeling that I 
know what colour belongs to a certain letter/number. 
8. The colour is not on the paper but floats in space. 
9. The colour has the same shape as the letter/number. 
10. I see the colour of a letter/number only in my head. 
11. I see the synaesthetic colour very clearly in proximity of the stimulus (e.g. on top of 
it or behind it or above it). 
12. When I look at a certain letter/number, the synaesthetic colour appears somewhere 
outside my head (such as on the paper). 
 
Illustrated Synaesthetic Experience Questionnaire (ISEQ; Original) (Skelton et al., 
2009) 
1. > You '''see''' a specific colour > The colour has the same shape as the letter or 
number > The colour looks like it is on the page 
2. > You '''see''' a specific colour > The colour has the same shape as the letter or 
number > The colour is not on the page, but floating in space 
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3. > You experience a coloured copy of the letters in the 'minds eye' and black and 
white on the page 
4. > You experience a block of colour in your 'minds eye' and black and white on the 
page 
5. > You experience a sensation of knowing a letters colour 
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CHAPTER 5 
GRAPHEME-COLOUR SYNAESTHESIA REQUIRES CONSCIOUS 
AWARENESS FOR PERCEPT BINDING 
-PAPER 4 
5.1 Abstract   
Grapheme-colour synaesthesia is when letters, numbers or symbols concurrently evoke 
a colour. This study investigates the extent to which a grapheme must be consciously 
perceived for colour concurrents to be elicited and the extent to which subliminally 
presented coloured graphemes break through into awareness.  This is explored using 
techniques that enable stimuli to be presented for long durations whilst remaining 
preconscious: gaze-contingent crowding (GCC) and continuous flash suppression 
(CFS). In Experiment 1, GCC was used to determine whether subliminally presented 
digits viewed by synaesthetes would A) influence digit responses B) influence colour 
responses C) evoke colour concurrents. Preconsciously presented digits influenced 
behavioural responses to digits, but not to colours, suggesting the digit, but not 
synaesthetic colour, is activated.  Some synaesthetes (those that project colours 
externally) did report colour experiences to ‘unseen’ digits but the colours did not 
typically correspond. In the other three experiments, CFS was used to investigate 
whether time for stimuli to break through to conscious awareness was influenced by 1) 
colourfulness of the grapheme’s syanesthetic concurrent (greyscale or coloured) 2) 
congruency of the grapheme’s font colour and concurrent colour (synaesthetic Stroop) 
3) congruency of colour word and font colour (a standard Stroop). Conscious detection 
of graphemes was not influenced by grapheme colourfulness or grapheme-colour 
congruency.  However a traditional Stroop effect for colour words was observed. This 
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suggests that despite the fact that graphemic stimuli are semantically processed 
unconsciously, this is insufficient to elicit the typical synaesthetic colour. Even when 
graphemes are viewed for long durations, grapheme-colour synaesthesia therefore 
requires conscious perception for the grapheme and colour to bind. 
5.2 Introduction 
Synaesthesia is a fascinating condition in which a particular perception (inducer) 
triggers a perceptual or conceptual experience (concurrent) in another (or the same) 
modality. One of the most common forms is grapheme-colour (GC) synaesthesia, where 
the individual experiences colours when viewing letters, numbers or grammatical 
symbols, which occurs in approximately 1% of the population (Simner et al., 2006). The 
consistency of the colour induced by a particular grapheme (Baron-Cohen et al., 1993) 
allows studies to be conducted which manipulate the pairings of grapheme and colour 
such that they are either correct for the individual synaesthete (congruent) or 
subjectively mismatching (incongruent). Using these congruent and incongruent 
pairings, a variety of cognitive processes affected by GC synaesthesia can be 
investigated. We used this premise to test whether a grapheme triggers and binds with 
its concurrent colour even when the grapheme is not consciously seen. 
The generation of synaesthetic colours is automatic, as demonstrated through the 
regularly used synaesthetic Stroop task (Dixon, Smilek, & Merikle, 2004; Mattingley, 
Rich, Yelland, & Bradshaw, 2001; Mattingley, Payne, & Rich, 2006; Nikolić, Lichti, & 
Singer, 2007). In this task, a GC synaesthete has to name either the font colour, or the 
concurrent photism colour which they experience, for individual graphemes. 
Synaesthetes have longer reaction times (RTs) and make more errors when the font 
colour and photism colour do not match, presumably due to interference from the 
mismatching photism, as in the standard Stroop effect (Stroop, 1935). The synaesthetic 
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Stroop task has also been modified to investigate the different levels of interference 
caused by variations of incongruent colour and grapheme pairings.  When the font 
colour is an opponent colour to the grapheme’s concurrent the greatest interference is 
created, in comparison to colours on the other colour channel (Nikolić et al., 2007). 
Presenting a grapheme which produces a red concurrent in green font will therefore 
cause greater interference than presenting it in blue or yellow. The Stroop task is 
therefore a highly useful and modifiable tool in synaesthesia research.   
 To investigate whether graphemes trigger the concurrent colour when the 
grapheme is not consciously perceived, Mattingley, Rich, Yelland and Bradshaw (2001) 
presented graphemes that were followed by a colour patch presented in a colour either 
congruent or incongruent in relation to the concurrent for the grapheme. Masking was 
used to supress conscious detection of the grapheme. When the grapheme was presented 
for 500ms (the longest presentation time) Stroop interference effects were evident. It 
was confirmed in a detection task that these graphemes were consciously perceived. 
When the grapheme was only presented for 28 or 56ms (and confirmed not to be 
consciously detected) the Stroop interference effects were no longer present. This was 
given as evidence that a grapheme doesn’t elicit its concurrent colour when it is viewed 
unconsciously. The graphemes were, however, displayed for such a brief time that 
priming the concurrent colour with the strength needed to influence colour identification 
(Blake, Palmeri, Marois, & Chai-Youn, 2005) or even a processing degree sufficient to 
prime the concurrent colour at all may not have been possible.   
 An alternative approach is to present a grapheme without masking, but reduce 
awareness of the grapheme by manipulating attentional demands.  Mattingley, Payne 
and Rich (2006) took this approach in a dual task paradigm again using a synaesthetic 
Stroop manipulation.  Synaesthetic participants had to name a target colour patch that 
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was presented after a grey inducer digit, the pairings being either congruent or 
incongruent. This time, however, there was a secondary task as the grey digit was 
presented within a diamond outline with sides intersected by uneven gaps. Participants 
had to detect where the larger gap was on the diamond. When the odd gap was much 
larger than the gap on the opposite side of the diamond, this was a low attention load 
task, when it was only slightly larger it was more difficult to distinguish and therefore a 
high attention load task. During the high load condition, the Stroop interference was 
lower than during the low load condition, demonstrating that attentional load modulated 
the Stroop task interference. Since the Stroop interference effect was still evident in the 
low load condition and, indeed, awareness of the grapheme was not directly assessed, it 
can’t be categorically stated that the colour didn’t bind to the grapheme. The results 
nonetheless show that the synaesthetic Stroop effect is strongly modulated by attention, 
which is in line with other research on GC synaesthesia and attention (Laeng, Svartdal, 
& Oelmann, 2004; Sagiv, Heer, & Robertson, 2006; Ward, Jonas, Dienes, & Seth, 
2010).   
One way in which graphemes can be presented for longer durations than 
masking studies without them being consciously perceived is through visual crowding. 
When a target or priming stimulus is surrounded by other distracters and viewed only 
with peripheral vision, they are harder to identify. Hubbard and colleagues used this 
method, presenting a target inducer digit surrounded by four crowding digits (Hubbard 
et al., 2005; Hubbard & Ramachandran, 2005). Both synaesthetes and control 
participants viewed the crowded digit in black font, controls also completed trials where 
the target was displayed in real colour (coloured, not black font). The task was to 
identify the central crowded grapheme. Three of the six synaesthetes were overall 
significantly better at this task than controls when the font was black, however controls 
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viewing the real colours were more accurate than synaesthetes. Synaesthetes also 
anecdotally reported experiencing colour, and using it to guide their decision 
(Ramachandran & Hubbard, 2001). Therefore, the synaesthetes colours did aid in the 
grapheme detection (at least for some synaesthetes), but not as well as real colour. 
Phenomenology of synaesthetic experience triggered by crowded digits has been 
compared to accuracy measures (Ward et al., 2007). After identifying the central 
crowded grapheme, synaesthetes stated whether they saw the colour and grapheme, saw 
colour but no grapheme, saw the grapheme and no colour, or saw neither (guessing). 
Out of the 14 synaesthetes, six of the seven projectors and one of the seven associators 
saw colour. Furthermore, four of the projectors experienced colour for some trials in 
which the grapheme wasn’t identified. This highlights the importance of recording 
phenomenology on a trial by trial basis. In this study, we shall explore this idea further. 
 The crowding technique used by Hubbard et al. (2005) allowed for the 
graphemes to be presented for longer durations of time than masking studies. However, 
all trials in which the participant moves their attention from the central fixation cross to 
the peripherally crowded target have to be removed, as the participant can look directly 
at the target thus rendering all crowding irrelevant. A more rigorous way of presenting 
peripherally crowded digits is through gaze-contingent crowding (GCC; also called 
gaze-contingent substitution). This utilises eye tracking which detects the participant’s 
fixation throughout the presentation of the stimulus. Unlike basic crowding, where trials 
with a saccade towards the priming stimulus are removed, if the participants gaze moves 
towards the crowded prime, the prime is simply removed from view leaving only the 
crowding visible. By presenting the crowded prime on both the left and right of the 
monitor with participants aiming to fixate centrally, trials where a saccade is made can 
be retained as the prime always remains on screen. 
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It should be noted that although no ceiling effect was encountered in the 
Hubbard et al. (2005) study, the performance on this visual crowding detection task was 
still very high. In order for attention to be controlled more carefully, GCC can be 
designed to reduce objective identification performance to near chance levels. There is 
some debate as to how fully unconsciously presented peripheral stimuli can be 
processed; however, priming effects have been demonstrated for percepts which require 
more than low level visual processing, such as GCC presented emotive faces (Faivre et 
al., 2012; Kouider et al., 2011). This study will therefore use GCC to present digits to 
synaesthetes for long durations without them being consciously perceived. 
  Continuous flash suppression (CFS) is another technique which can be used to 
present stimuli without them being consciously perceived. Two separate images are 
presented side by side on the monitor. A mirror stereoscope controls how these images 
are viewed. The left eye only sees the left image on the monitor, the right eye the right 
image. When the images are aligned in the centre of each mirror, they fuse so that the 
participant perceives only one image. During trials, the dominant eye sees a continually 
changing high contrast image which supresses the static image presented to the other 
eye. The image can be suppressed for long durations, several minutes in some cases 
(Tsuchiya & Koch, 2005). After a while, the suppressed image suddenly breaks through 
into conscious awareness, and this duration can be measured so that differences between 
suppressed stimuli can be investigated (Stein et al., 2011). This time until break through 
in CFS is called break through CFS (b-CFS). For example, it has been shown that 
upright faces ‘break through’ faster than inverted faces (Jiang, Costello, & He, 2007). 
This technique could be used to investigate the processing of graphemes supressed from 
awareness. In the same way that upright faces break through faster than inverted faces, 
would a grapheme presented in its congruent colour break through faster than an 
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incongruently coloured grapheme? Another little investigated aspect of GC concurrents 
are the greyscale colours. The colours that GC synaesthetes experience are not always 
bright or prototypical, for example banana yellow. Other colours, such as greenish 
browns or even greyscale colours like dark grey can be experienced. Some graphemes 
may have no colour at all. If a grapheme has a ‘colourful’ concurrent colour, would it be 
break through CFS to conscious awareness faster than a grapheme with a greyscale 
concurrent?  
Not only do synaesthetes have their own colour palette (Simner et al., 2005) but 
there are phenomenological differences in how or where they experience the colour. 
The projector sub-group see the colour on the grapheme itself, or in close proximity to it 
outside of their person (Dixon et al., 2004). Associator synaesthetes see the colour in 
their mind’s eye, or have more a sense of knowing that it is a particular colour rather 
than actually seeing it (Dixon et al., 2004). Projectors report experiencing more 
subjective colours under brief viewing conditions than associators do (Ward et al. 2007; 
2010), although the colours are not always the ones that are normally associated with 
that grapheme (Ward et al. 2007). This suggests differences between projector and 
associator synaesthetes in the conscious perception of colour. It has also been proposed 
that the differences between projector and associator synaesthetes could be due to 
differences in mental imagery ability (Simner, 2013). As mental imagery abilities are 
highly variable (Marks & Marks, 1973) it may be that synaesthetes with low mental 
imagery would only have a sense of “knowing” the concurrent colour whereas those 
with high mental imagery abilities would have more visual properties to their 
concurrent (Simner, 2013). We therefore considered it necessary to explore the 
relationship between colour and accuracy more thoroughly; do the colours actually help 
to detect graphemes and is this linked to mental imagery abilities?  
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Questionnaires have been designed to measure the differences in GC 
synaesthesia phenomenology. We used the Coloured Letters and Numbers (CLaN) 
(Rothen, Tsakanikos, et al., 2013) and revised Rouw and Sholte Projector-Associator 
(R-RSPA) (Anderson & Ward, 2014) questionnaires to explore how the synaesthetes 
experience and use colour, and to explore how the behavioural measures relate to 
differences in experience.   
 In this study, the scope of subliminally presented graphemes’ ability to bind with 
a colour will be investigated. In Experiment 1, GCC will be used to subliminally present 
digits to test whether they A) influence behavioural responses, B) influence congruent 
or incongruent colour responses, and C) elicit colours for the synaesthetes. In 
Experiment 2, CFS will be used to investigate whether the following factors influence 
breakthrough durations: A) the concurrent colour of achromatically presented 
graphemes; B) the congruency of a graphemes colour, and C) colour words presented in 
congruent or incongruent colours.  
5.3 EXPERIMENT 1 
Three tasks were made using the GCC technique, each using a similar set up and the 
same priming stimuli. The Digit Priming Task (Experiment 1A) presented a prime digit 
(e.g. 4) in the periphery followed by a supraliminal central probe digit (e.g. 3).  The 
participant was required to decide whether the centrally presented target was <5 or >5.  
This enabled measures of repetition priming (e.g. 3 presented as both prime and probe) 
and response priming (the prime and probe being numerically different but requiring the 
same response).  This task was performed by both synaesthetes and controls to 
determine whether the prime was actually being processed.  A second task, Digit-
Colour Priming (Experiment 1B), was conceptually similar with a digit prime but the 
central probe was a colour patch (corresponding to the colour of a digit) and the colour 
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had to be classified. Only synaesthetes performed this task, as this was to test whether 
the grapheme was triggering the concurrent colour.  The third task, the Digit-Detection 
task (Experiment 1C), involved presenting only the crowded digit. Participants had to 
decide what digit it was and, if they were synaesthetes, report any colour experiences.  
This was to measure whether the procedure was successful in giving rise to low 
awareness of the prime (preferably near chance levels) and, further, to see if 
synaesthetes were able to report colours for graphemes that were not consciously 
detected.  This task was run on both synaesthetes and controls. 
 
Method 
Participants 
Twenty synaesthetes (aged 21–56, M = 34.85, SD = 11.01, 14 female) and 22 control 
participants (aged 19-34, M = 22.95, SD = 4.61, 16 female) completed the GCC 
experiments.  
Priming Stimuli 
For the GCC technique, two almost identical images are made, one containing the 
priming stimulus, and the other only the crowding. When the participant’s gaze is 
roughly around the fixation cross, the image containing the prime is displayed, Figure 
5.1 is an example prime image. If their gaze is diverted outside the (predefined) central 
viewing area, the presented image changes to the one only containing the crowding (and 
fixation cross). Since the images are almost identical, the participant does not notice the 
image change. The background crowding images was generated by scrambling an image 
which contained digits 0-9 in Arial black font on a transparent background. The image 
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was scrambled in an 8 by 10 matrix, then a second layer was added with a random 
offset. The crowding was presented at 9o from centre (to the edge of the crowding), and 
the crowding itself was about 2o in width. The digit was therefore presented within the 
11 o suggested angle (Ramachandran & Hubbard, 2001). Primes were black digits (1, 2, 
3, 4, 6, 7, 8 or 9) with white halos, the digit itself being roughly 18-25 pixels wide. For 
each digit, four crowding/prime and crowding image sets were made. 
The program was made using Eyelink. For the GCC priming display, an image 
with one digit (the same at either side) was layered on top of digit crowding with a 
fixation cross presented centrally. If the participant viewed outside the central window 
(750 (w) by 1022 (h) pixels) then the crowding only image would be presented on the 
corresponding side of the screen. At least one prime digit was therefore present on 
screen at all times and trials with a horizontal saccade didn’t need to be removed (see 
Figure 5.1). Between trials the calibration had to be corrected for any drift (slight 
movement of the participant), so the participant was asked to look at the central fixation 
dot between trials, which changed to a cross during trials. 
During each trial, the participant was asked to look at the fixation cross whilst 
the crowded digit primes were presented for 2500ms, then the crowding only version of 
the image was presented for 100ms to prevent after images. Target images differed 
between blocks.  
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Figure 5.1. Example gaze-contingent priming images. When fixation is roughly central, 
a prime is displayed at both the left and right. If gaze moves towards either side, the 
corresponding prime is removed leaving only the crowding visible. After presentation 
of the prime for 2500ms, the crowding only image is shown for 100ms. 
 
Synaesthetes’ colours 
Each synaesthete completed the Synaesthesia Battery (Eagleman et al., 2007) before 
attending the experiment sessions. This allowed the average RGB values for the colours 
experienced by the synaesthetes for each grapheme to be calculated and used for 
creating the individually tailored experiments. Synaesthetes also completed the CLaN 
and R-RSPA in advance for investigation of relationships between phenomenological 
and behavioural measures. 
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Overall Procedure 
Participants sat 65 cm from the 21” Sony Trinitron CRT monitor (using a chin rest). 
Screen resolution was 1280 by 1024, refresh rate 60 Hz. Participants performed a 9 
point calibration before each experiment. Eye tracking was performed with an Eyelink 
II (SR-Research, Ontario) headset with 500Hz pupil position detection. The experiment 
was made using Experiment Builder. A Cedrus response box marked with the 
appropriate colours or numbers for the particular testing block was used. Participants 
were given specific instructions depending on which block they were completing.  
Eprime was used for response practice trials completed prior to the experiments 
which contained multiple response options (Experiments 1B and 1C) to train 
participants on which button to press without looking at the Cedrus box. During training 
trials, participants simply had to press the button which corresponded to the digit/colour 
patch on the screen. No priming stimulus was shown. Feedback was given after each 
trial (20 trials), but this is not included in the analysis. 
The order of experiments 1A and 1B was counterbalanced. However, 1C always 
happened last in case participants became more aware of the peripherally presented 
digits over time (although the digit prime set for 1C (1, 4, 6, 9; or 2, 3, 7, 8) was also 
counterbalanced). 
5.3.1 Experiment 1A 
This experiment measures repetition and response priming of digits, presented under 
GCC conditions, in synaesthetes and controls. 
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Procedure 
  
Figure 5.2. Trial sequence for Experiment 1A. Due to shrinking of stimuli for the 
diagram, it is not possible to see the digits within the crowding. 
 
The digit priming task contained 160 trials. Every priming digit (1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8 & 9) 
was paired with each target digit twice (16 x 8 trials) with an extra 32 repetition priming 
pairs (for example, 1 being paired with 1). After the crowded prime digit was shown, a 
target digit was presented and the participant had to indicate if the number was greater 
or less than five through a 2AFC button press as quickly and accurately as possible. 
This task was used as it is a sensitive measure of digit priming (Naccache, Blandin, & 
Dehaene, 2002). Completion of this task took approximately 25 minutes and 
participants had a short break after half the trials.  Figure 5.2 shows the trial sequence 
for the digit priming experiment. 
 
139 
 
Results 
The data from all experiments was treated in the same manner. For RT data, outliers 
(+/-2SD; 217 trials) were removed, calculated using the overall RT mean for each 
participant’s accurate trials. This was due to the large individual variation in break 
though time for the CFS experiments.    
To determine whether repetition priming decreased RTs, a two (repetition 
priming; congruent or incongruent) by two (group; synaesthete or control) way 
ANOVA with within subjects for repetition priming was conducted. The main effect of 
repetition priming was not significant, (F (1, 40) = 2.07, p = .16), with similar accurate 
response RTs in the congruent and incongruent trials. The main effect of group was not 
significant (F (1, 40) = 0.03, p = .86) with similar RTs for synaesthetes and control 
participants. The interaction was also not significant (F (1, 40) = 0.11, p = .75). 
Showing the same digit prime and target therefore didn’t reduce RTs and suggests that 
the digits were not processed enough to influence RTs in a repetition priming 
comparison. A Bayes factor was calculated to determine whether the results actually 
support the null hypothesis, or represent insensitive data (Dienes, 2011). If the value is 
less than 0.33 it supports the null hypothesis, greater than 3 supports the alternative and 
between these values the data is insensitive to distinguish between the hypotheses. The 
SD for the calculation was taken from two studies which used the same task but with 
masking instead of GCC. They found a priming effect of 16 ms difference between task 
congruent and incongruent responses (Naccache & Dehaene, 2001) or repetition 
priming congruent or incongruent responses (Reynvoet & Ratinckx, 2004). The 16ms 
will therefore be used as the SD of a half normal distribution for our Bayes factor 
analysis. A value of 0.95 was obtained which suggests that no conclusions can be taken 
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from the results (calculated from; mean difference = 5.595, SEM = 31.69 and SD = 
16ms).   
Next, whether there was an effect of task priming (where the prime digit 
corresponded to the trial response, for example a primed digit 2 would elicit the same 
task response as a target digit 4 and therefore be task congruent) on accurate trial RTs 
was investigated. A two (task priming; congruent or incongruent) by two (group; 
synaesthete or control) mixed ANOVA was conducted. The main effect of task priming 
was not significant (F (1, 40) = 0.50, p = .49) with similar RTs for task congruent and 
task incongruent priming. The main effect of group was not significant, with similar 
RTs for synaesthete and control participants (F (1, 40) = 0.02, p = .90) and the 
interaction was also not significant (F (1, 40) = 1.19, p = .28). Therefore, there was no 
effect of priming on RTs, which can be seen in Figure 3.  A Bayes factor of 0.94 
suggests that no conclusions can be taken from the results (calculated from: mean 
difference = 4.35, SEM = 32.62 and SD = 16ms).  RT priming effects are therefore not 
expected in Experiment 1B. 
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Figure 5.3. Mean reaction times for synaesthete and control participants in the digit 
priming task, for both repetition priming and task priming comparisons. Error bars 
represent +/- 1SEM.  
 
Next the number of errors made was analysed, however the data was skewed so 
non parametric analysis was conducted. To determine whether repetition priming 
influenced the number of errors, a related samples Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test was 
conducted, finding that there was a significant difference (Z = 432.50, p < .001, r = .64) 
between repetition congruent and incongruent trials. Independent Samples Mann-
Whitney U tests found no significant difference when comparing synaesthete and 
control groups error rate for repetition congruent (U = 186.50, p = .35, r = .15) or 
repetition incongruent (U = 288.50, p =.08, r = .27) trials.  Therefore although repetition 
priming was not evident in the RT data, it was in terms of error rates. This shows that 
repetition priming did occur, and that the digits were processed to a degree to influence 
behaviour. 
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For task priming error rates, first a related samples Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test 
was conducted finding no significant difference between task priming congruent and 
incongruent trials (Z = 90.50, p = .37, r = .14). When Independent Samples Mann-
Whitney U tests were conducted, although no significant difference was found between 
synaesthete and control participants for task congruent trials (U = 224.50, p = .90, r = 
.02) there was a significant difference between them in task incongruent trials (U = 
298.50, p = .04, r = .32) with more errors being made by the control group than 
synaesthetes, as can be seen in Figure 5.4. Therefore, although task priming was not 
evident in the RTs, there was an effect when looking at error rates.   
 
Figure 5.4. Median error rates in the digit priming task for synaesthete and control 
participants, with both repetition priming and task priming comparisons. Error bars 
represent interquartile range. 
 
 As it is important to explore the relationship between behaviour and 
phenomenology across variations of GC synaesthetes, we conducted Spearman’s Rho 
correlations for the synaesthetes between the questionnaire and experiment measures. 
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As can be seen in Table 5.1, there are significant correlations between the CLaN 
automaticity and attention measure and all of the error rates, both congruent and 
incongruent. This relationship was negative, therefore as the error rate increased, this 
was related to a reduced perception of automaticity and increased requirement for 
attention for synaesthetic colour experience. There were also significant correlations for 
all of the RTs and the longitudinal measure of CLaN, again negative, with longer RTs 
being associated with synaesthetic experiences which haven’t changed intensity (either 
stronger or weaker in the past). There was no clear relationship between projector and 
associator dimensions and the digit priming measures.  This is interesting, as it shows 
that the projector/associator divide most commonly researched is not necessarily the 
most important for behavioural variability. It should be noted that as the correlations in 
this paper are not corrected for multiple comparisons, they are exploratory in nature and 
would need to be corroborated by further research.  
Table 5.1. Spearman’s Rho correlations between the reaction time (ms) and error 
(number) data and the CLaN and M-RSPA questionnaire dimensions for the 
synaesthetes. 
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 Repetit
ion 
Congru
ent RT 
Repetiti
on 
Incongr
uent RT 
Task 
Congru
ent RT 
Task 
Incongr
uent RT 
Repetit
ion 
Congru
ent 
Error 
Repetiti
on 
Incongr
uent 
Error 
Task 
Congru
ent 
Error 
Task 
Incongr
uent 
Error 
CLaN 
Localisati
on (N = 
19) 
-.47 * -.42 -.42 -.41 -.21 -.22 -.32 -.20 
CLaN 
Automati
city/ 
Attention 
(N = 19) 
-.01 .06 .03 .04 -.48 * -.69 ** -.59 ** -.70 ** 
CLaN 
Deliberat
e Use (N 
= 19) 
.10 .21 .21 .22 -.55 * -.28 -.52 * -.27 
CLaN 
Longitudi
nal 
Change 
(N = 19) 
-.60 ** -.65 ** -.62 ** -.65 ** .05 .60 ** .45 .41 
R-RSPA 
Projector 
(N = 19) 
-.19 -.08 -.08 -.07 -.33 -.44 -.60 ** -.34 
R-RSPA 
Associato
r (N = 19) 
.07 .14 .18 .13 .08 -.04 .11 -.07 
p < .05 *, p < .01 **, p < .001 *** 
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5.3.2 Experiment 1B 
This experiment measures priming of colours by digits presented under GCC conditions 
in synaesthetes only. 
Stimuli 
The same digit priming stimuli were used as in Experiment 1A, however the targets 
were colour patches created for each individual synaesthete using the RGB values taken 
from the Synaesthesia Battery results. Out of the digits 1,2,3,4,6,7,8 and 9, the four 
digits which had concurrent colours most closely matched to red, green, blue and yellow 
were chosen. Target colour patches were made using the RGB values for these colours, 
and the digits they correspond to were included in the study for that individual 
synaesthete.  
Procedure 
 
Figure 5.5. Trial sequence for Experiment 1B. Due to shrinking of stimuli for the 
diagram, it is not possible to see the digits within the crowding. 
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This task contained four numbers and their corresponding synaesthetic colour patch. 
There were 80 trials, each digit being paired with each colour patch four times (4 x 16) 
with an extra 16 repetition priming pairs, four for each colour digit (4 x 4). Participants 
viewed the priming digit stimuli for 2500ms, then the crowding only image for 100ms, 
and finally an individualised colour patch in congruent or incongruent pairings. 
Participants had to indicate the colour of the target through a 4AFC button press. 
Completion of this block took roughly 15 minutes. Figure 5 shows the trial procedure.   
Results 
The RT outliers were removed before analysis (+/- 2SD; 57 trials). To test whether the 
prime digit influenced RTs (in accurate trials) for colour target response, a paired 
samples t-test was conducted. This showed no significant difference between congruent 
and incongruent trials (t (19) = -0.25, p = .80).  A Bayes factor was calculated, and at 
0.57 suggests that no conclusions can be taken from the results (calculated from; mean 
difference = 2.19, SEM = 8.68 and SD = 16ms).   
 
Figure 5.6. Mean reaction times for synaesthetic colour congruent and incongruent 
trials. Error bars represent +/- 1SEM. 
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To compare the error rates, a related samples Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test was 
conducted and found no significant difference between errors in congruent (Median = 0, 
range 0-4) and incongruent (Median = 0, range = 0-4) trials (Z = 35.50, p = .41, r = 
.18). Colours were therefore not primed by the digits either in terms of RTs or errors.  
 The behavioural measures were compared to the CLaN and R-RSPA 
questionnaire responses. Similar relationships were found to those in Experiment 1A. 
There was a significant negative relationship between the CLaN longitudinal change 
and the reaction times, with longer reaction times being associated with lower 
longitudinal change. There was also a significant negative relationship between CLaN 
automaticity and attention and the congruent colour error rate, with increased error rates 
being associated with lower automaticity increased requirements of attention, though 
the correlation with the incongruent error rate was not significant. Similarly to 
Experiment 1A, there was no significant relationship between the behavioural measures 
and projector/associator values. Between the two tasks, a similar pattern of correlations 
was found suggesting that rather than only looking at projector/associator divisions in 
behavioural studies, the CLaN should be used more often as it captures other 
dimensions of GC synaesthesia phenomenology which relate to behavioural outcomes. 
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Table 5.2. Spearman’s Rho correlations between colour priming reaction times (ms) 
and error (number of) rates and the CLaN and R-RSPA for synaesthetes.  
 Colour 
Congruent RT 
Colour 
Incongruent 
RT 
Colour 
Congruent 
Error 
Colour 
Incongruent 
Error 
CLaN Localisation (N = 19) -.29 -.32 -.14 .00 
CLaN Automaticity/ Attention 
(N = 19) 
-.09 -.19 -.82 *** -.14 
CLaN Deliberate Use (N = 19) .21 .15 -.45 .08 
CLaN Longitudinal Change (N 
= 19) 
-.49 * -.47 * .22 .04 
R-RSPA Projector (N = 19) -.01 -.02 -.32 .08 
R-RSPA Associator (N = 19) .22 .24 .23 -.16 
p < .05 *, p < .01 **, p < .001 *** 
5.3.3 Experiment 1C 
This experiment presented digits under GCC conditions and measured participant’s 
awareness of the digit (synaesthetes and controls) and colour phenomenology 
(synaesthetes only). 
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Procedure 
  
Figure 5.7. Trial sequence for Experiment 1C. Due to shrinking of stimuli for the 
diagram, it is not possible to see the digits within the crowding.  
 
Next we tested whether participants could actually detect what digit was being 
presented peripherally and if so, for synaesthetes, what associated colour experiences 
they had. In the digit detection task, there were 40 trials separated into two blocks of 20 
trials (10 of the control participants only completed one block). The same crowded 
images as in the Digit Priming task (Experiment 1A) were used, however only four 
were in each block (1, 4, 6 and 9; 2, 3, 7 and 8). The digit prime image was presented 
for 2500ms followed by the crowding only version of the prime for 100ms in line with 
the priming tasks; however, after that a question mark was presented (see Figure 5.7). 
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The participant had to indicate which digit had been present in the crowding, after 
which the word ‘confidence?’ appeared until they stated how confident they were in 
their answer. For these responses, 4AFC button presses were used to choose their 
confidence rating, the options were 25%, 50%, 75% or 100%. It was pointed out to 
participants that 25% represented chance. Participants were encouraged to try their 
hardest and use any inkling to guide their decision. After each trial, synaesthetes were 
also asked to rate verbally on an eleven-point Likert scale; the vividness of any colour 
experience (0 = no colour, 10 = extremely vivid); what colour they experienced if they 
gave a rating of one or higher for vividness. Each block lasted roughly five minutes for 
controls and eight for synaesthetes. 
Results 
Low objective accuracy would demonstrate that any effects (if RT differences had been 
measured) were due to preconscious grapheme and colour binding. To test this, a two 
(confidence; low (25 %) and higher (> 25 %)) by two (group; synaesthete or control) 
mixed ANOVA was conducted on the percentage accuracy of responses. One 
synaesthete never gave a confidence response greater than 25% and therefore was not 
included in this analysis. The main effect of confidence was significant (F (1, 39) = 
10.00, p = .01) with higher levels of accuracy for higher confidence compared to low 
confidence trials. The main effect of group was not significant (F (1, 39) = 0.01, p = 
.98) with synaesthete and control participants having similar levels of accuracy, and the 
interaction was also not significant (F (1, 39) = 2.99, p = .09). Figure 5.8 shows this 
comparison. Synaesthetes and controls were therefore comparable in their responses: 
one group was not more accurate or confident than the other. Differences in behaviour 
during Experiment 1A were therefore not driven by controls being more aware of the 
digits than the synaesthetes. 
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Figure 5.8. Mean accuracy for low confidence and higher confidence trials for 
synaesthete and control participants. Error bars represent +/- 1SEM. 
 
The rest of the analysis on Experiment 1C is on synaesthetes only. If colour 
occurs from early visual processes, then if colour is experienced it could be expected to 
improve detection accuracy, as it would give an alternative identification method other 
than digit detection. Alternatively, it colour is due to attention driven mechanisms then 
it could be assumed that in trials where colour is experienced, the grapheme has already 
been detected and identified leading to the colour perception, and these trials should be 
more accurate than trials where no colour is experienced. Both mechanisms expect a 
relationship between colour and accuracy. To test whether there were differences in 
accuracy driven by colours experienced, a related samples Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test 
compared accuracy for trials in which the participant reported no colour (Median = 
0.32, range = 0.00-0.50), compared to trials in which colour was reported (Median = 
0.34, range = 0.00-0.68).  There was no difference in accuracy between the trials (Z = 
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71.00, p = .53, r = .16) for the 16 synaesthetes who experienced colours for some (but 
not all) trials. Therefore, colours don’t appear to be linked to accurate recognition of the 
grapheme. 
 Next, the relationship between colour and confidence was analysed, by 
conducting a related samples Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test which found a significant 
difference (Z = 120.00, p = .01, r = .67) between the confidence rating, with higher 
confidence levels reported for trials in which a colour was experienced (Median = 
52.08, range = 25.83-60.42) than those where no colour was experienced (Median = 
31.39, range = 25.00-100.00). 
 Therefore, experiencing colour increased the confidence that a synaesthete had 
in their response, but didn’t improve their accuracy or metacognition. As we expected 
colours to improve accuracy, which was not found, were the colours the synaesthetes 
actually related to the primed digit? Any colour which had been experienced had been 
noted at the end of each trial, and this was then compared to the colours which had been 
recorded using the Synaesthesia Battery. We compared the colours for the digit which 
the synaesthete had chosen for the primed digit presented in the crowded display, and 
the colour for the digit which the synaesthete had selected in their digit choice response. 
The coding was completed by the experimenter. A very liberal coding scheme was used, 
where a match was recorded if it was similar in general colour (so orange would be 
considered a match to red) or in luminance (navy blue would be a match for black). The 
main reason for this is the potential for language and RGB value discrepancies. The 
colour had been ‘named’ by the researcher when recording what colour was associated 
by that synaesthete for each digit when viewing the synaesthete colour palette on the 
Synaesthesia Battery, and this was compared to a named colour given by the 
synaesthete at the end of a trial. The lenient colour coding scheme allowed for this 
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discrepancy. Related samples Wilcoxon Signed Rank tests were conducted to compare 
the number of trials in which there was; a match between the prime and reported colour; 
a match between the chosen digit and reported colour; no colour match. The 
significance level considered to demonstrate a significant difference was reduced to 
adjust for the multiple comparisons, to p < .02 being considered as significant (the 
general significance value of .05 divided by the number of comparisons; .05 / 3 = .016). 
There was a significant difference between the number of trials in which there was a 
prime match and choice match (Z = 105.00, p = .001, r = .80), between a prime match 
and no match (Z = 6.00, p = .01, r = 074) and between choice match and no match (Z = 
4.00, p = .001, r = .83). The colour was more likely to match the colour for the digit 
they chose, rather than the primed digit, as seen in Figure 5.9. Although there were far 
fewer colours reported which didn’t match either the prime or the response, it is 
interesting that colours were experienced at times which bore no relation to either the 
primed or chosen digit. 
 
Figure 5.9. Median number of colour matches for the prime digit, chosen digit or 
neither. Error bars represent the interquartile range. 
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The relationship between the accuracy, confidence and colours experienced were 
compared to the CLaN and R-RSPA values. This would inform us whether particular 
types of synaesthetic phenomenology increase accuracy or confidence in detection. The 
associator R-RSPA measure was significantly correlated with all of the colour 
experiences during the experiment, this was a negative relationship with higher numbers 
of colours or vividness of colours being related to lower associator values. The projector 
dimension of the R-RSPA was significantly positively related to the vividness of colour 
perceived, with greater vividness being associated with higher projector values. CLaN 
deliberate use was significantly positively related to vividness, number of colours 
overall, and choice match so that more colour experience was associated with higher 
deliberate use of synaesthetic colour in everyday life by the synaesthete. CLaN 
automaticity and attention was significantly correlated with prime and choice match, 
with higher match numbers being associated with higher automaticity. When 
considering automaticity and attention with the significantly higher number of choice 
matches compared to prime matches for colours, it appears that the colours may be 
experienced automatically, but after the participant thought of the number rather than 
before. It is interesting that the confidence levels were higher for trials in which a colour 
was experienced considering that it matched the chosen digit rather than prime digit 
more often.  
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Table 5.3. Spearman’s Rho correlations between accuracy, confidence, vividness and 
number of colours for synaesthete participants and the CLaN and R-RSPA measures. 
 Accuracy 
(average 
all trials) 
Confidence 
(% 
average 
for all 
trials) 
Vividness 
(average for 
all trials, 
range; 0-10) 
Number 
colours 
(range; 0 
– 40) 
Number 
Prime 
Match 
(number 
of) 
Number 
Choice 
Match 
(number 
of) 
CLaN Localisation  .11 .15 .24 .31 .16 .23 
CLaN 
Automaticity/ 
Attention  
-.23 .16 .33 .38 .51 * .50 * 
CLaN Deliberate 
Use  
-.15 .17 .61 ** .59 ** .49 .50 * 
CLaN 
Longitudinal 
Change  
.11 -.01 .04 .25 .03 -.00 
R-RSPA Projector  -.01 .20 .48 * .40 .21 .31 
R-RSPA 
Associator  
-.01 -.31 -.61 ** -.65 ** -.53 * -.56 * 
p < .05 *, p < .01 **, p < .001 *** 
5.4 EXPERIMENT 2 
CFS allows two images to be presented simultaneously, a dynamic high contrast 
Mondrian display and a static image. Only the dynamic Mondrian display is consciously 
perceived initially then the static image ‘breaks through’ into conscious awareness 
(Tsuchiya & Koch, 2005). By measuring the time to breakthrough, influences of the 
preconsciously viewed image on conscious detection can be investigated. Here we shall 
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be asking whether congruency of grapheme (or word) and font colour influences time 
until break through. 
Participants 
In total, 24 synaesthetic (aged 18-56, M = 30.83, SD = 10.64, 17 female) and 24 control 
participants (aged 19-44, M = 25.33, SD = 5.61, 17 female) took part. In Experiment 
2A, there were 21 synaesthetic participants and 21 control participants. For Experiment 
2B there were 19 synaesthetic participants and 19 control participants. Experiment 2C 
was completed by 22 non-synaesthetic participants, and no synaesthetes. Only 16 of the 
synaesthetes took part in both Experiments 2A and 2B, and 18 of the control 
participants took part in all of Experiments 2A, 2B and 2C. Experiment order was 
counterbalanced. 
Seventeen of the synaesthetes (who took part in any of 2A or 2B) had taken part 
in the Experiments 1A, 1B and 1C. Ten of the control participants (who took part in any 
of 2A, 2B or 2C) had taken part in Experiments 1A and 1C. This discrepancy is because 
of limitations in synaesthetes’ colour palettes (for example if they had no greyscale 
concurrents then they were not suitable for Experiment 1A) and individual reaction to 
the CFS (if a participant failed to see the first 10 trials they were excluded from that 
study, but if they failed to consciously see a grapheme in one experiment, it did not 
mean they were not capable in another).  
5.4.1 Experiment 2A 
This experiment was designed to test whether the colourfulness of the concurrent 
(whether it was colourful or greyscale) influenced the time it took for GC synaesthetes 
to consciously perceive the grapheme. Colour aids in breakthrough (Hong & Blake, 
2009); therefore, if a grapheme is binding with its concurrent preconsciously, it would 
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be expected to reduce time to break through if the concurrent is bright and colourful 
rather than greyscale. Control participants completed this task with graphemes either in 
black or the colours for the colourful graphemes.   
Stimuli 
In the synaesthete version, a grey scale dynamic Mondrian display was used as the 
suppressing stimulus. The Mondrian patterns consisted of 500 greyscale blocks 
(maximum height or width of individual blocks being 80 pixels) randomly positioned 
(overlapping) within the 300 by 300 pixel square which changed at a rate of 10 Hz. The 
static image was a grey square on which a grapheme was presented in Arial with 100 
font size. The graphemes were black and took 80 screens to reach full black (10 screens 
per second). The position of the Mondrian and stimulus images were dependent on 
calibration for each participant so that the images “fused” to form the perception of one 
square image. Graphemes were chosen for each synaesthete individually, depending on 
their responses to the Synaesthesia Battery (Eagleman et al., 2007). Figure 5.10 shows 
the colour palette for the digits 0-9 and alphabet. As can be seen, not all the graphemes 
evoked a colour, and some had grey scale concurrents which allowed for the experiment 
to be tailored for each individual synaesthete. Three graphemes which had a grey scale 
concurrent (the colour they evoked was black/ white/ grey) were chosen, if not enough 
were available then graphemes which evoked no colour were also used. Three 
graphemes which evoked a ‘colourful’ concurrent were also chosen, that is graphemes 
which triggered a more canonical colour, such as red, purple or turquoise. In the control 
version of this experiment, the participants viewed the graphemes in black font, or in 
the actual RGB value colours of the ‘colourful’ graphemes.  
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For control participants the suppressing Mondrian display was coloured and the 
graphemes were either black or in the colour of the ‘colourful’ graphemes experienced 
by their matched synaesthete (using RGB values). As the static image contained colour, 
it did not fade in view as it was not possible to fade in colour. A 5 pixel wide fixation 
dot was always present on each image to help keep images fused. 
There were 96 trials (48 greyscale, 48 colourful), with all graphemes being 
presented in black font for the synaesthetes. The control participants viewed 48 in black 
and 48 in the colours of the colourful concurrents.  
 
Figure 5.10. Example colour palette for a synaesthete, and how the graphemes were 
chosen for Experiments 2A and 2B of the CFS studies. 
 
159 
 
Procedure 
 
Figure 5.11. Experiment 2A set up and trial sequence. 
 
Participants sat 65 cm from a 21” CRT monitor (1280 by 1024 screen resolution, 60 Hz 
refresh rate), and viewed the images through a mirror stereoscope which allowed each 
eye to view a separate image on the monitor. The dominant eye viewed the grey 
dynamic Mondrian display, and the other eye viewed the static image. There was a 
2000ms delay after onset of CFS before the stimulus was presented. Once the mirrors 
had been calibrated so that the two images fused, a practice trial was completed where 
the participant had to state the grapheme present on the monitor once they saw it. This 
triggered the microphone which recorded the time it took until ‘break through’ through 
a Creative E-MU 0202 sound card. The participant completed one or two practice trials 
to make sure they knew how to respond into the microphone. The experimenter 
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recorded the accuracy of responses and any errors with triggering of the microphone. 
The experiment set up and trial sequence can be seen in Figure 5.11.  
Results 
In order to test whether synaesthetic colours aid breakthrough into consciousness, RTs 
for correct trials were analysed. The excluded trials were either incorrect (N = 55), 
delayed (N = 49) time out (N = 34) or outlying by +/- 2SD (N = 174). First the 
synaesthete data was analysed: a related samples Wilcoxon Signed Rank Tests was 
conducted to compare RTs for grey scale or colourful concurrent graphemes, which was 
not significant (Z = 97.00, p = .52, r = .14), as can be seen in Figure 5.12. Comparison 
of error rates between grey scale (Median = 0.00, range = 0.00-5.00) and colour 
(Median = 0.00, range = 0.00-2.00) the conditions was also not significant (Z = 16.00, p 
= .24, r = .26). Therefore, the synaesthetic colours did not aid breakthrough into 
consciousness. As there isn’t currently a non-parametric Bayes factor analysis, this 
cannot be calculated. 
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Figure 5.12. Median reaction times for breakthrough for greyscale or colourful 
graphemes, in both synaesthetes and controls. Error bars represent the interquartile 
range. 
 
 The control data was compared separately as the graphemes were not presented 
in exactly the same manner (they were not faded into view). A related samples 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Tests was conducted to compare RTs for black or coloured 
graphemes, finding no significant difference (Z = 104.00, p = .69, r = .09) as can be 
seen in Figure 5.12. However, when comparing the error rates between black and 
coloured graphemes, significantly more errors were made for the coloured (Median = 
0.00, range = 0.00-19.00) compared to black (Median = 0.00, range = 0.00-5.00) 
graphemes (Z = 1.00, p = .04, r = .44).  
Next, to determine whether any phenomenological traits were related to 
performance on this task, correlations were calculated between responses of the 
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synaesthete participants during Experiment 2A and the questionnaire (R-RSPA and 
CLaN) values and can be seen in Table 5.4. There were no significant correlations with 
the projector/ associator dimensions, and only the deliberate use dimension of the CLaN 
was significantly associated with the greyscale error rate. The relationship was negative, 
with higher greyscale error rates being associated with lower levels of deliberate use. 
Table 5.4. Spearman’s Rho correlations between reaction times (ms) and error rates 
(number of) with the CLaN and R-RSPA questionnaires. 
 Grey RT Colour 
RT 
Grey Error Colour 
Error 
CLaN Localisation (N = 15) -.31 -.22 -.41 -.11 
CLaN Automaticity/ Attention 
(N = 15) 
-.13 -.24 -.05 -.07 
CLaN Deliberate Use (N = 15) -.39 -.35 -.55 * -.12 
CLaN Longitudinal Change (N 
= 15) 
-.38 -.19 -.40 -.18 
R-RSPA Projector (N = 20) -.23 -.33 -.02 .08 
R-RSPA Associator (N = 20) .38 .29 .14 .17 
p < .05 *, p < .01 **, p < .001 *** 
5.4.2 Experiment 2B 
As a grapheme presented in black font suppressed from conscious awareness may not 
bind strongly enough with its corresponding grapheme to influence behaviour, we 
reasoned that presenting a grapheme in its concurrent colour may strengthen the binding 
of grapheme and colour, and therefore decrease breakthrough times in comparison to 
incongruent grapheme and colour pairings. In Experiment 2B, graphemes which evoked 
the colours red, green, blue and yellow were presented in their congruent or opponent 
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incongruent colour. Two grammatical symbols were also presented in red/ green or 
blue/ yellow. This way, the effect of colour congruency on breakthrough could be 
investigated. 
Stimuli 
A dynamic coloured Mondrian display (300 by 300 pixels, 100 Hz made of 500 
overlapping coloured blocks, each with a maximum height or width of 80 pixels) was 
presented to the dominant eye. The static image was a coloured grapheme presented on 
a grey square (300 by 300 pixel square size, Arial size 100 font). A 5 pixel wide fixation 
dot was always present on each image to help keep images fused. Graphemes were 
chosen from the Synaesthesia Battery results, with one grapheme being chosen which 
most closely evoked each of the colours red, green, blue and yellow. These graphemes 
were either presented in the correct colour (congruent, using the Synaesthesia Battery 
RGB values) or the opponent wrong colour (incongruent). Opponent pairings were used 
to maximise any potential interference (Nikolić et al., 2007). Two grammatical symbols 
which had no colour association were also chosen for each synaesthete and presented in 
red/green or blue/yellow. Figure 5.10 demonstrates how graphemes were selected for 
one synaesthete. There were three conditions; congruent colour (32 trials), opponent 
colour (32 trials) and neutral graphemes in opponent colour pairings (32 trials). Exact 
RGB values taken from Synaesthesia Battery (Eagleman et al., 2007) results. For each 
synaesthete, one control participant completed the same experiment as a control 
measure.  
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Procedure 
 
Figure 5.13. Mirror set up and trial sequence for Experiment 2B.  
 
The set up was the same as in Experiment 2A, again the dependent measure was voice 
onset RT (ms) for the participant naming the grapheme or grammatical symbol (‘break 
through’). Voice onset was used rather than key response to avoid the potential 
confound of priming between colours and response keys. There was 2s of CFS only 
(presentation of the Mondrian display) before the static stimulus was presented, Figure 
5.13 shows the experiment set up. It was predicted that congruent pairings would break 
through faster than incongruent pairings. 
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Results 
In order to compare time to break through, the incorrect (N = 21), delayed (N = 69) time 
out (N = 104) and outlying by +/- 2SD (N = 164) trial RTs were removed. To test 
whether synaesthetes bind the grapheme and colour prior to awareness, the synaesthete 
group was compared to the control group. Independent samples Mann- Whitney U tests 
found no difference between the synaesthete and control group RTs for congruent (U = 
117.00, p = .07, r = .30), incongruent (U = 120.00, p = .08, r = .29) or neutral (U = 
137.00, p = .21, r = .21) trials, as can be seen in Figure 5.14. When comparing the 
synaesthete only data, a related samples Wilcoxon Signed Rank Tests was conducted to 
compare RTs for congruent and incongruent graphemes which was not significant (Z = 
93.00, p = .94, r = .02). Therefore, the synaesthetic colours did not aid break through 
into consciousness.  
 
Figure 5.14. Median reaction times for congruent, incongruent and neutral trials for 
synaesthete and control participants. Error bars represent the interquartile range. 
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The same set of analyses was conducted to compare the error rates of 
synaesthete and control participants, with independent samples Mann- Whitney U tests 
finding no difference between groups for congruent (U = 218.50, p = .27, r = .25), 
incongruent (U = 171.00, p = .80, r = .09) or neutral (U = 202.50, p = .53, r = .15) trials, 
as can be seen in Figure 5.14. A related samples Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test was 
conducted on the synaesthete data only, comparing error rates for congruent and 
incongruent trials. This was not significant (Z = 5.00, p = 1.00, r = .00) (Median = 0.00, 
range = 0.00-1.00 for both all groups and conditions other than control neutral which is 
Median = 0.00, range = 0.00-2.00).  
The RTs and error rates were compared against the CLaN and R-RSPA as 
variability in phenomenology may have been masking differences in RTs. However, 
none of the behavioural measures were significantly correlated with the questionnaires, 
as can be seen in Table 5.5. This further confirms that the grapheme and colour didn’t 
bind preconsciously. 
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Table 5.5. Spearman’s Rho correlations between the median reaction times (ms) and 
error rates of the behavioural data, and the CLaN and R-RSPA questionnaires. 
p < .05 *, p < .01 **, p < .001 *** 
5.5.3 Experiment 2C. 
We also conducted a more traditional style Stroop task under CFS. This was to test if 
colour words and their font colours bind under CFS. If a word can bind with its colour, 
 Congruent 
RT 
Incongruent 
RT 
Neutral 
RT 
Congruent 
Error 
Incongruent 
Error 
Neutral 
Error 
CLaN 
Localisation 
(N = 13) 
.07 .14 .12 -.39 .37 -.11 
CLaN 
Automaticity/ 
Attention (N = 
13) 
.16 .20 .04 -.39 .00 -.37 
CLaN 
Deliberate Use 
(N = 13) 
-.05 -.00 .19 -.47 .03 -.06 
CLaN 
Longitudinal 
Change (N = 
13) 
-.21 -.27 -.42 .36 -.18 .03 
R-RSPA 
Projector (N = 
18) 
-.02 .11 -.02 -.07 .31 -.01 
R-RSPA 
Associator (N 
= 18) 
-.03 -.13 -.02 .17 -.04 .07 
168 
 
we would know that a grapheme can be processed sufficiently to allow for grapheme-
colour binding if such a process did indeed occur preconsciously in GC synaesthetes. It 
was predicted that congruent colour and word pairings would breakthrough into 
conscious awareness faster than incongruent pairs. 
Stimuli 
A colour dynamic Mondrian display was presented to the dominant eye, as in 
Experiment 2B. Static stimuli were presented on the grey square as in Experiments 2A 
and 2B. The words red, green, blue and yellow were presented in the correct colour, or 
opponent colour. Two neutral words were also presented (crayon and paint) which were 
presented in red and green, or blue and yellow. Words were presented in Arial size 100 
font. In each trial, the suppressing CFS display was shown alone for 2000ms before the 
static stimuli were presented. There were three conditions; congruent colour (32 trials), 
opponent colour (32 trials) and neutral words in opponent colour pairings (32 trials). 
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Procedure 
 
Figure 5.15. Experiment 2C CFS set up. 
 
The procedure was the same as experiments 2A and 2B except that participants had to 
say the colour of the font when they consciously saw the word, triggering the 
microphone for voice onset RT (ms) to be recorded. The procedure can be seen in 
Figure 5.15. 
Results 
RTs were calculated for correct trials, with the RTs for incorrect (N = 26), delayed (N = 
85) time out (N = 33) and outlying by +/- 2SD (N = 75) trials being removed). To 
determine whether congruency of colour and word aided in breakthrough of the word, 
related samples Wilcoxon Signed Rank Tests were conducted. As three comparisons 
were conducted, the significance level accepted as representing significance was 
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adjusted accordingly (.05/3 = .016). There was a significant difference between RTs for 
congruent and incongruent trials, with congruent trials breaking through faster (Z = 
210.00, p = .01, r = .58); between congruent and neutral trials, with neutral trials 
breaking through faster (Z = 197.00, p = .02, r = .49); and between neutral and 
incongruent with neutral breaking through faster (Z = 25.00, p = .001, r = .70). These 
differences can all be seen in Figure 5.16. The 162ms difference between congruent and 
incongruent RTs is substantial, and shows that colour words and font colours bind pre 
consciously to influence conscious detection. 
 
Figure 5.16. Median reaction times for congruent, incongruent and neutral words. Error 
bars represent the interquartile range. 
 
 Next, error rates were compared, also using related samples Wilcoxon Signed 
Rank Tests and an adjusted significance level (p = .016). There was a significant 
difference between congruent (Median = 0.00, range = 0.00-1.00) and incongruent 
(Median = 1.00, range = 0.00-4.00) trial error rates, with more errors being made for 
incongruent trials (Z = 91.00, p = .001, r = .70) and between incongruent and neutral 
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(Median = 0.00, range = 0.00-1.00) trials, with more errors being made for incongruent 
trials (Z = 11.00, p = .01, r = .58). The difference between congruent and neutral error 
rates wasn’t significant (Z = 6.00, p = .08, r = .37). Therefore, incongruency of font 
colour and word caused more errors and longer breakthrough RTs showing that the font 
colour and word bound preconsciously. 
5.6 Discussion 
This study aimed to investigate the extent to which subliminally viewed graphemes bind 
with their concurrent colour. The first set of experiments assessed whether a digit 
presented using GCC would prime RTs or error rates. We showed that the priming digit 
influenced error rates for identification of subsequent target graphemes, with more 
errors being made for repetition incongruent compared to congruent trials (Experiment 
1A). However, when the target was a colour patch there was no difference in error rates 
between congruent and incongruent trials for the GC synaesthetes (Experiment 1B). 
This suggests that the digits didn’t bind with their concurrent colours. For those 
synaesthetes who experienced colours during the digit detection task, this didn’t 
improve accuracy even though it improved response confidence (Experiment 1C). 
Furthermore, when a colour was experienced for the peripherally presented digit, it was 
likely to match the digit that they reported having seen during that trial, rather than the 
digit that was actually presented. Overall, there was no evidence of grapheme and 
colour binding for the GCC presented digits. 
Next, we asked whether a grapheme displayed unconsciously using CFS would 
influence the time it took to break through into conscious awareness. When comparing 
detection of graphemes with a colourful or greyscale concurrent (Experiment 2A), or 
when comparing graphemes presented in their congruent or incongruent colour 
(Experiment 2B), no differences in time to breakthrough or error rates were evident. 
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Finally, we showed colour words presented in the congruent font colour broke through 
into conscious awareness faster and had fewer errors than colour words with 
incongruent font colour (Experiment 2C).  This is the first time a classic Stroop task has 
been conducted using CFS. Together, these results show that although the CFS stimuli 
could be processed enough to influence break through time for colour words, there was 
no evidence of grapheme and colour binding occurring under CFS for the GC 
synaesthetes. 
These findings support previous studies of GC synaesthesia and consciousness as 
there was no behavioural evidence in the form of accuracy or RTs to indicate the 
grapheme binds with its concurrent colour when it is viewed without conscious 
awareness (Mattingley et al., 2001; Rich & Mattingley, 2010). As the graphemes in the 
GCC experiments were viewed peripherally with the participant asked to focus on the 
central fixation cross, this also supports research showing that attention is required for 
the grapheme and colour to bind (Rich & Mattingley, 2010; Sagiv et al., 2006). In the 
CFS studies participants viewed the grapheme in foveal vision but without conscious 
awareness and still the grapheme and colour didn’t bind, providing additional support 
that conscious awareness is required for synaesthetic binding. Unlike previous studies, 
the stimuli in this series of experiments were displayed for seconds, much longer than 
the milliseconds durations of the masking tasks. This allowed extra stimulus viewing 
time for possible triggering of the concurrent colour, and binding of the colour with the 
grapheme. Insufficient stimulus exposure therefore can’t account for the lack of 
behavioural influence from grapheme manipulations. 
Colours were experienced by some synaesthetes even when the priming digit was 
not detected, which supported previous peripheral crowding research (Ward et al., 
2007). Even more surprisingly, some colours didn’t match any of the digit choices for 
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that trial. Some synaesthetes spontaneously stated during the digit detection task that 
they were confused because the colour didn’t match any of the digit choice options. 
Furthermore, they gave these colours even though it was stated very clearly to 
synaesthetes before the start of Experiment 1C that it didn’t matter whether they 
experienced any colours or not, either way it was informative to us. This was to make 
sure synaesthetes didn’t feel like they were failing at the task if they didn’t experience 
colours for the GCC digits. This corresponds to research showing synaesthetic 
concurrents don’t influence contrast and chromatic adaptation (processed by early visual 
mechanisms) (Hong & Blake, 2008). As early visual feature detection didn’t trigger 
synaesthetic concurrents using either GCC or CFS but colours were experienced when 
no grapheme was detected this study supports the role of attention which has been 
found necessary for GC synaesthesia generation by a host of research (Mattingley et al., 
2006;  Mattingley, 2009; Sagiv, Heer, & Robertson, 2006; Ward et al., 2010). 
Furthermore, this suggests that synaesthetic colour can be internally generated without 
the need for an external inducing grapheme. The colour experiences for chosen digits 
(rather than the actually primed digits) in Experiment 1C were, however, negatively 
related to the associator measure of the R-RSPA and not correlated with the projector 
measure. Previous research of mentally generated graphemes has found inconsistent 
priming results suggesting variability between the phenomenology and behaviour 
relationship of GC synaesthetes when imagining graphemes (Spiller & Jansari, 2008). 
More investigation of how colours are triggered without processing of an external 
stimulus may explain what mechanism underlie internally generated synaesthetic colour 
experience.  
Dimensions of the CLaN correlated with behavioural measures in Experiments 1A 
and 1B. Automaticity and attention correlated negatively with error rates; therefore, 
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greater errors were associated with synaesthetes who experienced lower levels of 
automaticity and increased attentional requirements for the creation of their synaesthetic 
concurrent. However, greater error rates, lower levels of automaticity, and increased 
attentional requirements may all be due to individual differences in general 
attentiveness rather than in synaesthetic phenomenology. Longitudinal change 
correlated negatively with RTs; therefore, longer RTs were associated with synaesthetes 
who have experienced little change in the strength of their colour concurrents (either 
becoming stronger or weaker) over time. The relationship between projector and 
associator dimensions was less clear, with generally low correlations against 
behavioural measures. Considering that colour locus has been linked to behaviour 
differences in Stroop tasks previously (Dixon et al., 2004) it is unclear why this 
relationship is not consistent. Furthermore, it suggests that colour locus should not be 
the primary synaesthete grouping strategy when studying variability within GC 
synaesthetes.  This demonstrates the need to explore phenomenology more fully when 
contrasting GC synaesthesia sub-groups.  
The lack of benefit for consciously detecting the grapheme when it was coloured 
compared to black whilst under CFS for control participants (Experiment 2A) showed 
that the colour didn’t aid breakthrough. As colour breaks through more readily than 
other visual properties (Hong & Blake, 2009) it was predicted that the coloured 
graphemes would be detected faster. Our task however was to name the grapheme, not 
the colour. Although colour isn’t subject to suppression as fully as other visual 
properties of a static visual stimulus, the colour isn’t fixed (Hong & Blake, 2009), so the 
colour may have been perceived before the grapheme had been detected and reported. 
This finding shouldn’t however impact on the synaesthete findings, as we did find faster 
break through in the Stroop study (Experiment 2C) for congruent trials. 
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Although graphemes didn’t bind with their concurrent colour under CFS, the colour 
words did. This shows that semantic information is accessible despite suppression, 
supporting previous research of semantic processing under CFS (Costello, Jiang, 
Baartman, McGlennen, & He, 2009; Yang & Yeh, 2011). This also supports a variety of 
research paradigms that have shown congruency of suppressed stimuli influences 
breakthrough time (Alsius & Munhall, 2013; Salomon & Lim, 2013; Zhou, Jiang, He, & 
Chen, 2010; for a review see Gayet, Van der Stigchel, & Paffen, 2014).  
The Stroop CFS paradigm could be used to test preconscious binding of colour 
words and colours for synaesthetes with alien colour effect, where the colours 
experienced by colour words are not the actual colours they refer to (Gray et al., 2006). 
If RTs and error rates are similar to those of controls, then it would support the current 
study, showing that the colour word and associated colour don’t bind without conscious 
awareness for synaesthetes. If interference is measured in relation to their synaesthetic 
concurrent rather than the font colour, then pre conscious word and colour binding 
would be evident.  
The detection of images in Experiment 1C was not at chance levels. This suggests 
that in some trials, participants may have been aware of what digit was being presented 
in the periphery. Although this doesn’t detract from the tendency for colours 
experienced by synaesthetes to match the digit they thought they saw, rather than the 
one actually presented, the conscious detection of graphemes could be controlled more 
rigidly by using a staircase design. By measuring the minimum size of digit which can 
be consciously seen within the crowding and setting the test stimulus to just below this, 
the conscious detection of digits could be reduced to chance levels.   
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Overall, this study showed that even with long viewing times, subliminally viewed 
graphemes don’t bind with their concurrent colours for GC synaesthetes. Even so, 
colours were still experienced and critically often didn’t match their concurrent for the 
primed grapheme, suggesting a strong role of top-down systems for the generation of 
the colour. 
FINAL CONCLUSIONS OF THE THESIS 
 
This thesis sought to investigate the links between conscious phenomenology and 
behavioural advantages associated in synaesthesia. This was completed from two 
complementary approaches. First, hypnosis was used to create synaesthesia-like 
phenomenology in high susceptible participants. From Chapters 2 and 3 it was shown 
that the phenomenology of synaesthesia is not restricted to synaesthetes, high 
susceptible participants can have similar conscious experiences of percepts linked to 
particular concurrents. Chapter 2 showed that GC synaesthesia experiences could be 
evoked, although the suggestion did not work for all participants. The reported 
vividness and disparity of colour experienced was however remarkably similar to that of 
developmental synaesthetes. Chapter 3 showed that an MS synaesthesia-like experience 
could be triggered however the experience of sound was not confined to the high 
susceptible participants, people also experienced it from mental imagery instruction. 
Furthermore, many participants heard beeps without any instruction in the baseline 
measure, suggesting that non-MS synaesthetes deliberately pair visual flashes and beeps 
as a task strategy. Together, this shows that the phenomenology of synaesthesia is not 
restricted to developmental synaesthetes (although the pairing of beeps and visual 
images in non-MS synaesthetes may be a deliberate strategy, rather than an automatic 
association). In Chapter 2, more vivid colours and a greater degree of digits appeared as 
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coloured in accurate trials where the shape had been identified within the array. This 
was suggested to be due to the ability to use mental imagery more efficiently. Once the 
shape has been identified it is easier to then mentally project the colours onto the digit 
array. This supports previous literature suggesting a link between synaesthesia and 
mental imagery (Barnett & Newell, 2008; Price, 2009; Spiller & Jansari, 2008; Spiller 
et al., 2015). 
 In Chapters 2 and 3, I also investigated whether hypnotic synaesthesia causes 
behavioural advantages similar to developmental synaesthetes. The phenomenology of 
synaesthesia wasn’t associated with task improvement. This supports theories of 
hypnosis that propose that hypnosis can’t create any new special abilities in participants 
that they could not achieve without the use of hypnosis, such as the cold control theory 
(Dienes & Perner, 2007). However, the lack of behavioural improvement may be due to 
the practice that developmental synaesthetes have of experiencing the synaesthetic 
concurrent. Synaesthetes may be more practiced in integrating the grapheme and 
concurrent colour features (Sagiv & Robertson, 2005). Conscious visual experience, 
rather than being a direct representation of the external world, has suggested to be more 
of an active exploration of the world mediated by a set of rules based on how the being 
moves within the world (O’Regan & Noë, 2001). These rules (sensorimotor 
contingencies) are different depending on the sensory modality, for example the rules 
for vision would be different for those of audition, and practice is required to master 
understanding of these rules. This change towards viewing cognition as action (Engel, 
Maye, Kurthen, & König, 2013) could therefore account for the lack of behavioural 
improvement in the hypnotic synaesthetes in Chapters 2 and 3. Training synaesthesia 
studies have shown that changes in behaviour after training participants to link 
grapheme with colours which are similar to developmental synaesthetes (Bor, Rothen, 
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Schwartzman, Clayton, & Seth, 2014). As practice was required for the behavioural 
changes in the trained synaesthetes, and ‘cognition is action’ (O’Regan & Noë, 2001), 
this may account for the lack of behavioural advantage associated with the synaesthetic 
phenomenology seen in Chapters 2 and 3. This is because the hypnotic synaesthetes 
have not had practice in actively mastering their understanding of the synaesthetic 
concurrent.  
 In Chapter 4 the individual differences of GC phenomenology were researched 
by completing principle component analysis (PCA) of two existing questionnaires 
designed to categorise synaesthetes as either a projector or associator (Rouw & Scholte, 
2007; Skelton et al., 2009). After PCA two revised questionnaires were made, the R-
RSPA and R-ISEQ. As both these questionnaires had two factors corresponding to 
projector and associator, it was determined that these are separate dimensions of 
synaesthetic experience and should be treated as such in research. 
In Chapter 5 I researched whether a synaesthete has to be consciously aware of a 
grapheme for it to bind with its concurrent colour.  Developmental GC synaesthetes 
completed detection tasks for graphemes which were presented subliminally. Their 
performance showed that graphemes don’t bind with their associated concurrent pre-
consciously supporting previous literature (Mattingley et al., 2001; Sagiv et al., 2006). 
By presenting the graphemes (via CFS) for a long time in comparison to previous 
literature, I was able to show that it wasn’t short stimulus presentation times which 
accounts for the lack of grapheme-colour binding as measured using objective 
behavioural measures of accuracy and RT. I also supported the finding that even 
without conscious awareness of a grapheme, a synaesthete can still have a colour 
experience although this colour doesn’t necessarily match the concurrent colour for the 
presented grapheme (Ward et al., 2007). Therefore phenomenology of synaesthesia is 
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not limited to the perception of externally generated graphemes, they can also be 
internally generated. This further supports the link between mental imagery and 
synaesthesia (Simner, 2013) which was also evident in Chapter 2 although not this 
relationship was not as clear in Chapter 3.  
Finally, throughout this thesis large individual variations were measured. This 
was evident in the degree to which high susceptible participants experienced the 
grapheme-colour synaesthesia suggestion when viewing graphemes in Chapter 2. In 
Chapter 3 there was variability not only in the level that participants experienced the 
mental imagery or hypnotic hearing-motion suggestion, but also whether this was a 
spontaneous strategy they used at baseline varied. In Chapter 4 I showed that even the 
division of GC synaesthetes as projector or associator is not clear cut, with some 
synaesthetes having both types of experience in response to graphemes. Furthermore, in 
Chapter 5 there was large variation in the number of colours which GC synaesthetes 
experienced to subliminally presented graphemes and whether these matched the 
concurrent for the grapheme presented. Individual differences are therefore a very 
important aspect of both synaesthesia and hypnosis research. 
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